This Day in Goodlove History: This Day in Goodlove History, March 4

This Day in Goodlove History, March 4

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Jeff Goodlove email address: Jefferygoodlove@aol.com

Surnames associated with the name Goodlove have been spelled the following different ways; Cutliff, Cutloaf, Cutlofe, Cutloff, Cutlove, Cutlow, Godlib, Godlof, Godlop, Godlove, Goodfriend, Goodlove, Gotleb, Gotlib, Gotlibowicz, Gotlibs, Gotlieb, Gotlob, Gotlobe, Gotloeb, Gotthilf, Gottlieb, Gottliebova, Gottlob, Gottlober, Gottlow, Gutfrajnd, Gutleben, Gutlove

The Chronology of the Goodlove, Godlove, Gottlob, Gottlober, Gottlieb (Germany, Russia, Czech etc.), and Allied Families of Battaile, (France), Crawford (Scotland), Harrison (England), Jackson (Ireland), LeClere (France), Lefevre (France), McKinnon (Scotland), Plantagenets (England), Smith (England), Stephenson (England?), Vance (Ireland from Normandy), Washington, Winch (England, traditionally Wales), including correspondence with George Rogers Clarke, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, ancestors William Henry Harrison, Andrew Jackson and George Washington.

The Goodlove Family History Website:

http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/users/g/o/o/Jeffery-Goodlove/index.html

The Goodlove/Godlove/Gottlieb families and their connection to the Cohenim/Surname project:

• New Address! http://www.familytreedna.com/public/goodlove/default.aspx

Anniversary’s: Jane Black and Evan Banes, Ida Godlove and Albert F Tessendorf

Birthday: Erwin V. Henderson

March 4, 1152: Frederick Barbarossa was elected Roman-German king. Born in 1123, Barbarossa or Frederick I was Holy Roman Emperor for forty years. He was slated to lead the Third Crusade along with Phillip of France and Richard the Lion-Hearted. Unfortunately, Barbarossa drowned before he could help lead the Crusade. From the Jewish point of view, unfortunately is the correct word to use in describing his death. Unlike other Crusaders, Barbarossa sought to protect the Jews. He warned local priests and monks not to preach against the Jews. He told the Diet (Parliament) that anybody who killed a Jew would forfeit his own life. Thanks to Frederick's efforts, German bishops threatened those who attacked Jews with excommunication. As a Jewish commentator of that time wrote, "Frederick defended us with all his might and enabled us to live among our enemies, so that no one harmed the Jews."^{^[1]}

March 4, 1193: Saladin, the great Moslem leader, passed away. Among Saladin’s many accomplishments was the re-taking of Jerusalem from the Crusaders and his subsequent defeat of Richard the Lionhearted. Saladin had begun his leadership career in Egypt where Maimonides served as physician to his court. There is some question as to whether Maimonides provided medical services to Saladin or to his brother-in-law and his entourage.^{^[2]}

1194: Llywelybn Faer (The Great) rules Wales, Henry VI conquers Sicily and is crowned King of Sicily, the “Elder Edda” collection of Scandinavian mythology created, erection of Chartres Cathedral begins.[3]

March 4, 1215: King John of England makes an oath to the Pope as a crusader to gain the support of Innocent III. While they may have been odds over many issues, the two leaders both held firm to the concept of allowing the Jews to exist, but in a state of humiliation. In 1210, John imprisoned the Jews of Bristol and demanded 66,000 in ransom as the price of their freedom. To move the process along, John reportedly had the teeth of the prisoners extracted one at a time until they agreed to the payment. Such was his treatment of the Jews, that Barons included special language about the treatment of the Jews in the Magna Carta. The Fourth Lateran Council over which Innocent actively presided adopted several cannons attacking Jews including the denying them the right to hold office and the requirement to wear distinctive dress.^{^[4]}

March 4, 1386: Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila) is crowned King of Poland. The situation of the Jews in Poland had already begun to deteriorate prior to his kingship. In the middle of the century, the Jews were blamed for the Black Plague and attacked by the countrymen. Under Wladislaus II and his successors the first extensive persecutions of the Jews in Poland commenced, persecutions which the monarch did not act to stop.^{^[5]}

March 4th, 1492: m - King James IV of Scotland concludes an alliance with France against England. [6]

March 4, 1570 - King Philip II bans foreign Dutch students^{^[7]}

March 4, 1634: The first tavern in America opens in Boston.^{^[8]}

March 4, 1681

Ebenezer Zane came to Pennsylvania with William Penn in 1681 when the Colony of Pennsylvania was established by Charter from King Charles II on March 4, 1681.^{^[9]}^{^[10]}

In 1681, the western boundary of Pennsylvania was established in William Penn's charter - "The said Lands to extend westwards five degrees in longitude, to bee computed from the said Easterne Bounds..."¹ William Penn was determined to acquire the Native American claims to the land by legitimate negotiations and purchases, but his efforts to negotiate with fellow Europeans claiming land in North America may have been more difficult.

