This Day in Goodlove History, January 1

This Day in Goodlove History, January 1

Jeff Goodlove email address: Jefferygoodlove@aol.com

Surnames associated with the name Goodlove have been spelled the following different ways; Cutliff, Cutloaf, Cutlofe, Cutloff, Cutlove, Cutlow, Godlib, Godlof, Godlop, Godlove, Goodfriend, Goodlove, Gotleb, Gotlib, Gotlibowicz, Gotlibs, Gotlieb, Gotlob, Gotlobe, Gotloeb, Gotthilf, Gottlieb, Gottliebova, Gottlob, Gottlober, Gottlow, Gutfrajnd, Gutleben, Gutlove

The Chronology of the Goodlove, Godlove, Gottlob, Gottlober, Gottlieb (Germany, Russia, Czech etc.), and Allied Families of Battaile, (France), Crawford (Scotland), Harrison (England), Jackson (Ireland), LeClere (France), Lefevre (France), McKinnon (Scotland), Plantagenets (England), Smith (England), Stephenson (England?), Vance (Ireland from Normandy), and Winch (England, traditionally Wales), including correspondence with George Rogers Clarke, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,and ancestors Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison.

The Goodlove Family History Website:

http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/users/g/o/o/Jeffery-Goodlove/index.html

The Goodlove/Godlove/Gottlieb families and their connection to the Cohenim/Surname project:

• New Address! http://www.familytreedna.com/public/goodlove/default.aspx

• • Books written about our unique DNA include:

• “Abraham’s Children, Race, Identity, and the DNA of the Chosen People” by Jon Entine.
•
• “ DNA & Tradition, The Genetic Link to the Ancient Hebrews” by Rabbi Yaakov Kleiman, 2004.

“Jacob’s Legacy, A Genetic View of Jewish History” by David B. Goldstein, 2008.

Anniversary: Nova Elder and Forris D. McKinnon 82, Nettie Godlove and John E. Preston 85

Birthday: Abraham l. Godlove 146, Sevilly Godlove 168

January 1, 45 B.C.: In the Julian reform of the Roman calendar on January 1, 45 BC, Caesar added two additional days to the end of December. But, because they fell between the Ides and the next Kalends, Caesar was confronted either with having the Saturnalia celebrated on the same "day" (i.e., the same number of days after the Ides) or on the same "date" (its position in the month relative to the following Kalends). He chose to leave the festival on the same day, even though this meant changing its date.

Macrobius says that the Saturnalia occurred on "the fourteenth before the Kalends of January" in the Republican calendar. In a month that then had only twenty-nine days, a.d.XIV.Kal.Jan. is December 17. This also was its "day" in the Julian calendar, with its thirty-one day month, although the "date" now is a.d.XVI.Kal.Jan., just as Caesar had intended in his reform of the calendar.

Feeney provides an intriguing example of the consequences of the new calendar in the person of Marc Antony, who was born in 83 BC on the day after the Ides of January (January 14). In the Republican calendar, January had twenty-nine days and Antony's birthday, since he was born after the Ides, was counted down to the next Kalends. That day was the seventeenth before the Kalends of February. In the Julian calendar, two days were added to January, which now had thirty-one. In 45 BC, celebrating his thirty-eighth birthday for the first time under the Julian calendar, Antony had to chose whether to recognize it on the same date (the seventeenth day before the Kalends), as he always had done, even though that date now was two days later (on the third day after the Ides), or on the same day (the day after the Ides). He chose to observe his birthday on the same day.

But this date did not exist in the calendar of the Republic. When Antony was born, there was no nineteenth day before the Kalends of February, since only seventeen days can be counted back. Nineteen days would be the day before the Ides of January, not the day after. Antony's birthday is the anniversary of the "day" he was born, but it is not the "date" of his birth simply because that day did not exist in the Julian calendar.

When Antony committed suicide in 30 BC, dying in Cleopatra's arms, his memory was damned by the Roman Senate (damnatio memoriae). He already had been declared a public enemy (Suetonius, Augustus, XVII.2) and his statues torn down when Octavian entered Alexandria (Plutarch, Antony, LXXXVI.5). The Senate also ordered that monuments to Antony be defaced or dismantled, his honors rescinded, his descendants forbidden to use the praenomen Marcus, and "the day on which he had been born accursed" (dies nefastus), a day unfit for public business (Dio, Roman History, LI.19.3; Plutarch, Cicero, XLIX.6).

And yet the greatest damnation was accidental. Not only was his natal day condemned but, with the reform of the Roman calendar by Julius Caesar, it no longer even existed. It was as if the man who had tried to save Caesar and later betrayed Rome never had been born.[1]

44 B.C.: Cleopatra, Egyptian queen

A painting of Antony and Cleopatra by Lawrence Alma-Tadema in 1885
CREDIT: Lawrence Alma-Tadema, 1885

Motherhood played a key role in the Egyptian queen's grip on power. Her romances and children with Julius Caesar and Mark Antony cemented her political influence in Rome and allowed her free reign to rule her own kingdom in Egypt. As a woman, Cleopatra needed a male consort to keep the throne; she found a convenient one in her son by Caesar, Caesarion. In 44 B.C., Cleopatra poisoned her current co-regent and younger brother, according to Stacy Schiff's "Cleopatra: A Life" (Little, Brown and Company, 2010). Three-year-old Caesarion became the official king of Egypt, with Cleopatra running the show.

She died at 39 after a 22-year-long reign, defeated along with Mark Antony by Caesar's legal heir, Octavian. After Cleopatra's death, Rome annexed Egypt. Caesarion was killed, but Cleopatra's three children by Mark Antony were spared. Her daughter, Cleopatra Selene, eventually became queen of what is now Algeria.[2]

A comet occurs in 44 B.C.. It is seen by the Romans as a divine sign that something significant is going to occur. It is a warning.[3]

December 25 and January 1, 418-427: John Cassian records in his "Collations" (X, 2 in P.L., XLIX, 820), written 418-427, that the Egyptian monasteries still observe the "ancient custom" of Christs birth; but on 29 Choiak (25 December) and 1 January.[4]

January 1, 630: Prophet Muhammad sets out toward Mecca with the army that will capture it bloodlessly. [5] The Quraysh violated the nonaggression treaty, and in January 630 Muhammad led a 10,000 –man army to Mecca. When the Muslims arrived, they found the Meccans dispirited, and the sity was surrendered without a fight. Muhammad treated the defeated Meccans with mercy, which was more than he could have expected had the outcome been reversed. One of his first actions, though, was to enter the Kaaba and destroy the hundreds of idols located within. From this pont forward the sacred building was to be dedicated to Allah alone. The destruction of the idols showed the people of Mecca how truly powerless their gods had been, and they were grateful for Muhammad’s leniency. Soon most of the Meccans had become Muslims.[6] At first Mohammed “had hoped to find is main supporters among the Jewish tribes” of Arabia. This can be seen in his early adoption of certain laws regarding fasting and facing Jerusalem during prayer. When the Jews refused to accept him as the final line of prophets that had included Abraham and Moses, he turned against the Jews “in a cruel war of extermination.” Mohammed would die two years after the conquest of Mecca but his legacy lives on to this very day.[7]

630 C.E.: Among the Turkic powers to emerge were the Khazars, who until 630 C.E. were part of the western Turkish Empire. (Appropriately enough, the name Khazar appears to derive from a Turkish work meaning “wandering.”) After that empire’s collapse, the Khazars established a Central Asian empire of their own along the Caspian Sea that converted to Judaism in the ninth century C.E. Although we do not know how much of the general population of Khazaria may have converted, correspondence between Khazaria and Jewish officials in Moorish Spain records Judaism as the state religion of Khazaria.[8]

7th and 8th centuries…Received: February 15, 2005

Address for correspondence: Ellen Coffman, Ellenlevy66@yahoo.com

Early on, the unique history of the Jews attracted DNA researchers who sought to solve the mystery of the origins of the Jewish people. Researchers had previously relied on linguistic, anthropological and archaeological evidence to try to address this question; genetic genealogical research has opened up a new area for researchers to explore.

One question the DNA studies sought to answer was whether the genetic ancestry of contemporary Jewish populations demonstrated, to any degree, their supposed descent from the ancient Israelites of the Middle East of three thousand years ago. Or rather, did the DNA evidence indicate that Jews were simply a people who came into being in Europe during the Diaspora years, being mainly comprised of those descended from European ancestors? Or, as some historical researchers suggested, did the DNA of Jews mainly reflect ancestry from the Khazars, an ancient tribal people with roots in both Central Asia and Russia who converted to Judaism in the 8th century?

This paper represents a new examination and reassessment of the Jewish DNA studies to date, presenting possible alternative explanations for the origins and distribution of certain genetic markers among Jewish populations, and in particular, among the group of Jews known as “Ashkenazim.”

Recent genetic research has greatly expanded our understanding of the probable origins and distinct geographic patterns of certain groups of people, including Jews. This recent research has superceded some of the earlier studies on Jewish DNA, allowing a reassessment of the theories of Jewish origins in light of this new research.

The new analysis shows that Jewish ancestry reflects a mosaic of genetic sources. While earlier studies focused on the Middle Eastern component of Jewish DNA, new research has revealed that both Europeans and Central Asians also made significant genetic contributions to Jewish ancestry. Moreover, while the DNA studies have confirmed the close genetic interrelatedness of many Jewish communities, they have also confirmed what many suspected all along: Jews do not constitute a single group distinct from all others. Rather, modern Jews exhibit a diversity of genetic profiles, some reflective of their Semitic/Mediterranean ancestry, but others suggesting an origin in European and Central Asian groups. The blending of European, Semitic, Central Asian and Mediterranean heritage over the centuries has led to today’s Jewish populations.

In examining Y chromosomal diversity in this review, two types of data are considered: Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs), and Short Tandem Repeat Loci (STRs). STR markers are characterized by mutation rates much higher than those seen with SNPs. SNPs, on the other hand, are derived from rare nucleotide changes along the Y chromosome, so-called unique event polymorphisms (UEP). These UEPs represent a single historical mutational event, occurring only once in the course of human evolution. UEPs have been given a unified nomenclature system by the Y Chromosome Consortium (2002), resulting in the identification of each UEP with a particular haplogroup.