The fundamental problem with Penn's charter is that the point of beginning for his southeastern boundary... did not exist. Penn's charter started with the intersection of a circle 12 miles from New Castle (now located in Delaware) and the beginning of the 40th degree of latitude, "on the South by a Circle drawne at twelve miles distance from New Castle Northward and Westward unto the beginning of the fortieth degree of Northern Latitude." However, the 40th degree is so far north of New Castle that the lines never intersect, so the 1681 charter created great confusion between the Calverts of Maryland and the Penns of Pennsylvania.^{^[11]}

March 4, 1699: Jews of Lubeck, Germany, were expelled.^{^[12]}

1700 CE

Example of regional variations in surface air temperature for the last 1000 years, estimated from a variety of sources, including temperature-sensitive tree growth indices and written records of various kinds, largely from western Europe and eastern North America. Shown are changes in regional temperature in ° C, from the baseline value for 1900. Compiled by R. S. Bradley and J. A. Eddy based on J. T. Houghton et al., Climate Change: The IPCC Assessment, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1990 and published in EarthQuest, vol 5, no 1, 1991. Courtesy of Thomas Crowley, Remembrance of Things Past: Greenhouse Lessons from the Geologic Record ^{^[13]}

Eighteenth Century

Take two striking examples: alcohol and milk. The ability to digest large amounts of alcohol dependes to some extent o the overproduction by a certain set of genes on chromosome 4 of enzymes called alcohol dehyudrogenases. Most people do have the capacity to pump up production by these genes, a biochemical trick they perhaps evolved the hard way, that is, by the death and disabling of those without it. It was a good trick to learn, because fermented liquids are wrought by various forms of dysentery in the first millennia of settled agricultural living must have been terrible. “Don’t’s drink the water’, we westerners tell each other when heading for the tropics. Before bottled water, the only suppy of safe dringing water was in boiled or fermented form. As late as the eighteenth century in Europe, the rich drank nothing but wine, beer, coffee and tea. They risked death otherwise. (The habit dies hard.)^{^[14]}

But foraging, nomadic people not only couldnot grow the crops to ferment; they didi not need the sterile liquid. They lived at low densities and natural water supplies were safe enough. So it is little wonder that the natives of Australia and North America were and are especially vulnerable to alcoholism and that many cannot now ‘hold their drink’.

1700: In 1700 America consisted of eleven small colonies of 250,000 people along the Atlantic coast from Massachusetts to Carolina extending westward as far as the Appalachians, comprising a few hundred thousand square miles.^{^[15]} In 1700 about two hundred Jews lived in the British colonies of North America. They neatly bifurcated their lives into being a state “everymen,” blending in and proving their value to society through their trade ties, and maintaining in private their Jewish identities and sustaining their own communitites, with the synagaogue playing a crucial role in their lives. Like most people in the colonies they accepted the hierarchical nature of the society and deferred to communal authority figures. ^{^[16]}

1700: In the year 1700, a professor named Eisenmenger at the University of Bonn published a massive work, “Judaism Revealed”, (2120 pages) in which he claimed to have unmasked the monstrosities of the Talmud Jews. Eisenmenger knew the languages concerned and his book became the Bible of religious and post religious anti-semitism for two centuries and more.^{^[17]}

1700: Towns like Berlin grow into great cities, and by 1700 there is an unprecedented population explosion in Europe thanks to a plant from the far away Andes, the potatoe. ^{^[18]}

1700

^{^[19]}

^{^[20]}

Early 1700s:During the early 1700s, the Shawnee, Mingo, Delaware, and other Indian tribes also used present-day West Virginia as a hunting ground.^{^[21]}

1700-
1703

Jesuits moved mission from Peoria to the Mississippi Valley, settling briefly at Des Peres River and then founding the town of Kaskaskia near the mouth of the Kaskaskia River.

^{^[22]}

1700-1720

^{^[23]}

Fort Newell

^{^[24]}

March 4, 1732/1733

John Battaile’s eldest son, John, was born in December 1695, and

died March 4, 1732-3. He married Sarah _____. This well known family

has spread widely through the South and West.^{^[25]}

March 4, 1762

Re; Richard and Onnour Stephenson

This indenture made this 4th day of March (March 4) 1762 between Richard Stephenson^{^[26]} of the County of Frederick and Colony of Virginia, farmer and Onnour, his wife, of the one part and John Carlyle and George William Fairfax of the other part witness that for and in consideration of the sum of 107 pounds 16 shillings and three pence current money of Va. to him the said Richard Stephenson in hand paid by the said John Carlyle and George William Fairfax... whereas.., whereof... by virtue of a bargain and sale to them thereof made by the said Richard Stephenson for one whole year by indenture bearing date the day next before the day of the date of these presents and.., the tract or parcel of land situate in the County of Frederick on the River Shenandoah which was granted unto the said Richard by Jomn Hardin By Deed of Lease & Release Bearing Date the 4 and 5 day of December 1752 it being the tract of land whereon the Bloomery now stands and bounded as by a survey whereof made as follows: beginning at a small walnut on the river side by the mouth of the mill water courses and running thence north 75 — 76 degrees west 40 poles to an elm tree by the road thence north 3 degrees east 24 poles to a bush and stake thence south 40 degrees east 18 poles to a black oak thence south 60 degrees east 38 poles to a white oak thence south 53 degrees east 21 poles to a white oak in the River side, thence up the river south 40 degrees west 34 poles to the beginning containing ten acres of land together with the iron works or bloomery and all houses, buildings, orchard, trees, woods, underwood,water courses, etc.

(two pages of where.., and whereas... etc.).

Witnesses, John Hardin

Valentine Crawford

Edward Masterson

March 4, 1761 received of the within mentioned John Carlyle and George William Fairfax the sum of 107 pounds 16 shillings and 3 pence, it being the consideration of the within deed.

Richard x Stephenson

John Hrdin Onnour x Stephenson

Valentine Crawford

Edward Masterson

At a court held for Frederick County on the 7th day of April 1761,

This indenture was acknowledged by Richard Stephenson party thereto and ordered to be recorded.

Teste.

Archibald Wager, C. C..^{^[27]}

March 4, 1769; Warner Washington and Lady and Capt. Crawford and Mr. Tibbles went away after breakfast.^{^[28]}

March 4, 1770: Mr. Crawford set of for Williamsburg & Mr. Magowan for Colhester the last of whom returnd.^{^[29]}

March 4, 1762

Re; Richard and Onnour Stephenson

This indenture made this 4th day of March (March 4) 1762 between Richard Stephenson^{^[30]} of the County of Frederick and Colony of Virginia, farmer and Onnour, his wife, of the one part and John Carlyle and George William Fairfax of the other part witness that for and in consideration of the sum of 107 pounds 16 shillings and three pence current money of Va. to him the said Richard Stephenson in hand paid by the said John Carlyle and George William Fairfax... whereas.., whereof... by virtue of a bargain and sale to them thereof made by the said Richard Stephenson for one whole year by indenture bearing date the day next before the day of the date of these presents and.., the tract or parcel of land situate in the County of Frederick on the River Shenandoah which was granted unto the said Richard by Jomn Hardin By Deed of Lease & Release Bearing Date the 4 and 5 day of December 1752 it being the tract of land whereon the Bloomery now stands and bounded as by a survey whereof made as follows: beginning at a small walnut on the river side by the mouth of the mill water courses and running thence north 75 — 76 degrees west 40 poles to an elm tree by the road thence north 3 degrees east 24 poles to a bush and stake thence south 40 degrees east 18 poles to a black oak thence south 60 degrees east 38 poles to a white oak thence south 53 degrees east 21 poles to a white oak in the River side, thence up the river south 40 degrees west 34 poles to the beginning containing ten acres of land together with the iron works or bloomery and all houses, buildings, orchard, trees, woods, underwood,water courses, etc.

(two pages of where.., and whereas... etc.).

Witnesses, John Hardin

Valentine Crawford

Edward Masterson

March 4, 1761 received of the within mentioned John Carlyle and George William Fairfax the sum of 107 pounds 16 shillings and 3 pence, it being the consideration of the within deed.

Richard x Stephenson

John Hrdin Onnour x Stephenson

Valentine Crawford

Edward Masterson

At a court held for Frederick County on the 7th day of April 1761,

This indenture was acknowledged by Richard Stephenson party thereto and ordered to be recorded.

Teste.

Archibald Wager, C. C..^{^[31]}

March 4, 1774; All except Mr. Calverts family, Mr. Diggers, Dulany, and Dr. Rumney went away after dinner.[32]

March 4-5, 1776: American fortify Dorchester Heights , overlooking Boston from the south.[33] Under the cover of constant bombing from American artillery, Brigadier General John Thomas slips 2,000 troops, cannons and artillery into position at Dorchester Heights, just south of Boston, on this day in 1776. Under orders from General George Washington, Thomas and his troops worked through the night digging trenches, positioning cannons and completing their occupation of Dorchester Heights.