While I examine both types of Y chromosome data, I rely primarily on SNP data due to its increasing use by researchers as a tool in reconstructing the peopling of the world. Research on the diversity and geographic patterns of haplogroups have provided researchers with a greatly expanded understanding of prehistoric movements of people and a means of better understanding the present-day genetic variation among populations. Research with STR “haplotypes” is also occasionally discussed in this paper, particularly in light of its ability to demonstrate a high rate of endogamy, genetic drift, and founder effects among Jewish populations.

Examination of mitochondrial DNA, on the other hand, is based on the combined polymorphisms of the control region (hypervariable segments I and II, or HVSI and HVSII) along with specific SNPs in the coding regions of DNA found in the mitochondria. Both males and females have mtDNA, which they have inherited from their mothers, whereas Y chromosome DNA is found only in males and is inherited directly from their fathers.

Like the Y chromosome data, mtDNA sequences are sorted into major phylogenetic haplogroups as well. Recent analysis on both mtDNA and Y chromosome SNPs have allowed researchers to further divide many haplogroups into sub-branches, known in the DNA literature as “sub-clades.” The geographic distribution of mtDNA haplogroups and their sub-clades also adds to our understanding of relationships of groups of people, including Jewish populations.

The Birth of European Judaism

This section is intended to provide the reader with a brief history of the Jews in Europe as well as define terms used frequently in the Jewish DNA studies, such as “Diaspora,” “Sephardim,” and “Ashkenazim.” Furthermore, since Jews appear to have both Israelite/Middle Eastern and European genetic ancestry, an understanding of the Jewish experience in Europe is important in explaining how European ancestry became an integral part of the Jewish genetic makeup. However, this section is not intended to be an extensive recounting of the history of the Ashkenazi people.

The birth of European Judaism begins with the Diaspora. “Diaspora” is a term derived from the Greek work meaning “scattering.” While the word was originally used by ancient peoples to identify any group that was exiled or resettled from their homeland, the term has now become particularly associated with the Jewish exile from ancient Israel and resettlement elsewhere.

The Jews resettled in many distant lands, even as far as China. This work, however, focuses specifically on the Ashkenazi Jewish experience. Jews were subdivided into groups depending on where they resettled. Ashkenazi Jews are the Jews of France, Germany, and Eastern Europe. Sephardic Jews are the Jews of Spain, Portugal and North Africa. Mizrachi/Oriental Jews are the Jews of the Middle East. Certain Jewish communities do not fit into these distinctive groupings – in particular, the Falasha Jews of Ethiopia and the Chinese Jews.

Contemporary Jewry is comprised of approximately 13 million people, of whom 5.7 million live in the United States, 4.7 million live in Israel, and the remainder resides throughout the world (Ostrer 2001). Approximately 90% of the Jews of the U.S. are of Ashkenazi origin, while among the Jews of Israel, 47% are Ashkenazi, 30% are Sephardic, and 23% are of Mizrachi/Oriental origin (Ostrer 2001). Within Jewish groups, membership in three male castes (Cohen, Levi, and Israelite) is determined by paternal descent (Behar et al. 2003).

The history and genetic ancestry of Sephardic Jews is dealt with in only a cursory fashion here. There have been only very limited genetic studies on Jews of Sephardic descent, while in contrast, many DNA studies have explored the genetic ancestry of Ashkenazi Jews. Thus, the primary focus of this work is on Ashkenazim DNA results, but also included is a comparison of Sephardic and Ashkenazi results pertaining to Y chromosome haplogroups J and E.

The word “Ashkenazi” is derived from the Hebrew word for Germany, while “Sephardic” is derived form the Hebrew word for Spain. The word “Ashkenazi” was first used in medieval rabbinical literature to define western European Jews. An interesting story was related by author Arthur Koestler, who noted that the term “Ashkenaz” is also mentioned in the Hebrew bible, referring to a people living somewhere in the vicinity of Armenia. Probably for this reason, the Khazars, a people who lived in and around this area in ancient times and converted to Judaism in the 7th- 8th centuries, came to believe they were the descendants of these biblical people. Some scholars argue that they began to call themselves “Ashkenazim” when they migrated to Poland in the 13th century. Eventually, perhaps, the term came to describe the community as a whole, not just the Khazarian immigrants (Koestler 1976, pp. 181-182).

While the Jews of today are connected historically and religiously to the Jews of ancient Israel, the DNA evidence also indicates that a significant amount of Jewish ancestry can be traced directly back to their Israelite/Middle Eastern ancestors. However, these ancestors represented a heterogeneous mix of Semitic and Mediterranean groups, even at their very beginnings.[9]

January 1, 1527: Croatian nobles elect Ferdinand I of Austria as king of Croatia in the Parliament on Cetin. There were no Croatian Jews in attendance since the Jews had been expelled and there was no record of any Jews living in Croatia after 1526.[10]

January 1, 1582: Our Current calendar was slightly modified by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582.[11] 10 days from October 1582 were completely erased from the calendar to allow the time to catch up. He also decreed that the New Year would begin January 1, not in late March as it did before. The Protestant American colonies were slow to adopt the Popes new Calendar and did not change it for two hundred years. They continued to celebrate the new year at the end of March. The Americans were considered fools, which is a likely reason why April 1 is April Fools day.[12]

January 1, 1637

The first mounted mail service is inaugurated, between Boston and New York.[13]


January 1767

Governor Penn, however, says, in January 1767, that the efforts had been partially successful, that many families had withdrawn, but some had since returned. This co-operative action by the two Governors, seems to have been rendered necessary by the unsettled state of the boundaries between the two provinces. So thought Governor Penn; and Governor Fauquier joined in the effort very cordially but without intimating any claim, on the part of Virginia, to the territory intruded upon. Its value had not yet been weighed. the horns of the strife were not yet grown.[14]

January 1, 1774: The organization of the Westmoreland County Court at Hannastown, within thirty-five miles of Pittsburg, stirred the Virginians into action. The county was scarcely organized, when John Murray, the fourth Earl of Dunmore, one of the Scottish Peers, then the royal Governor of the colony of Virginia, made a visit to Fort

Pitt (Pittsburg), and on his way stopped with Captain Crawford on the Youghiogheny. George Washington was to have come with him, but was prevented by the death of his step-daughter, Miss Nellie Custis. At Fort Pitt Dunmore met Dr. John Connolly, who soon became his representative in the valley of the Monongahela.[15]
On January 1, 1774, Dr. John Connolly had posted a printed advertisement at Pittsburgh, and throughout the vicinity, announcing that Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, had been pleased to nomi- nate and appoint him " Captain, Commandant of the Militia of Pitts- burgh and its Dependencies," and proposed " moving to the House of Burgesses the necessity of erecting a New County, to include Pitts- burgh;" a Virginia county, of course. This official announcement created some consternation among the .good people of the Pennsylvania jurisdiction. Arthur St. Clair, prothonotary of Westmoreland county, caused Dr. Connolly to be arrested, but the prisoner, after a few days confinement in the county jail at Hanna's Town, prevailed upon the sheriff to permit him to visit Pittsburgh, pledging his honor to return
before the next court in April.[16]

Connolly did report at the April term of the court, but it was with ,a body-guard of nearly two hundred men, and soon had made his own terms with the Westmoreland County officials; and on his way

back to Pittsburgh he made several arrests of Pennsylvania adherents, and held them to trial or committed them to prison.[17]

January 1, 1774

The famous proclamation which Justice Mackay enclosed to Justice St.Clair, and copies of which were posted about Pittsburgh, read as follows:

“Whereas, his Excellency John, Earl of Dunmore, Governor-in-Chief and Captain General of the Colony and Dominion of Virginia, and Vice-Admiral of the same, has been pleased to nominate and appoint me Captain, Commandant of the Militia aof Pittsburg and its Dependencies, with instructions to assure His Majest’s subjects settled on the Western Waters, that having the greatest regard to their prosperity and interest, and conviced from their repeated memorials of the grievances of which they complain, that he purposes moving to the House of Burgesses the necessity of erecting a new county, to include Pittsburgh, for the redress of your complaints, and to take every other step that may tend to afford you that Justice for which you solicit. In order to facilitate this desirable circumstance, I hereby require and command all persons in the Dependency of Pittsburg, to assembly themselves there as a Militia on the 25th instant, at which time I shall communicate other matters for the promotion of public utility. Given under my hand, this 1st day of January, 1774.

“John Connolly” [18]

The pioneers who had whiskey stills on their plantations were continually being haled into court. When Justice William Crawford presided at the January term of 1774, the grand jury found true bills against Thomas Gist, of Gist’s Plantation, and Zachariah Connell, of Stewart’s Crossings. The following records show that the court made a strenuous attempt to regulate the liquor business. “It appearing to the Court that John Barr, one of the tavern keepers of this county, is keeping a disorderly house, it is ordered by the Court that the said John Barr is not to sell any spirituous liquors for the future in the Township of Mt. Pleasant, and that he pay a fine of forty shillings.[19]

January 1, 1776

The British burn Norfolk, Virginia.[20]

[21]

January 1, 1776

The American flag is raised for the first time on land, at Prospect Hill in Sommerville, Massachusetts.[22] It was called the Grand Union Flag.[23]

January 1, 1779: Winch, David, Lancaster, Col. Wade's regt. for service at Rhode Island; Capt. Belknap's co.; muster rolls sworn to at East Greenwich, September 28, November 10, and December 30, 1778; enlistment to expire January 1, 1779.[24]

January 1, 1780: On January 1 we saw several ships in the fleet which had lost some of their masts in the storm and appeared to be in distressed circumstances. Toward evening the second storm came up, combined with rain, hail, and snow, which continued in the most terrible manner until the forenoon of the 6th. The fleet had become separated in such a way that one could count only twenty sail in the farthest distance. Since the storm came out of the southeast and drove us toward land, the sailors were greatly worried about shipwreck on the Great Bank of Cape Hatteras, which extends over thirty nautical miles into the ocean.