The cannon that made Thomas' efforts possible were those taken by Lieutenant Colonel Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen with his Green Mountain Boys at Fort Ticonderoga on May 10, 1775. Colonel Henry Knox then brought the cannon and powder to Boston through the winter snow in time for Washington and Thomas to employ them in the engagement at Dorchester Heights.

By muffling their wagon-wheels with straw, the Patriots were able to move their cannon unnoticed. Washington would use this same strategy to evade British General Charles Cornwallis after the Battle of Trenton.

At daybreak, British General William Howe received word of the American position overlooking the city. Within days, General Howe came to realize that the American position made Boston indefensible and soon ordered the evacuation of all British troops from the city; the British sailed for Halifax, Nova Scotia, on March 27. Howe and his troops remained in Canada until they traveled to meet Washington in the conflict over New York in August.

In 1898, a Georgian white marble revival tower was commissioned for the site of the battle to memorialize the Patriot victory at Dorchester Heights. The memorial tower has been listed on the National Register of Historic Places since 1966. In 1978, it joined eight other sites in the Boston National Historic Park under the purview of the National Park Service.[34]

March 4, 1777. Reachd Winchester to Dinner according to Appointment with the Officers[35] &ca. claimg. part of the 200,000 Acs. of Land.[36]

March 4, 1777: When the English at Detroit kept the Indians stirred up along the frontiers to the westward, Washington created what he designated as the Western Department, with headquarters at Fort Pitt. There were two important groups in this department, due to their having enlisted under the banner of different colonies. Those west of the Monongahela River were in the Virginia regiments, and there is just a little confusion as to the number of these regiments, due to the assignments of Colonel William Crawford. He did not remain in the service long, for he was back at Heathtown and was in his place as a justice of the Yohogania court during the latter years of the Revolution, until he started up to Sandusky. He had first gone to the Virginia capital at Williamsburg, where he was commissioned as a lieutenant-colonel of the 5th Virginia Regiment on February 13, 1776, and served there until promoted as colonel of the 7th Regiment on August 14, 1776. He is credited with having raised this regiment largely in the district of West Augusta. It was attached to General Woodford’s brigade and was nearly cut to pieces at the battle of Brandywine. Colonel Crawford served with this regiment until March 4, 1777.

The 13th Virginia Regiment was sent east to become a part of General Muhlenberg’s brigade and in September, 1778, was renumbered as the 9th Virginia, being sent west of the Alleghenies for service in the spring of 1779. It reported John Gibson as colonel; Richard Campbell as lieutenant-colonel, and Richard Taylor as major, with five captains and 275 rank and file.[37]

August 8, 1777-March 4, 1778 Thomas Moore

George Rogers Clark Papers Vol 4.1781-1784, James Alton James, Ed.

March 4, 1791: Vermont is the 14th state to join the Union. It is the first state to join the original 13 states.^{^[38]}

March 4, 1793: On March 4, 1793, George Washington’s second inaugural took place in Congress Hall, the building adjoining Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Independence Hall is called “The Cradle of Liberty.^{^[39]}

1794 – March 4 - The first Court of Quarter Sessions was convened by Magistrates Benjamin Harrison, Hugh Miller and John Wall at the house of Morgan Van Matre. ^{^[40]}

1795 - March 4 - Benjamin Harrison, Morgan Van Matre, Jeremiah Robinson, John Wall and Henry Coleman, Trustees of Cynthiana, sold lots in the town to Hugh Stevenson, Benjamin Harrison, Robert McBride, John McLaughlin, Lewis Marshall, William Rankin. ^{^[41]}

1795 - March 4 - Benjamin Harrison and wife Mary conveyed to Christian, John, Robert and Elizabeth Scott, 230 acres in Harrison and Bourbon Counties. Morton's? line, corner to said Harrison,, etc. Consideration £81. Witness - W. Moore, C.H.C. Acknowledged Harrison Court March 1795 by Benjamin Harrison. ^{^[42]}

March 4, 1797: John Adams is sworn in as second President of the United States, succeeding George Washington. This orderly transfer of power, including the acceptance of the outcome of elections, is a uniquely American gift to the world of political science.^{^[43]}