Since a sunbeam fell around noon, an observation was taken and we were at latitude 31° 29’ north, but the wind blew too contrary and very hard. In the meantime, one could make a small coal fire in order to prepare some tea.[25]

January 1, 1787: To examine the 19th section upon authority. The cases of Rice et al. v. Efford et al.f and of Stones v. Keeling, and Hughes v. Striker,g are all that bear upon the subject. The only question which seemed to create much difficulty in those cases was, whether births and marriages, before the act, were embraced by it? and the decisions are, that such births and marriages are embraced, where the children, born before wedlock, had been recognized by the father, after the 1st of January, 1787. But this is said to be nothing more than an obiter dictum of Judge Roane. But we regard it as the reasoning of the Court, given by the only Judge who gave any reason for the decision. A decision, that marriages and births, before the act, are embraced by its provisions, because the recognition took place after the act was in force, is plainly a decision, that, but for the subsequent recognition, prior marriages and births could not be considered as within the act. These cases furnish good authority for applying the 7th section of the marriage act, to marriages contracted before, but existing on the 1st of January, 1787; (January 1, 1787) and for substituting the words 'hath been,' in the act of descents respecting aliens, for the words 'shall have been.' If this be correct, both those provisions will accord with the residue of the acts containing them,

f

3 Henn. & Munf. 225.

g

Ib. and with the act concerning dower, and the statute of wills and distributions. The operation of all, will then be prospective.

13

The statute of descents shows, that wherever, in adopting the civil law, its framers meant to exceed or fall short of its provisions, they have done so in explicit terms. By the civil law, the marriage of the parents legitimated the children previously born, without the father's recognition.h This legitimation was the subject of the famous proceeding at the parliament of Merton. The ecclesiastics there demanded, that the marriage of the parent should legitimate the children; to which the barons returned their memorable answer: 'Nolumus leges Angliae mutari.'i The common lawyers of England, therefore, would not agree to adopt the civil law in this particular. But the common lawyers of Virginia, who compiled the act of 1785, determined to adopt the civil law in this particular, sub modo; that the marriage of the parents should legitimate the children, provided the father should afterwards recognize them. It is contended, on the other side, that this recognition is nothing more than statutory evidence of the fact, which might be otherwise proved, and is not of itself a substantive provision. If this argument be correct, then by the common and civil law a bastard must always have been the heir of his natural father, provided the identity of that natural father could be proved. But as we know that the mother, both by

h

1 Bl. Comm. 455. Just. Inst. l. 1. tit.

i

1 Bl. Comm. 455. the common and civil law, was always a competent witness to establish that fact of the father's identity, and yet never resorted to for the purpose of making her child heir to the father, we have a right to conclude, that the recognition required by the statute, is something more than mere evidence of the fact.

14

3. The appellants claim as heirs of Richard Stevenson, under the 18th section, and in support of this claim they contend, that the terms, 'inheriting or transmitting inheritance on the part of the mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother,' confer a capacity to inherit and transmit inheritance in the ascending as well as descending line, and also from and among collaterals. Their doctrine amounts plainly to this: that by the true construction of the second member of the 18th section, bastards are made the legitimate children of their mothers, at least for the purposes of inheritance.

15

In expounding the statute of descents, it has been justly remarked by Judge Tucker, that the framers of it were eminent sages of the law, and complete masters of its technical terms. This being the case, it would be reasonable to look for the same technical language, in all cases where the same thing was intended. When in the 19th section of the act of descents, and also in the marriage act, they remove from certain classes of bastards all the disabilities under which they laboured, they employ that legal term which conveys their meaning clearly, and leaves nothing for construction. They say they shall be 'legitimate,' not that they shall be capable of inheriting 'on the part of their mothers and fathers;' leaving us to inquire after the extent of the capacity. The law causes them to change characters. They cease to be bastards, and become the legitimate children of their father and mother. The consequences of their legitimacy follows. They have father and mother, sisters and brothers, uncles and aunts, with an universal capacity of inheriting and transmitting inheritance. The 18th section immediately preceding, if it had been intended to make bastard children the legitimate offspring of their mothers, would have followed the same language, and would have left nothing to interpretation. That section would have read thus: 'In making title by descent, it shall be no bar to a party, that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent from the intestate, is, or hath been an alien or a bastard. Bastards also shall be considered in law as the legitimate children of their mother.' The 19th section, like the marriage act, gives no new capacities to bastards as such. They make certain persons of that description legitimate, and the capacities of legitimacy follow of course. They inherit to both parents, not as bastards, but as their legitimate offspring.

16

The second proposition of this argument is, that all the disabilities of bastardy are of feudal origin. With us it is of Saxon origin. The term bastard being derived from a Saxon word, importing a bad, or base, original. The disabilities of bastardy are the same under the civil as under the common law, and in all ages and nations.j He has no ancestor; no name; can inherit to nobody, and nobody to him; can have no collaterals nor other relatives except those descended from him. He can have no surname, until gained by reputation. This is the origin of new families. He is the propositus by common law. But by the civil law he can inherit his mother's estate.k She is, therefore, the propositus of the civil law. Collaterals descended from a male relative are by the civillaw termed agnati; those descended from a female relative cognati.l In a note to Cooper's Justinian, which I take to be from the pen of Sir Henry Spelman, it is said that illegitimate children can have no agnati—Quia neque gentem neque familiam habent.m If for this reason they can have no agnati, it follows that they can have no cognati; and this is the reason of Justinian's broad proposition, that bastards can have no collaterals; which is our doctrine in this case.

17

It is admitted that the 18th section does not give legitimacy except specially for inheritance; that is, it removes that incapacity, and no other: finding and leaving them bastards. Now, there are no other disabilities except the incapacity to inherit or to hold a church dignity.n And since these dignities do not exist in the United States, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the bastard on the footing of a lawful child of his mother, for the purposes of inheritance, and thus to admit him among collaterals in her line, it is inconceivable why they should not have said at once, that bastards shall be considered in law the legitimate children of their mother. Instead of which, they have used a technical term, ex parte materna; which in the civil law is constantly opposed to this other term, ex linea materna. The first importing a capacity of lineal inheritance; the other, that, and collateral inheritance also. Neither by the common nor civil law could she inherit to her child, even chattels; she is not mother for inheritable purposes by either code; and the 18th section has given her no inheritable blood of her child. Being incapable of inheriting herself, she cannot give inheritance to a legitimate child by the civil law; because, by one of its canons, the child can never succeed by representation or succession, where the parent could not.

18

So far, therefore, is the assertion, that the heritable disabilities of bastardy are of feudal origin, from being correct, that they were known and enforced from time immemorial in all nations; were known and emorced in England, before the Norman sat foot there. The Ecclesiastics at Merton did not demand of the king that bastards should inherit even to their mother. They simply demanded, that by the intermarriage of their parents they should become legitimate; which was refused.

19

But it is contended by the appellants' counsel, that the words, 'in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother,' apply as well to collateral as lineal inheritance. But what is that which a bastard has capacity to do, 'in like manner as if lawfully begotten of his mother?' The answer is in the words of the statute, 'of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of his mother.'

20

But, we insist, that although Richard Stevenson, the son, took by purchase from the State; yet he took quasi heir, to hold as such to the use of his male anceastry, under the equity of the 5th section of the act of descents: 'Provided, nevertheless, that where an infant shall die without issue, having title to any real estate of inheritance derived by purchase or descent from the father; neither the mother of such infant, or any issue which she may have by any person other than the father of such infant, shall succeed to, or enjoy the same, or any part thereof, if there be living any brother or sister of such infant on the part of the father, or any brother or sister of the father, or any lineal descendant of either of them.' The principle of this section is, that the estate which came from a male ancestor, shall return to his stock. The principle of the 6th section, immediately following it, is the same; that the estate which came from a female ancestor, shall return to her stock. It is admitted, that the case of Richard Stevenson is not within the letter of the 5th section; but is it not within the equity of it? The estate came not from the father by descent, or by gift; but in equity we may pursue the consideration of the grant, and have a right to inquire, whether that consideration was furnished in common, by the paternal and maternal kindred; and, therefore, ought to pass to both lines. The consideration of the grant to Richard Stevenson, is his father's military service, and his death in that service. Loss is a valuable consideration for a grant, and the grant ought, in consequence, to be made to the heir of the family suffering the loss. A military bounty is in the nature of compensation for a loss, or of a gratuity for services. It is intended to supply to a family, as far as the liberality of the country can supply the place of a lost member. They are intended to avail the heir in his pecuniary concerns to the extent to which it is supposable his father's labour might have availed him had he lived. In this view, therefore, the hounty, given by law to the heir, is, in equity, a paternal estate, and should descend and pass to the paternal kindred, in exclusion of the maternal.

21

The Attorney-General, on the same side, contended, that the appellants were not entitled, either as legal representatives of Hugh, or as heirs of Richard Stevenson.

22

1. The appellants were not the legal representatives of Hugh Stevenson; for legal representatives are those whom the law appoints to stand in a man's place, and such was not the case of the appellants. The law recognized no connexion between them and Hugh Stevenson.

23

But, it is objected, that the father had made them his legal representatives by his will. This admits of various answers: but one is sufficient, that the will was a nullity; it was revoked by the subsequent marriage and brith of a child.o Neither, therefore, by operation of law, nor by any act of Hugh Stevenson, does it appear that the appellants were his legal representatives.

24

2. Neither could they inherit as heirs to Richard Stevenson; for, being natural children, there was no common blood between them.