March 4, 1797

^{^[44]}

March 4, 1799: Under cover of night, between the 3rd and the 4th of March, work commenced- the erecting of five batteries, four against the southern wall and one in support of the northern sector.13 The artillery park at Napoleon¹s command consisted only of field pieces, mostly of 12, 8, 6 and 3 "pouces" (=inches of 2.7 cm), of howitzers of 6 pouces and of 6-pouce mortars,14 since the heavy artillery had all been loaded for transfer to Acre bay onto the ships of the flotilla commanded by captain Standelet, and onto the freighters that had been collected for that purpose in the Egyptian harbors. Those ships were only just then commencing their journey north, without the means of contact with the land forces, and Napoleon was compelled to make do with the lighter ordnance at his command. However, he did not seem to have been unduly worried.Most probably, the outward appearance of these antiquated walls revived his confidence in the description of M. de Volney, who, in 1784, had called the ramparts of Jaffa "mere garden walls." ^{^[45]}Joseph Lefevre was said to have been in Napoleon’s Body Guard Unit.

March 4, 1801: On opposite sides of what had been a tall monument. The top fallen off, these inscriptions on the square base:

Geo. W. Crawford, born June 4, 1790, died September 20, 1871.

Winnie, wife of George W. Crawford, born March 4. 1801, died August 6, 1871.

Harriet, dau. of G. and Winnie Crawford, died August 26, 1860. Aged 26 years, 24 days.

Richard Crawford, son of G. and Winnie Crawford, b. November 28, 1833.

5. Mrs. Emahiser says that in 1958 she saw a marker:

Julian Crawford, 21 years, died 1851. ^{^[46]}

March 4, 1801

Thomas Jefferson becomes the 3^rd President of the United States.^{^[47]}

March 4, 1801: A contingent of sword-bearing soldiers escorted the new president to his inauguration on March 4, 1801, illustrating the contentious nature of the election and the victors' fear of reprisal. In his inaugural address, Jefferson sought to heal political differences by graciously declaring We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.

As president, Jefferson made some concessions to his opponents, including taking Hamilton's advice to strengthen the American Navy. In 1801, Jefferson sent naval squadrons and Marines to suppress Barbary piracy against American shipping. He reduced the national debt by one-third, acquired the Louisiana Territory, and his sponsorship of the Lewis and Clark expedition opened the west to exploration and settlement. Jefferson's first term ended in relative stability and prosperity, and in 1804 he was overwhelmingly elected to a second term.

The flawed voting system that was so problematic in the election of 1800 was later improved by the 12th Amendment, which was ratified in 1804.^{^[48]}

March 4, 1802

In Madison County, Ohio, at London, in the original surveys, page 2, no. 1020, part of Military Warrant No. 22, on West Fork of Deer Creek, called for 1,000 acres to Uriah Springer.

Surveyed by Duncan McArthur

Frederick Zimmerman

Joseph Bowman, C. C.

Isaac M. Riley, M. May 6, 1801-March 4, 1802.^{^[49]}

Since Uriah Springer was the Power of Attorney for Moses Crawford, Sr. (Son of Lt. John Crawford and grandson of Col. William Crawford), this may have been the stretch of land Moses was entitled to. Probably was sold by Uriah Springer and the amount turned over to Moses Crawford, Sr., as part of his share. (See letter of Richard Crawford, written to his Uncle David Bradford).

Uriah Springer, (who was Power of Attorney to Moses Crawford’s share of Lt. John Crawford’s estate), had a son , Uriah Springer. The records of Brown County, Ohio, indicate that young Uriah Springer was collecting bounty lands belonging to his own father, (who was the second husband of Sarah, daughter of Col William Crawford). Uriah

Springer, Sr. ranked as a Captain. Here a transaction, involving Robert and Joseph Wardlow, concerning a United States patent. Pages 332, 333 and 334. Young Uriah Springer was a Justice of the Peace and he and his wife Nancy, lived at Williamsburg (which is in present Clermont County, Ohio). On East Fork of the Little Miami River, and where many of the early transactions were recorded. Note: the relationship between young Uriah springer and Moses Crawford, Sr., would be first cousins, since Moses’ father, John, was brother to young Uriah’s mother, Sarah.

At Circleville, Ohio, in Pickaway County (formed in 1810), Warrant no. 223, Uriah Springer, 700 acres. Surveyed about 1901 on no. 914 which no. belongs to Uriah Springer, St.

For his services in the American Revolutionary War, Uriah Springer, Sr., was entitled to about 4,000 acres of bounty lands. His warrants as follows and not to be confused with Crawford’s.

Warrant No. 222, Uriah Springer , 2,999 acres, Captain on the Va. Con’t Line, 3 years. Surveyed & dated April 1, 1783.

Warrant No. 223, Uriah Springer, 2,000 acres, Va. Con’t Line, 3 years. Surveyed April 1, 1783.