25

It is again objected, that they were legitimated by the 19th section of the law of descents. But this clause has received a judicial exposition by the highest Court of the State, in which the law was passed, and is now the settled law of that land. In the cases of Rich v. Efford,p and Sleighs v. Strider,q the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided, that the act applied to cases of prior births and marriages; but, that to give it an application, the father must have been in life after the passage of the act. In this case, the father had died more than ten years before the act took effect, and, consequently, the case at bar is not within its operation. But, it is said, that the Court of Appeals were right in extending the law to cases of births and marriages antecedent to the act; but they were demonstrably wrong in declaring, that the act applied to cases only in which the father had died posterior to the act. To which we answer, that the precedent cannot be divided; if it is to have the authority of a precedent, it must be taken altogether; it cannot be entitled to the authority of a precedent so far as it favours the opposite side, and be open to dispute so far as it destroys their position. It has been the settled law of Virginia, since the year 1805; for it was then that Sleighs v. Strider was decided, and though its correctness may have been originally doubtful, yet extreme inconvenience follows the disturbance of a rule of property which has been so long settled; and that this argument ab inconvenienti, was of great weight in the estimation of the Court of Appeals itself, may be seen from the proposition to reconsider the decision of that Court in the celebrated case of Tomlinson and Delland.r The original decision in that case, which subjected the succession to personal property, to the feudal principle, which, in relation to lands, respected the blood of the first purchaser, had been made in 1801. It having produced great excitement in the State, and being very generally disapproved, a reconsideration was most strenuously pressed in 1810, nine years only after the original decree; but a majority of the Court was of the opinion, that the inconvenience of overthrowing what was already considered as a settled rule of property, was too great to be encountered, even if the decision were erroneous at first. It is true, that they thought the decision called for by the stern language of the law; but from one of the Judges this opinion was wrung with such manifest reluctance, that it was believed he would have come to a different result had the question heen res integra. Here the rule having been settled, the Court will say how far it ought now to be considered as the settled law of the State.

26

If, however, these precedents be open to question at all, they are open throughout; and if the Court of Appeals erred at all, it was not in limiting the operation of the law to cases in which the father has died since the act took effect, but in extending it to cases of births and marriages which happened anterior to the passage of the law. This law took effect on the 1st of January, 1787. The births, the marriage, the recognition, and the death of the father, had all occurred in, and prior to August, 1776. Had the legislature of Virginia the right to pass a retrospective law? The Court of Appeals said not, in the cases of Turner v. Turner's executors,s Elliott v. Lyell,t and the Commonwealth v. Hewitt.u Even where it has been attempted to apply a new remedy to pre-existing rights, it is said the language must be irresistibly clear, or the Court will not give it such retrospective operation.

27

Does the language of this act clearly intend to operate on pre-existing facts? on pre-existing marriages and births? We contend that it does not. In the case of the Commonwealth v. Hewitt, before cited, Judge Roane, in resisting the retroactive effect of the law, founds himself, in a great measure, on the general nature of laws, as prospective, and on the time assumed by the act itself for the commencement of its operation, from and after the passing thereof. Both considerations concur here, with this farther circumstance in favour of this law, that while it has (in the original act) the usual clause, 'This act shall commence in force from and after the passing thereof,' a subsequent and distinct law was passed to suspend its operation until the 1st of January, 1787. Again; this act commences with a general declaration, most unequivocally prospective. The first clause is, 'be it enacted by the general assembly, that henceforth, when any person having title, &c.' According to settled rules of construction, therefore, the force of this expression, henceforth, runs through every subsequent clause. The 19th section under consideration ought to be read thus: 'Be it enacted that, HENCEFORTH, [that is, after the 1st of January, 1787,] (January 1, 1787)where a man, having by a woman, one or more children, shall, afterwards, intermarry with such woman, such child or children, if recognized by him, shall thereby be legitimated.' Is this language so irresistibly retrospective, in relation to the date of the law, that the Court is constrained to give it that construction? Is it not, on the contrary, so obviously future and prospective, that it requires subtility and violence to wrest it to a retrospective meaning? The verbs which indicate the acts that are to produce the effect of legitimation, are in the future tense. It is insisted, therefore, that the clause has no application to any case, but to one in which all the facts on which it is to operate, shall happen after its passage; the birth of the children, the marriage, and the recognition. It is true, that in speaking of the children, the present participle is used, 'having one or more children.' But the present tense of this participle relates, not to the time of passing the act, but to the time of the marriage, 'having,' at the time of the marriage, 'one or more children.' This is not a new use of the present tense; grammarians tell us that the present tense is occasionally used to point at the relative time of a future action. The true reading of this part of the act is this, 'where' (i. e. in all cases, hereafter, in which) 'a man shall marry a woman, having by him, at the time, one or more children.' Thus, the participle, although present at the time of the marriage, is future in relation to the passage of the act. This is no unusual application of this participle;—if I say, 'if a man shall go to Rome, and having a dagger in his hand, shall strike it to the heart of the Pope:' the present participle is properly used in it; it is present in relation to the action with which it stands connected, though future, in relation to the time of speaking. So the present participle here is present in reference to the act with which it clearly stands connected, the act of marriage; although future in relation to the date of the act. The sense is the same as if the legislature had said, 'wherever, hereafter, a man shall have one or more children by a woman, and shall, afterwards, intermarry with her,' &c. It is only by this construction which considers both the birth and marriage as future, that the word 'afterwards,' used in the act, acquires a grammatical sense, or, indeed, any kind of sense. To prove this, let us see what the effect will be of considering this participle, as used in the present tense, in reference to the time of passing the act. Then the sense will be, 'where a man now having one or more children by a woman, shall afterwards intermarry with her:' it is clear that the word, afterwards, becomes insignificant and senseless. It adds nothing to the meaning; for if a man now having one or more children by a woman, shall intermarry with her, he must of necessity intermarry with her afterwards; for the future verb, shall intermarry, makes the act future, in relation to the passage of the act; and the adverb of time, afterwards, added to the verb, does not perform its appropriate function of adding a new quality to the verb. It is a useless clog, therefore, on the sence, because its tendency is to obscure, and not to illustrate the sense. Whereas, the construction for which we contend, (by considering both facts as posterior to the act, but the marriage as being posterior to the birth,) gives the word, afterwards, force and significancy; it then performs the office of arranging the order of the two future events. In this point we differ from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and insist, that the liberality which would apply this act retrospectively, to previous births and marriages, is a liberality which looks beyond the judicial sphere, and belongs only to the legislature. What is the argument on which the Court of Appeals (and the opposite counsel, after them) ground themselves in extending this act to antecedent births and marriages? 'I see no difficulty,' says Judge Roane, in Rice v. Efford,v 'except what arises from the words, shall afterwards intermarry, which might seem to import only marriages to be celebrated in future: that word, afterwards, however, is rather to be referred to the birth of the children, than the passage of the act; and no good reason could possibly have existed with the legislature for varying the construction of a section, embracing two descriptions of cases standing on a similar foundation.' The counsel for the appellants, seizing this passage, has said, the terms, 'shall afterwards intermarry,' are correctly referred (by the Court) to the birth of the children, not to the date of the act. This is not accurate: it is not the three words, shall afterwards intermarry, that are referred by the Court to the birth of the children: but the word, afterwards, alone. This, we admit, is correctly referred to the birth of the children: but the Court having correctly gained this conclusion, forget the force of the future verb, 'shall intermarry.' We say, that the force of this future verb requires that the marriage shall be after the act. That henceforth, 'where a man having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman,' irresistibly demands a marriage future to the date of the act: that the words, shall intermarry, make the marriage future in relation to the act. The word, afterwards, removes the marriage farther off, and marks its futurity in relation to another event, the birth of the children; which other event, although expressed by the present participle, is itself drawn forward into futurity by the force of the word, afterwards, to which it is attached. That such an intention is utterly inconsistent with the prospective character given to the whole act, by the force of the word henceforth, and in the commencement. That the force of this word runs through the whole act; and that, used in the clause under consideration, it would render the retrospective construction of that clause absurd. In the passage cited, Judge Roane says, that no good reason could possibly have existed with the legislature, for varying the construction of a section embracing two descriptions of cases, standing on a similar foundation. This might have been a good argument on the floor of the legislature, to induce them to embrace past cases; but it is no argument to prove that they have embraced them. Whether they ought to have embraced them is a very different question from whether they have actually done so. The first is purely a legislative question; the last purely a judicial question, and the only question in the case for the Court.

28

But it is said, the appellants do not seek to give the act a retrospective effect; they say that the act, from the time it took effect, clothed the appellants with a new capacity of inheritance, not in relation to rights previously vested, but in relation to inheritances which might thereafter fall. Let it be admitted that their position is such; let it also be admitted, that the legislature had the right to clothe them with such new capacity in relation to future inheritances. But the question still remains, have they done so: is it to persons in their predicament that this new capacity of inheritance is extended? We have endeavoured to show that it is not: whether the Court look to the exposition of the statute by the tribunals of the State, or whether they look to the construction of the statute, per se. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, while they admit the application of this statute to antecedent births and marriages, decide that the law applies to cases only where the father has died posterior to the passage of the statute. The reasoning on which the Court ground this distinction is not fully developed by them: the appellants' counsel infers their reasoning, and, as we may safely admit, contests it with success. But there is a reason for requiring that the father should continue in life after the act, which applies with equal force both to the marriage and the recognition, and corroborates the construction drawn from the language of the law, that both those facts should be posterior to the act. It is this: the statute attaches new legal consequences to the act of marrying a woman by whom the man had, previously, had children; and to the act of recognizing such children. Make the law prospective in those particulars, and the citizens for whose government it was intended, have it in their choice, by performing those acts thereafter, to incur those consequences or not. But attach those consequences to a past marriage and recognition, and you change the legal character of a past transaction by an ex post facto law. By a subsequent law you attach consequences to an act which did not belong to it when it was performed. It is precisely for this reason that ex post facto laws are prohibited; because consequences are attached to an act which did not belong to them at the time; and which, consequently, could not have entered into his consideration of the question, whether he would commit it or not. You surprise him by a new case, on which his judgment was never called to pass, and when it is too late to retract the step and avoid the new consequences.

29

3. The next ground taken by the claimants is, that if they were not legitimated by the 19th section of the law of descents, they were made capable of inheriting from Richard by the 18th section of that law.w It is contended on the part of the appellants, that this clause opens an inter-communication of blood through the mother, to an indefinite extent lineally and collaterally. But we insist, that it only gives to the natural children the faculty of inheriting immediately from the mother, and of transmitting such inheritance to their posterity. The legislature has not said, that natural children shall be considered as lawfully born of their mother for all the purposes of inheritance pointed out by the act. It has given them two capacities of inheritance only; the capacity to inherit on the part of the mother; and the capacity of transmitting inheritances on the part of the mother. These capacities, it is true, they are to enjoy, in like manner 'as if they had been lawfully begotten of the mother.' But these words, 'as if, &c.' do not add to the number of their heritable capacities; they seem only to designate the extent to which they shall enjoy the two specific capacities which are expressly given them.

30

Do these capacities authorize them to claim the inheritance from Richard? What are they? 1st. That they shall be capable of inheriting on the part of their mother; 2dly. That they shall be capable of transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother. The last capacity it is not contended, has any application to the case at bar. This not being the case of an inheritance transmitted through the natural children, but one which they claim directly for themselves. If they are entitled, therefore, their title must arise under the first capacity, that of inheriting on the part of their mother. What is the meaning of this expressin, on the part of their mother? The counsel on the other side contends, that it means from or through the mother; that it connects the bastard with the ancestral line of the mother, and through her, collaterally, with all who are of her blood. On the other hand, we insist, that the capacity does not go beyond an inheritance from the mother, and the transmission of that inheritance lineally and collaterally among their descendants; or, in other words, to make the mother the head of a new family. The expression 'on the part of the mother,' does not carry the mind beyond the mother, unless connected with words of more extensive significance, such as, ancestors on the part of the mother, or descendants on the part of the mother; and here it would be the supplemental words which would produce the effect, not the words, 'on the part of the mother.' But, it will perhaps be urged, that in the case of Barnitz v. Casey,x the counsel upon both sides, and the Court, seem to have understood this term in the sense contended for on the other side. That case arose on a statute of Maryland, in which the force of the term is expounded to mean, from or through. In our case, the Virginia statute furnishes an opposite inference. The expressions, 'on the part of the father,' and 'on the part of the mother,' occur in the 5th section of the law of descents. It is the only instance in which they do occur, and there they are indisputably synonymous with 'of' and 'from' any brother or sister of such infant on the part of the father, and no vice versa. It is said, that this provision places the natural children on the footing of legitimate children to all the purposes of inheritance. But, we would ask, does it enable the mother to inherit from them? Does it enable the mother's ancestors or collateral relations so to inherit? The provision is, that the natural children may innerit from the mother. But where is the provision that the mother may inherit from them, or that her relations may inherit from them? It is not to be found; the legislature did not look upwards beyond the mother. It was not their object to force her natural issue upon a family which she had dishonoured and offended by bringing them into the world. That they should have connected them with her was just and proper; she could not complain. But to have connected them with a family from which she had probably been expelled on account of her infamy, and to have given them a capacity to inherit the estates of that family, would not have been quite so just or reasonable. We contend, that the legislature have not done it; but that the capacity to transmit applies only to inheritances descending from the mother, and from each other. Again; if the expression, 'on the part of the mother,' is of the extent contended for, then the capacity to inherit on the part of the mother, is a power to take inheritances from, or through her, in right of her. But the inheritance claimed is not of this description; it is a direct inheritance from a mother, which, both at the common law, and under the statute, is not an inheritance on the part of the mother; it does not come from, or through her, it does not come in her right. So say the Court in the case of Barnitz v. Casey, before cited.y That was on the statute of Maryland; the statute of Virginia, in case there is no father, gives the estate to the mother, brothers and sisters, per capita, so that the shares taken by the brothers and sisters, are cast at once from the deceased brother on them, and do not come to them, from, or through, or in right of the mother. This is the inheritance which the appellants claim, and which they claim in virtue of their specific and single capacity to inherit on the part of the mother.

31

Mr. Hammond, for the appellants, in reply, stated, that the argument on the other side, involved the general construction of the act, as well as its operation upon this particular case. It asserts, that the recognition must, in all cases, be subsequent to the marriage; thus proving the consent of the father to the legitimation. Now, if the legitimation does not result from the agreement, or depend upon the assent of the father, this argument is of no avail. The principle is adopted from the civil law. And it is reasonable to suppose, that when the ablest lawyers and civilians of the country, introduced it into their code, they intended to adopt it as interpreted and understood in the countries where it prevailed. The civilians held, that 'this legitimation is a privilege or incident inseparably annexed to the marriage, so that, though both the children and parents should wave it, the children would, nevertheless, be legitimate.' The foundation of this doctrine is thus explained: 'Ratio est quia matrimonium subsequens ex fictione legis retrahitur ad tempus susceptionis liberorum ut legitimati habeantur legitime suscepti (i. e.) post contractum.'z

32

If legitimacy is an incident inseparably annexed to the marriage, it must be the marriage, and not the agreement of the father, that legitimates the child. But there can be no such legitimacy without the agreement or recognition of the father. Agreement and recognition are not synonymous terms. Recognition implies no more than a simple admission of a fact; it is in the nature of evidence. Agreement supposes an assent or compact, from which certain consequences result, made with a view to those consequences. Recognition refers to something past. Agreement implies a transaction from which some effect is to follow. The provision under consideration consists of an enumeration of facts, and a declaration of legal consequences resulting from those facts. The facts are, having children by a woman, and afterwards marrying her. Upon such a case the statute operates, and declares the children legitimate. But the effect follows only the legal proof of the facts; and this the statute has defined. There must be a recognition by the father; and this is considered a third fact. Though as a fact it must exist; yet its existence is only necessary to establish the first fact; that the husband of the mother is, in verity, the father of the child. No legal consequences can result, until facts are established by proof. We insist, that the terms 'if recognized by him,' are inserted for the single purpose of defining the proof upon which the material facts should be established, and are to be regarded only as prescribing a rule of evidence for the particular case. Had the legislature intended this recognition as one fact, a principal condition upon which the legitimacy was to be founded, they could easily have connected it with the other facts, so as to have left no doubt about it. The act would have read thus: 'Where a man, having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, AND recognize such child or children, they shall thereby be legitimated.' As the words now stand in the sentence, they are of very different import. The two principal facts are first enumerated; then proceeding to declare the result, the mode of proof is set down, as it were, in a parenthesis, hypothetically, and indefinite as to time: As much as to say, 'when the father and mother intermarry, if, suppose that, allow that the father recognized the children, they shall be legitimate.' If the recognition of the father is a principal fact; if the legitimacy is the consequence of that recognition, the child could only be legitimate from the time of the recognition. This would introduce endless confusion and litigation. The rights of parties would always depend upon the time the father signified his assent, or declared his agreement. This never was the doctrine of the civil law. Some referred the legitimation to the birth, others to the time of marriage; but all dated it from the one or the other of these periods. But as legitimation could not exist until the celebration of the marriage, we hold that it must commence at that time, and from that time confer rights upon the parties. A recognition before marriage is within the letter of the act. It supplies evidence as conclusive of the fact to be established, as if made after the marriage. Constantine, who introduced this provision into the civil law, 'is supposed to have intended it as an encouragement to those who had children born in concubinage, to marry the mother of such offspring.'aa But in our case, the recognition is in fact subsequent to the marriage. The will speaks only from the death of the testator, and is, therefore, a recognition by him at the time of his death. The appellants were born illegitimate. Their father recognized them as his children. While illegitimate, he declares their mother his wife. He afterwards marries her, and continues to recognize them as his children. He dies. Then comes an act of the legislature, the special object of which is, 'to protect and provide for the innocent offspring of indiscreet parents, who had already made all the atonement in their power for their misconduct, by putting the children whom the father recognized as his own, on the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock.' If birth and marriage are the facts upon which the act operates, and recognition nothing but evidence of those facts, the decisions already cited are decisive in our favour. It is settled, that the act extends to cases of birth and marriage before its passage; and it is perfectly clear, that the enacting part of the act is prospective. The parties upon whom it is acknowledged to operate, could claim no rights, but those which accrued after the first of January, 1787. It was at that period, and not before, that their new capacity commenced. We have shown, that this interpretation of the act interferes with no vested right: And we have shown how interests in possession may be affected, upon the principle decided in the Virginia Court of Appeals. In the view we take of the case, the death of the father, before the passage of the act, is a circumstance of no importance. It is upon the children, and not upon the father, that the act operates. It attaches upon existing cases, and gives a character to transactions already past. Were he alive, he could not recal the birth, the marriage, or the recognition. A solemn disavowal of the children could not restrain the operation of the law; for we have shown, that legitimation results from the facts, and not from the inclination or pleasure of the father.

33

The common law rules of succession, both as to real and personal estate, were exceedingly narrow and illiberal. Where those rules have been enlarged by statute, Courts have always given the act a liberal interpretation in favour of the persons let in. Thus the English statute of distributions was construed to extend to cases of intestacy that happened before its passage, where administration was granted afterwards.bb No vested right was disturbed by this interpretation, though it allowed the act a retrospective operation. So in our case, though legitimated by a law subsequent to their birth, the appellants claim a new capacity, only in regard to inheritances that may fall after their legitimacy takes effect. The appellants do not seek to make themselves heirs to their father Hugh. They claim that, upon the death of their brother Richard, in 1796, they were his heirs at law. In making title by descent from a brother, the father is not noticed at the common law. The descent is held to be immediate between brothers. So, by the laws of Virginia and Kentucky, where the father and mother are both dead, the descent is cast directly to the brothers and sisters. If this position could at any time have been doubted, it is now settled by the decision of this Court in the case of Barnitz's Lessee v. Casey.cc

34

But if the appellants were not legitimated by the 19th section of the act, they claim that they are entitled, as bastards, under the 18th section. When it is admitted that the act changes the condition of bastards, the extent of that change must be ascertained. By determining the class of cases included, it can be best decided what cases are excluded. The Court are called upon for the first time to put a construction upon this part of the act; and we hold, that it will not be correct to say, that bastards cannot inherit collaterally, without showing that the terms and policy of the law can be fairly satisfied, and collateral inheritance between bastards denied. The Court must say that the act confers nothing but a direct lineal succession between bastards and their mother; or they must say that the act removes entirely their incapacity of inheritance through and from the maternal kindred. To this last position it is objected by the counsel for the respondent, that it makes bastards the legitimate children of their mother for purposes of inheritance, which ought not to be done; because if such had been the intention of the legislature, they would have said so in express terms. But does it follow, that the capacity of inheritance would follow the express legitimation of bastards, without providing that such should be the consequence of legitimation? Children legitimated by the marriage of their parents, are no longer bastards. But bastards legitimated in the maternal line, would still, in law, be without a father, and that badge of illegitimacy must ever attach to them. It was a maxim of the civil law, that the Prince could legitimate bastards; but the civilians held, that such legitimation did not confer the right of succession.dd It was the right of succession, the capacity of inheriting and transmitting inheritance, that the legislature in this case meant to confer; and they have chosen to do it in express terms. There is no room to doubt what was intended; and we think there is no just foundation for the exceptions and limitations set up by the respondent.