These surveys, like others are located in various places and in different sized plats.^{^[50]}

March 4, 1813: John STEPHENSON. Born on January 7, 1765 in Frederick County, Virginia. John died in Kentucky on March 17, 1832; he was 67. Buried in Concord Cemetery, Kentucky.

John first married Elizabeth MOORE. Born on March 19, 1773. Elizabeth died on July 6, 1812; she was 39.

They had the following children:

10 i. Elizabeth (1796-1852)

ii. Mariah.

Mariah married Thomas CALVERT.

iii. Sally.

Sally married Asher COX.

11 iv. Eliza T. (1811-1847)

On March 4, 1813 when John was 48, he second married Alice “Alsey”. Born in 1771. Alice “Alsey” died in Kentucky on September 19, 1846; she was 75. Buried in Concord Cemetery, Kentucky.

They had the following children:

i. Presley L.

ii. James F.

iii. Edward.

iv. Julia Ann.

Julia Ann married Clifton CALVERT.^{^[51]}

18 U.S. 207

5 L.Ed. 70

5 Wheat. 207

STEVENSON'S Heirs
v.
SULLIVANT.

March 4, 1820

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ohio. This was a suit in Chancery, and the case upon the facts admitted by the parties, was as follows: Previous to the year 1775, Hugh Stephenson, of Virginia, lived and cohabited with Ann Whaley, and had by her the appellants in this cause, whom he recognized as his children. In July, 1775, he made his will, in which he described the appellants as the children of himself, and of his wife Ann, and devised the whole of his property to them, and to their mother. In July, 1776, he intermarried with the said Ann Whaley, and died the succeeding month, leaving her pregnant with a child, which was afterwards born, and was named Richard. The will was duly proved after the death of the testator. In June, 1776, the testator was appointed a colonel in the Virginia line, upon continental establishment, and died in the service. After his death, and the birth of Richard, a warrant for 6,666 and two-thirds acres of military lands, was granted by the State of Virginia to the said Richard, who died in the year 1796, in his minority, without wife or children, and without having located or disposed of the above warrant. His mother also died before the year 1796. The defendant claimed the land in controversy under John Stephenson, the elder paternal uncle of Richard; and the appellants having filed their bill in the Court below to recover the premises in question, the same was dismissed, and the cause was brought by appeal to this

February 18th.

Mr. Brush, for the appellants, stated, that the appellants insisted, that, as representatives of their father, Hugh, the warrant in question ought to have issued to them. All the laws of Virginia, granting military land bounties, were passed after the death of Hugh Stephenson. The act which extends the bounty to those who had died before any bounty was provided, is that under which the warrant issued. It assigns the bounty to the 'legal representatives' of the person upon account of whose services it was granted. We maintain, that the term, representatives, is used purposely not to exclude the heir, but to embrace others than the legal heir, under the then existing laws. It never could be intended to give a bounty to elder brothers and uncles, who might be in arms against the country; but to the immediate objects of the soldier's attention and care, whom, by his will, he had appointed to represent him, or to that class of relatives, among whom personal property was distributed by the statute of distributions; certainly more just and liberal in its provisions, than the feudal course of descents, by which real estate was cast on the eldest male relative in a collateral line. But, waving this point, the complainants maintain that they are heirs at law of Richard Stephenson. And they maintain this upon two grounds. First. By the Virginia law, regulating the course of descents, passed in 1785, they were legitimated. Second. By the same law, as bastards, they were made capable of inheriting to their deceased brother, on the part of the mother.

1. The ancestor of Richard never had any interest in the subject that constitutes the estate. It is a gratuity given to his representative, who most clearly took as a purchaser, and the estate he held, upon his decease, passed to his heirs generally, without reference to the channel through which he derived it. The estate originated under the laws of Virginia. The parties resided in Virginia, until the establishment of the State of Kentucky, where Richard died. The descent was cast, either under the laws of Virginia, or Kentucky; and, in this respect, they are the same. The act of 1785, provides, that 'where a man having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child or children, if recognized by him, shall thereby be legitimated.' In the case of Rice v. Efford,a and in the case of Sleighs and Strider, cited by Judge Tucker, and given in a note,b it is decided, that this act includes cases of births and marriages, antecedent to its passage. This is its plain and natural interpretation. It was meant, as the Judges say, 'to protect and provide for 'the innocent offspring of indiscreet parents, who had already made all the atonement in their power for their misconduct, by putting the children, whom the father recognized as his own, on the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock.' It meant to put them on the same footing, not only as it respected their father's estate, but in relation to the estates of each other, and the estates of all their kindred. In both the cases above cited, the father died after the act of 1785 took effect; and, in that point, the present case is to be distinguished from them. It would appear, from the case of Rice v. Efford, that the Chancellor considered it a material point, that the recognition of the illegitimate children took place after the act of 1785 was in operation. And Judge Roane expressly says, that the interpretation adopted, 'applies to cases only, where the father has died