35

We admit distinctly, that the appellants must take as bastards, or they cannot take at all. They are 'clothed with all the attributes and disabilities of bastards, except the capacity of inheritance, specially conferred on them, and conferred on them too as bastards.' What were the disabilities of bastards at the time the act was passed? They could not inherit. In matters of succession and inheritance, they had no mother, and consequently could have no other relative. But except on the single subject of inheritance, the laws recognised and regarded them as standing in the same relation to their kindred as if born in wedlock. In contracting marriage, bastards were held to be relations, and prohibited from marrying within the Levitical degrees. In the case of Haines v. Jeffell, the Court of King's Bench refused a prohibition, to stay proceedings in the Spiritual Court against Haines, for marrying the bastard daughter of his sister.ee And the Court said it had always been held so; especially where it was the child of a woman relative. Here the law expressly recognizes the collateral kindred between the uncle and his bastard niece. Bastards are within the marriage act, which requires the consent of parents or guardians to the marriage of persons within age.ff In this case, Mr. Justice Buller declares that the rule that a bastard is nullius filius, applies only to cases of inheritance, and says it was so considered by Lord Coke. Even Blackstone, who is quite a zealot for the common law doctrines respecting bastards, admits, almost in terms, that bastards were, at the time he wrote, subject to no disability but the incapacity of inheritance.gg And Woodeson asserts the same thing.hh In passing the act, the legislature meant to effect a change in the legal condition of bastards, by removing, to some extent, the only legal incapacity to which they were subject: and this was a total disqualification to inherit or transmit estates, from or to ascending or collateral kindred. It is, therefore, evident, that the legislature contemplated confering this capacity, in respect to the ascending or collateral kindred, or both. The civil law distinguished bastards into four classes. Those born in concubinage succeeded to the effects of their mother and relatives, and in some cases to a part of the estate of their putative father.ii So that the authority of precedent is against the doctrine of the respondent, which would limit the effect of the act to inheritance direct between the mother and the bastard.

36

But it is urged, that the appellants cannot inherit collaterally, because, legally speaking, bastards have no collateral relations; and therefore the appellants cannot be the brothers and sisters of Richard. This was true before the passage of the act. But does it remain so since? The law then provided, that so far as inheritance was concerned, a bastard was the son of no person. He had neither father nor mother, and, consequently, had no blood to convey succession except in a lineal descent from himself. There was no blood to convey succession, either to ascendants or collaterals. Having in law no mother, there could be no source from which a bastard could derive inheritable blood, and no channel through which his blood could communicate with that of others. But as this was a provision of positive law, a new provision could restore the connection. Such is the effect of the provision under consideration. 'Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting, and transmitting inheritance, on the part of THEIR MOTHER, in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother.' Henceforth there shall be heritable blood between the bastard and the mother. The bastard has thus a legal mother; and having a mother, a channel is opened through which he can have brothers and sisters, and every other relative in the ascending and collateral line. It was because the bastard had no mother, that he could have no brothers and sisters. The act gives him a mother. He can inherit from, and transmit inheritance to her direct. Heritable blood can flow from the mother to her bastard child, and be traced from the child to the mother, and through the mother to brothers and sisters, and uncles and aunts. The bastard is not legitimated: But his blood is made heritable through that parent about whom there can be no doubt. The character of his blood being changed, he is restored to his kindred in matters of inheritance; the only case in which the law separated him from them. It is true that the appellants were not the brothers and sisters of Richard at the time of his birth, as far as concerned inheritance. But the act of 1785 has effected a change in their condition; and from the day it took effect, they were in law, and for the purposes of succession to estates, his brothers and sisters of the half blood. Had Richard left brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the 15th section of the act would expressly embrace their case. There was no occasion to make express provision for the succession of bastards, either in the law of descents, or in Judge Tucker's table, because the general provision for the half blood included their case. This is clearly the mode of succession contemplated. They shall inherit in like manner as if lawfully begotten.

37

It is argued that, on the part of, are technical terms of the law, which only import immediately from. The operation of the act is thus limited to a descent immediately from the mother. If we are mistaken in the consequence, which we suppose even this intercommunication of blood must work in the legal condition of a bastard, we must still inquire whether the terms of the act can be satisfied by this narrow construction. We do not admit that the terms, on the part of, import no more than immediately from. We insist that they are used to describe the ancestral kindred in the line of each parent. On the part of the mother, means, from or through the mother, or her relatives. Thus, brothers and sisters of the same mother, but different fathers, are brothers and sisters on the part of the mother, and are described as such in the 6th section of the act. And in the case of Barnitz's lessee v. Casey, before cited, the counsel upon both sides, and the Court, seem to have understood these terms in the sense we contend for. The capacity of transmitting inheritance, conferred by the act, can have no operation, if the terms, on the part of, be interpreted to mean, immediately from the mother. The bastard must transmit the inheritance to or through, whether it pass to ascendants or callaterals.

38

The common law disabilities of bastards are, like the canons of descent, of feudal origin: for it must be remembered that this disability relates entirely to inheritance. Escheats are the fruits and consequences, as Blackstone says, of feudal tenure resulting from the frequent extinction of heritable blood, according to the feudal tenure of inheritance. A bastard, being the son of nobody, could have no heritable blood, consequently none of the blood of the first purchaser. The feudal doctrine of carrying the estate through the blood of the first purchaser, inevitably excluded inheritance among bastards. In this sense the disability of bastards was the consequence of feudal policy, and totally inconsistent with the liberal and equitable canons of descent, introduced by the act of 1785. The preference of the male ascending line, preserved by the statute of 1786, is not founded upon feudal doctrines. The inheritance is directed first to the father; not because he is the most worthy of blood, but because he is the head of the family, who can best dispose of the estate among his surviving children: And upon this same principle the grandfather is preferred to the grandmothers and aunts. This is no preference of the male ancestors; but simply a preference of the husband or father, if in existence, to the wife or children of the same person; and the principle of this doctrine is directly repugnant to that of the feudal or common law. Corruption of blood by convictions for crimes, alienage, and bastardy, were three fruitful sources of escheats at the common law. The principle of extinguishing the inheritable blood, applied to each case. The first was cut up by the constitution of Virginia. The act of 1785 laid the axe to the root of the other two. Not by authorizing aliens to hold lands, or by legitimating bastards. In the one case it permits a citizen, claiming by descent, to trace his relation to an intestate through an alien. In the other, it confers a capacity of inheritable blood upon bastards. The object of both provisions is the same: to enable the kindred of the intestate to obtain the property he left, instead of rapaciously seizing it for the government. The act is clearly remedial, and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the object of the legislature, conformable to the opinions of the Virginia Courts already quoted. [26]

January 1, 1796: The first slave to be set free in Harrison County was in 1796. The document freeing this slave reads thusly, “Being convinced of the impropriety of perpetual slavery, I do emancipate a male negro bond slave named Isaac, after the first day of January, 1796. Signed, Newton Cannon.” This document was recorded by William Moore, first Clerk of Harrison County Court, 1796.[27]

January 1, 1798: The first Jewish censor was appointed by the Russian government to censor all Hebrew books printed in Russia or imported from other countries.[28]

January 1, 1808

March 2, 1807: Congress passes an act prohibiting the importation of slaves after January 1, 1808.[29]

January 1, 1837 – 600 members of the Treaty Party depart for the Cherokee Nation West, paying their own way.[30]

January 1, 1862: December 30, 1862 to January 1, 1863: Battle of Murfreesborough, TN.[31]

January 1, 1863: On September 22, 1862 President Lincoln issues a preliminary Emanicipation Proclamation, calling for all slaves within areas under rebellion to be free on January 1, 1863.[32]

[33]

January 1, 1863: Recapture of Galveston, TX.[34]

January 1, 1863: In 1862, the U.S. War Department authorized the formation of the 37th Infantry to show that men past draft age were willing and able to go war. The unit of 914 men was assembled that December at Camp Strong near Muscatine, Iowa. The oldest man was 80 year old Pvt. Curtis King. Six men were in their 70s, including 72 year old drummer, Nicholas Ramey. Another 136 men were in their 60s. Nearly all of the members of the regiment were over 45.

Required to hike in the mud and sleep in the rain like other soldiers, the Graybeards were spared not of the rigors of army life. They were, however, exempted from combat duty, serving instead as guards of military prisons, railroads, and arsenals in Missouri, Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Only three men were killed in action, but 145 died of disease and 364 were discharged because of physical disabilities.

By war’s end, more than 1300 of the sons and grandsons of Graybeard members had enlisted. So the regiment accomplished its major purpose, to serve as a grand propaganda tool for recruiting.

37th Regiment Infantry organized at Muscatine and mustered in December 15, 1862. Moved to St. Louis, Mo., January 1, 1863. Attached to District of St. Louis, Mo., Dept. of Missouri, to May, 1863. Alton, Ill., to January, 1864. Rock Island, Ill., to June, 1864. Memphis, Tenn., District of West Tennessee, to August, 1864. Indianapolis, Ind., Cincinnati, Columbus and Gallipolis, Ohio, to May, 1865. Provost guard duty at St. Louis, Mo., and guarding military Prisons till May 1, 1863. Guard Pacific Railroad from St. Louis to Jefferson City, Me. Headquarters at Franklin till July 29. Moved to Alton, Ill, and guard Military Prison till January 16, 1864, and at Rock Island, Ill, till June 5. Ordered to Memphis, Tenn., June 5, and duty there till August 27. Moved to Indianapolis, Ind., August 27-31. Guard prisoners at Camp Morton (5 Cos.) and Military Prisons at Cincinnati, Ohio (5 Cos.), till May, 1865.

The idea was a bold one: a regiment of old men in Union blue, risen from their comfortable parlors and front-porch rockers to rally ‘round the flag. The sight of these ancient soldiers marching off to war could make young men blush with shame and send them running to the nearest recruiter, That was the idea, but the reality of the 37th Iowa Infantry was another story altogether. [35]


Samuel Godlove, William McKinnon Goodlove, and William Harrison Goodlove had several things in common, including the unique Cohen modal haplotype DNA. They also are each mentioned today.

January1, 1863: Battle at Helena, Arkansas. Samuel Godlove 24th Iowa Infantry. (The Same regiment as William Harrison Goodlove will join a year from now. The rest of the Godloves will fight for the South; Samuel Godlove will fight for the North.

January 1, 1863: Godloves in Third Battle of Winchester

© James Funkhouser

On September 19, 1864, units of Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah moved west along the Berryville Pike in the initial assault of the Third Battle of Winchester. Although this battle ultimately was a Union victory, this initial thrust was met with ferocious resistance from the forces of the Confederate Army of the Valley, commanded by Lt. General Jubal Early, and the Federals were repulsed with heavy losses. Among those seriously wounded that afternoon was a 21-year-old private in the 24th Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Samuel Godlove, whose unit had been assigned to Sheridan only in August. Samuel was the son of Adam Godlove of Washington County, Iowa, formerly of Perry County, Ohio, and Hardy County, Virginia.

While the Union forces on the Berryville Pike were launching their assault and later while they were pushed back, Union troops advanced from the north and engaged Confederate cavalry near Bunker Hill in Berkeley County, twelve miles north of Winchester. Among these was the 18th Virginia Cavalry, a unit with a sizeable number of men from Hardy County. In a battle that lasted over seven hours, the badly outnumbered Confederate units were pushed back to Winchester. The 18th Cavalry suffered about 40 casualties. Among the wounded was Private Joseph Godlove, Adam’s nephew, the son of his brother Francis of Wardensville. Joseph survived his wound; his older brother Isaac, in the same company, was unhurt. Both lived into the twentieth century

On October 14, twenty-five days after the Third Battle of Winchester, Samuel Godlove died from his wounds. He is buried in the National Cemetery in Winchester. Samuel was the last of Adam’s children to be born in Ohio, the year before his family’s move to Iowa. He died and was buried twenty-five miles from the place of his father’s birth.[36][37]

January 1, 1864: At the age of 15 years[50], Dr. William McKinnon Goodlove (1st cousin, 3 times removed) enlisted as a soldier in the 57th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Dr. Goodlove reenlisted January 1, 1864, and served to the close of the war in the 15th Army Corps, under Gen. John A. Logan, “Sherman’s Army,” and was discharged at Little Rock, Arkansas. [51]

January 1, 1864: A copy of a diary written by William Harrison Goodlove dated from January 1, 1864 thru December 18, 1864. William Harrison Goodlove left the diary to his son, Earl Lee Goodlove who left it to his oldest son, Covert Lee Goodlove, who resided in Center Point, Iowa. The diary was copied “as written” by Jean (Goodlove) Lorence, daughter of Covert L. Goodlove, April 1987.[52] (It is in the possession of Jay Covert Goodlove.)

Goodlove, William H. Age 27. Residence Cedar Rapids, nativity Ohio. Enlisted Dec. 30, 1863. Mustered Dec. 30, 1863. Mustered out July 17, 1865, Savannah, Ga.[53]

Enlisted December 30, 1863 H Company 24th IA Infantry .

The Diary

Transcription by Jean (Goodlove) and Jack Lorence

Friday, January 1, 1864[54]

At home – coldest day I ever saw. Snow 14 inches deep. Sworn into the United service 1864[55]

January 1865[56]

January 1, 1865

January 1, 1865, brought good tidings t a few members of the 24th; furloughs for four officers and 5 per cent of the enlisted men present were approved by General Sheridan. [57]

January 1, 1868: Daniel Edgar Sickles (1819–1914): A native of New York City, Sickles was a member of Congress when he shot and killed Philip Barton Key, the son of Francis Scott Key the composer of The Star Spangled Banner. The younger Key had been having an affair with Sickle’s wife. A judge acquitted Sickles after he declared in court that he had forgiven his wife for her indiscretion. Sickels’ Civil War career began as colonel with the Seventieth New York in June 1861 and he was made brigadier general by September 1861. Sickels took charge of Third Corps from Joseph Hooker after Chancellorsville. At Gettysburg, Sickles advanced his men from their assigned sector at Cemetery Hill without permission from commanding officers, and subsequently lost a leg in the retreat. He mustered out as a major general January 1, 1868 and served in Congress during the 1890s. He chaired the New York State Monuments Commission for 26 years until forced out by scandal.[58]


January 1, 1876

January 1, 1876, William McKinnon Goodlove removed to Rushsylvania and commenced the practice of medicine at that place, and, as might be expected from his diplomas, his library and his experience, his field of labor enlarges, his practice extends.[38] I

January 1, 1883: On board Convoy 59, on September 2, 1943 was Chila Gotlib, born January 1, 1883 from Seidlitz, and Malka Gotlib, born February 14, 1878 from Varsovie. (Warsaw, Poland.)[39]

January 1, 1892

The receiving station for immigrants at Ellis Island opens in New York Harbor.[40]

January 1, 1897

(Pleasant Valley) Little Ralph Goodlove is the guest of Mrs. Lottie Penly.[41]

January 1, 1898

Miss Jessie Goodlove, Mr. Carl and Miss Mary Wiley are spending the holidays at their respective homes.[42]

January 1, 1914: Gretel E. Gottlob, Offenbach (place of residence). Born January 1, 1914.Declared legally dead. Sobibor.[43]

January 1, 1920: By the beginning of the New Year, agitation to form a Buck Creek consolidated district gathered momentum. Although the leaders of the effort contained four present and three past directors of the Union Township school board and the director from the Hazel Green No. 7 subdistrict, the Brotherhood of the Buck Creek Church organized and led the campaign for the new school. A number of women in the Buck Creek Church were also key supporters of the idea, but none assumed positions of leadership in the campaign. As one informant put it, “the Buck Creek Church people they were the ones that began to push to build the school [and] the ones that was awful willing even though taxes would be higher to build this good school. The ones that were against the school, against doing it, nine out of every ten were Catholics.”[44]

January 1, 1934: According to a report by Morton Rothenberg, President of the Zionist Organization of America, 11,000 German Jewish refugees had entered Palestine from April 1, 1933 through January 1, 1934. As co-chair of the United Jewish Appeal, Rothenberg is contributions totaling three million dollars to aid the refugees from Germany.” At the same time, Dr. Arthur Hantke, director of the Palestine Foundation Fund reported that “there is no unemployment.” There is an “insistent demand for workers” throughout the country meaning that the influx of immigrants will be a net economic gain.[45]

January 1, 1936: Prisoners are to be transferred to the Occupied Zone for deportation by September 15. The foreign nationalities sought are the same as those targeted by the Parisian roundups, Those to be arrested are foreign Jews who arrived in France after January 1, 1936, whether serving in foreign workers groups, held in camps or in supervised residence centers, or at large. Exempt from arrest are those over the age of 60 or under 18 and those who have served in the French or Allied armed forces, as well as members of veteran’s families. Additional exemptions are specified for those who have French children or a French spouse, those whose spouses are of nationalities other than those sought, pregnant women, the sick and disabled, those whose work has economic importance, and those who have rendered outstanding service to France or who are well known for their cultural works. If a member of a family is exempt but wishes to accompany the others into deportation, he or she may; and parent who are arrested may leave their children under age 18 in the Unoccupied Zone. Cado requests prefects to prepare by August 16 lists of those to be arrested, and he orders them to prevent the emigration of any deportable Jews, even those possessing exit visas.

Cado’s list of exemptions is relatively large, and when estimates of the numbers of Jews subject to arrest reach Vichy, Bousquet annuls most of the exempt categories to be certain that he can meet the commitment he has made to the Germans.[46]

January 1, 1939: The Measure for the Elimination of Jews from the German Economy is invoked, banning Jews from working with Germans.[47]

January 1, 1942: For a moment, imagine being gifted with extraordinary vision, standing in the center of Tokyo, Japan, on January 1, 1942, and being lifted well above the surface of the earth. Gazing to the southeast, towards the central Pacific, one might first pick out the smudge of Marcus Island, not quite a thousand miles distant, a Japanese possession since 1898. Peering further into the distance, still directly southeast, a string of coral atolls appears some 3000 miles away. These are the Marshall Islands, which Japan seized from Germany in 1914 (Japan aligned itself with the Allies in World War I), and which were formally mandated to Japan's control by the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919.

Beyond the Marshalls are the Gilbert Islands - which Japan seized two days after Pearl Harbor - and, still further southeast, the Ellice Islands. South and east of the Ellice Islands lay Fiji and Samoa, which in turn straddle the critical shipping lanes between the United States and Australia. It was these shipping lanes, and the obvious possibility of Japan severing them, that occupied the minds of American military planners from Washington, DC to Hawaii during the first weeks of the war. [48]

January 1, 1943: Dutch Jews are no longer permitted to have private bank accounts, and all Jewish money is put into a central account.[49]

January 1, 1964: Family of William Crawford STEPHENSON (19) & Martha A. JENKINS

23. Stella Verlea STEPHENSON. Born on May 17, 1892. Stella Verlea died in Poke County, Missouri on January 1, 1964; she was 71.