3 Henn. & Munf. 225.

Id. 229. posterior to the passage of the act.' This observation of Judge Roane may properly be termed an obiter dictum. The case before him did not require that point to be decided; and, we conceive, that the dictum is demonstrably incorrect, as is also the intimation of the Chancellor. The object of the act was to 'protect and provide for the children,' by giving them a complete capacity of inheritance. To give them this title, the law requires two facts; the marriage, and the recognition by the father. But, it is said, that although the law embraces the case of an anterior marriage, the recognition must be subsequent. Why this distinction? The grammatical construction of the sentence does not require it. The terms, 'shall afterwards intermarry,' are correctly referred to the birth of the children, not the date of the act. In relation to the marriage and the recognition, the statute speaks from the same time. The whole structure of the sentence necessarily connects them. The active participle, 'having,' in reference to the birth of the children, and the passive participle, 'recognized,' in relation to their acknowledgment, are the only terms which could properly be used to describe both anterior and subsequent cases with reasonable precision. Surely it would be a strange construction, by which the active participle is made to embrace both the past and future, while the passive participle, in the same sentence, is confined to future cases only! This can only be done by interpolating the word hereafter, so as to make that part of the sentence read, 'such child or children, if HEREAFTER recognized by him.' The object of the statute does not require, but absolutely forbids such interpolation. It was designed, as the Court say, in the case of Stones v. Keeling,c to establish the most liberal and extensive rules of succession to estates, 'in favour of all, in whose favour the intestate himself, had he made a will, might have been supposed to be influenced.' It operates solely upon the children, and it must have been designed to operate equally upon all in the same situation, whether the acknowledgment was made before or after the passing of the act. The dictum of Judge Roane, evidently grew out of an argument suggested by himself, that the interpretation adopted by the Court, might be considered an invasion of private right. We see no difficulty on this ground; but if there were any, it is not remedied by applying the act to cases only where the father died posterior to its passage.

The possible interest which children have in the father's property, during his lifetime, is not of that absolute character which the legislature cannot control. If it were, every change of the law of descents, would be an invasion of the rights of expectants under the existing law. A descent cast by the death of an intestate, cannot be disturbed by subsequent laws; but that is no reason why the legislature should not change the law, or give to individuals new capacities of inheritance. The security of existing rights remains inviolable, notwithstanding this is often done. By the death of H. Stephenson, before the act of 1785, his property passed

3 Henn. & Munf. 228. in note. to his legitimate child. If, under that act, the appellants were legitimated, in 1787, they, thereby, could not prejudice the rights of Richard. Their new capacity was altogether prospective. From that day, they enjoyed a character to inherit rights which might thereafter accrue; and, in relation to those rights, we do not see what bearing the time of their father's death has upon the question. In the case of Sleighs v. Strider, W. Hall devised land to his son, R. Hall, for life; and after to his eldest son and his heirs forever: but if no male issue, to his eldest daughter and her heirs. Bichard Hall had an illegitimate son born in 1776: in 1778 he married the mother, and recognised the son till his death, in 1796. He had also daughters after the marriage. It was determined that the son was legitimated, by the act of 1785, and entitled under the devise from his grandfather. It would seem, from the dictum of Judge Roane, that if Richard Hall had died before the 1st of January, 1787, the grandson never could have been legitimated. Whether he could or not, the eldest daughter must have taken. But suppose that the grandson had lived until 1788, and, in the lifetime of his father, had died leaving issue: would such issue, or the eldest daughter of Richard, have taken under the devise? We maintain that the issue of the deceased son would have taken: from which we infer that the time of death is immaterial. The interpretation of the Virginia Courts can only be made rational and intelligible by rejecting the limitations suggested by the Chancellor and Judge Roane, and applying the statute to all persons within its literal meaning, without reference to the time of the recognition, or the death of the father. By this course, the new capacity, in all, will take date from the 1st of January, 1787, and will confer rights from that day only; as in cases that have arisen since the statute, the legitimate rights of the children, born before marriage, all take date from the marriage, without any reference to the time of recognition, or the death of the father.