Stella Verlea married Carl Lee MAUZEY.

They had the following children:

i. George William (1927-)

ii. Earl Wayne (1929-1929)

iii. Donald Lee (1930-)

iv. Robert E. “Gene” (1932-1997) [59]

January 1, 1979

Jacqueline Means becomes the first woman Episcopal priest in the United States.[60]

Mary and Gary Goodlove visit The Battle of Princeton, January 1, 2005.

Gary and Jeff Goodlove stand by a canon found behind the Mercer house at The Battle of Princeton. January 1, 2005.

Standing on the spot where George Washington and William Crawford crossed the Delaware, December 26, 1776. Taken January 1, 2005. JG

Continental Lane: Road over which Washington’s Army began its march to Trenton, December 26, 1776

Photo taken January 1, 2005 by JG.

We stopped by the Trenton Memorial on New Years (January 1) morning and as we peered through the window, to our surprise a man who name was Henry, peered out and asked if we would like to ride the elevator to the top. We had to sit down and finish our coffee, as we were quite stunned that here, on a national holiday, there was a man who didn’t take a day off. This was what made our visit unique and unforgettable. Henry took us up the monument in the smallest elevator I’ve ever been in and as we learned as we reached the top, one of the oldest. Henry informed us to not let the door blow shut at the top, as a crane would have to bring us down.

I believe that Henry, who was in his mid seventies, takes a great deal of pride in his job. The memorial was immaculate, considering the neighborhood, and as we left Henry was caring for the grounds. The point of this conversation is that this is not only the time on our trip that someone has shown up, as a volunteer, and taken time to help tell the story. The story of the place and what happened there. There were many places where people have shown up to help tell the story of the people who lived there. Those are the people I would like to thank. Those people who understand the importance of telling the story, and passing it along for the next generation. JG.

[61]

Dennis with photo taken by Jeff Goodlove. January 1, 2010.

[62]

Sherri and Dennis, January 1, 2010.





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[1] http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/calendar/saturnalia.html


[2] http://www.livescience.com/14055-top-12-warrior-moms-history.html


[3] Comets, Prophets of Doom, 3/13/2005. H2.


[4] http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03724b.htm


[5] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/


[6] Introducing Islam, Dr. Shams Inati, page 70.


[7] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/


[8] Jacobs Legacy, A Genetic View of Jewish History, by David B. Goldstein, page 72.


[9] http://www.jogg.info/11/coffman.htm


[10] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/


[11] Biblical Archaeology Review, September/October 2010 Vol 36 NO 5 Page 16.


[12] Secret Access: The Vatican, 12/22/2010


[13] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[14] The “MONONGAHELA OF OLD Or HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE YEAR 1800 By JAMES VEECH Reprinted with a New Index GENEALOGICAL PUBLISHING CO., INC. BALTIMORE 1975. p. 87


[15]


[16] http://www.mdlpp.org/pdf/library/1905AccountofVirginiaBoundaryContraversy.pdfttp://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924017918735/cu31924017918735_djvu.txt


[17] http://www.mdlpp.org/pdf/library/1905AccountofVirginiaBoundaryContraversy.pdf


[18] Connolly. Dr. John Connolly. Born in Lancaster County around 1750. Nephew of George Croghan. Appointed in 1774 “Captain, Commandant of the Militia of Pittsburgh and its dependencies” by Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia. He was to claim the region as a part of West Augusta County, VA. His wife was Suzanna Semple—daughter of Samuel Semple the tavern owner. In 1774, Connolly changed the name of Fort Pitt to Fort Dunmore, and later that year returned to Virginia after residents of the Pittsburgh area met and declared allegiance to the colonies in their struggle against the Crown. After the Boston Tea Party the night of December 16, 1773, when Samuel Adams and other "Sons of Liberty" dressed as Mohawks, boarded ships in the harbor and threw the tea overboard, southwest PA was on the side of the revolutionists. This action and the reaction of the British Parliament, was greeted by Pittsburghers with a local ban on the drinking of tea. Some historians cite Connolly’s actions following this hostile action against the Crown together with several minor skirmishes back and forth between settlers and Indians to justify Dunmore’s War in 1774. When accused of stirring-up trouble between Indians and settlers he was jailed in Hanna's Town, but was released on bail awaiting trial and skipped town and headed back to Virginia. He was taken in Hagerstown, MD and held as a prisoner for the duration of the Revolutionary War. As late as 1798, Connolly was in Detroit meeting with other unrepentant Tories planning the capture of New Orleans to control the Mississippi for the Crown. Connolly was a through-and-through Tory as was his uncle George Croghan.

http://www.thelittlelist.net/coatocus.htm


[19] Annals of Southwestern Pennsylvania by Lewis Clark Walkinshaw, A.M. Volume II pg. 28.


[20] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[21] Secret America, Green. 5/17/2009


[22] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[23] Secret America, Green. 5/17/2009


[24] Ancestry.com. Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors in the War of the Revolution, 17 Vols. [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: The Generations Network, Inc., 1998. Original data: Secretary of the Commonwealth. Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors in the War of the Revolution. Vol. I-XVII. Boston, MA, USA: Wright and Potter Printing Co., 1896.


[25] Diary of the American War, A Hessian Journal by Captain Johann Ewald pgs.191-196.


[26] https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/18/18.US.207.html


[27] Cynthiana Since 1790 by Virgil Peddicord, page 5.


[28] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/


[29] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[30] Timetable of Cherokee Removal.


[31] State Capital Memorial, Austin, TX, February 11, 2012


[32] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[33] State Capital Memorial, Austin, TX, February 11, 2012


[34] State Capital Memorial, Austin, TX, February 11, 2012


[35] http://www.geocities.com/heartland/fields/6746/graybeard.html?20066


[36] Jim Funkhouser email, June 16, 2010.


[37] Battles Fought
Battle at Black River Bridge, Mississippi
Battle at Champion Hills, Mississippi on May 16, 1862
Battle on October 15, 1862
Battle at Helena, Arkansas on January 1 1863
Battle at Port Gibson, Mississippi on 01 May 1863
Battle on May 15, 1863
Battle at Champion Hills, Mississippi on May 16,1863
Battle at Vicksburg, Mississippi on May 27,1863
Battle at Vicksburg, Mississippi on June 01,1863
Battle at Vicksburg, Mississippi on June 9,1863
Battle at Vicksburg, Mississippi on June 10,1863
Battle at Vicksburg, Mississippi on June 12,1863
Battle at Jackson, Mississippi on July 14,1863
Battle at Carrion Crow Bayou, Louisiana on November 2,1863
Battle at Louisiana on December 1,1863
Battle at Natchitoches, Louisiana on April 2,1864
Battle at Mansfield, Louisiana on April 6,1864
Battle at Mansfield, Louisiana on 08 April 1864
Battle at Sabine Cross Roads, Louisiana on April 8,1864
Battle at Pleasant Hill, Louisiana on April 9, 1864
Battle at Red River, Louisiana on April 20,1864
Battle on May 20,1864
Battle at Rosedale Bayou, Louisiana on May 30,1864
Battle at Halltown, Virginia on August 28,1864
Battle at Winchester, Virginia on September 19,1864


[38] History of Logan County, Ohio. 1880 pp.691-692


[39] Memorial to the Jews Deported from France, 1942-1944 by Serge Klarsfeld, page 450.


[40] On This Day in America.


[41] Winton Goodlove papers.


[42] Winton Goodlove papers.


[43] [2]Memorial Book: Victims of the Persecution of Jews under the National Socialist Oppression in Germany, 1933-1945




[44] Smith, interviewby Reynolds, The informant’s parents were active members of the Buck Creek Church in 1919. He was in his late teens at the time. There Goes the Neighborhood, Rural School Consolidation at the Grass Roots in Twentieth Century Iowa, by David R. Reynolds, page 179-180.


[45] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/


[46] French Children of the Holocaust, A Memorial by Serge Klarsfeld, pages 45 and 46.


[47] Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, Editor, page1761.


[48] http://www.cv6.org/1942/marshalls/marshalls_2.htm


[49] Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, Editor, page 1775


[50] There were more than 10,000 soldiers serving in the Union Army who were under the age of eighteen. Civil War 2010 Calendar


[51] History of Logan County and Ohio, O.L. Basking & Co., Chicago, 1880. page 692.


[52] On the front page of the transcription.


[53] http: //iagenweb.org/civilwar/books/logan/mil508.htm


[54] Woodlawn

Trails sign located at 8079 State Road 259, Lost River WV 26810
The house, still standing, was the home of James W. Wood, who grew up here and was 15 years old when the war began. He joined the Confederate army in January 1864 and fought at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. He also served with Jubal Early’s Valley army. After the war he served three terms in the West Virginia House of Delegates. http://www.visithardy.com/civil-war/wv-civil-war-history/


[55] To boost enlistment in Federal armed forces, a system of bounties was developed very early. Men who volunteered to serve for ninety days in 1862 received $25 from Uncle Sam, while those who signed up for a year got twice as much. Riswing throughout the conflict, the bounty paid to a five year volunteer after March 1863 was $400. It is not known what bounty William Harrison Goodlove received. Civil War 2010 Calendar


[56] Duty in the Shenandoah Valley (From October, 1864) till January, 1865.

UNION IOWA VOLUNTEERS, 24th Regiment, Iowa Infantry: http://www.itd.nps.gov/cwss/template.cfm?unitname=24th%20Regiment%2C%20Iowa%20Infantry&unitcode=UIA0024RI


[57] A History of the 24th Iowa Infantry by Harvey H Kimball, August 1974, page 189.


[58] Civil war generals http://www.indianahistory.org/library/manuscripts/collection_guides/P0132.html




[59] www.frontierfolk.net/ramsha_research/families/Stephenson.rtf


[60] On This Day in America by John Wagman.


[61] Photo by Sherri Maxson.


[62] Photo by Jeff Goodlove