2. We insist that the appellants, being the bastard brothers and sisters of Richard on the part of the mother, are his heirs at law. The law of 1785 contains this provision: 'Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance, on the part of the mother, in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother.' In adopting a rule for the interpretation of this provision, we insist, in the language of the court, in the case of Stones v. Keeling,d that 'the act relates to the disposition of property only; and proceeds to show who shall be admitted to share the property of a person dying intestate, notwithstanding any former legal bar to a succession thereto; and in that light the law ought to receive the most liberal construction; it being evidently the design of the legislature, to establish the most liberal and extensive rules of succession to estates, in favour of all, in whose favour the intestate himself, had he made a will, might have been supposed to be influenced.' It gives to bastards a full

3 Henn. & Munf. 228. note. and complete capacity of inheritance, through the maternal line, both lineal and collateral. By nothing short of this can the terms of the law be satisfied. It is said, however, that the terms of the law are fully satisfied when it is extended to inheritance direct, between the bastard and the mother; thus excluding collateral descents between bastards altogether. This doctrine is founded upon an entirely erroneous rule of construction. It is assumed that the statute being an innovation upon the common law, must be construed strictly, and extended only so far as the letter absolutely requires. The Virginia Courts, in the cases referred to, have adopted a different rule; and a rule more consonant to reason and justice, and to our free and equal principles of government. The incapacities of bastards grew out of the feudal system, and originated in the dispositions of the feudal lords to multiply escheats and forfeitures. Most undoubtedly it was the intention of the Virginia legislature, to cut up the whole system root and branch. If bastards cannot inherit from a legitimate brother, they cannot inherit from each other. Neither can they inherit from, or transmit inheritance to, uncles, grandfathers, or any collateral relative whatever. By the same rule, legitimate brothers and sisters cannot inherit from bastards, or their descendants. And if this be the case, who can say that bastards are capable of inheriting 'and transmitting inheritance, on the part of the mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother.' Mr. Doddridge, contra, stated, 1. that in examining the appellants' claim to hold the lands in question, as the legal representatives of Hugh Stephenson, under his will, he would contend, what indeed seemed to be admitted on the other side, that Richard Stephenson took by purchase from the State, and that Hugh never had an interest in the subject, legal or equitable, which he could devise, or which could pass from him in a course of descents. If this be so, it would certainly follow, that upon the death of Richard, under age and without issue, after having survived his mother, the estate passed from him to his heirs general, according to the letter of the act directing the course of descents, as the appellants' counsel contend, and without reference to the channel through which he obtained it. But we shall insist, that according to the equity of the 5th section of the act of descents, the land passed to the fraternal kindred.

One of the laws of Virginia on the subject of land bounties refers to them, as having been 'promised by ordinance of Convention.' This circumstance made a search for that ordinance necessary. There were three sessions of a Convention held in the year 1775. By an act of the last, the Convention of 1776 was regularly elected. The present controversy has had the effect of collecting the journals of both Conventions. They are now, for the first time, published. A perusal of them will show, that the Conventions, although they provided for raising troops, never made a promise of land bounty to any description of the public forces. Indeed, until they declared the State independent, they had asserted no claim whatever to the crown lands, such a promise would have appeared absurd. The first mention of a land bounty will be found in the acts of the first regular General Assembly at their October session in 1776, chapters 11. and 21. enacted after the death of Hugh Stevenson. The practice of giving bounties in land was followed up by the acts of October 1778, c. 45, May 1779, c. 6., and the manner of carrying them into grant was provided for by the acts of May 1779, c. 18. and of October 1779, c. 21. But these laws having omitted to provide for the heirs of those who were, or should be, lost in the service, two others were passed. By the first a promise was made to the officers and soldiers, then living, in these words: 'and when any officer, soldier, or sailor, shall have fallen, or died in the service, his heirs or legal representatives shall be entitled to, and receive, the same quantity of land as would have been due to such officer, soldier or sailor, respectively, had he been living.'e The second is in the following words, (comprehending the case of H Stevenson:) 'That the legal representatives of any officer, on continental or State establishment, who may have died in the service, before the bounty in lands promised by this or any former act, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same in like manner as the officer himself might have done if living. It is observable, that the latter act only respects the heir of an officer who had fallen before any land bounty was promised

Chan. Rev. Code, 112. to any person; whereas the former is an encouragement held out to the living officer, soldier, and sailor, &c. By the latter act, it is evident that the bounty conferred by it was not given to those who died before any bounty was provided; nor to the legal representatives of those, on account of whose services the same was given, as such. The bounty is directly given to the legal representative for the loss of an ancestor; and is so much as the father would have been entitled to had he lived or fallen in the service, &c. Here, if the heir took quasi heir, the debts of his ancestor might sweep the gift away. The difference between pay and bounty cannot well be overlooked. The first is a vested estate, and, as such, subject to debts and legacies. Bounties to the widow or heir, are in the nature of compensation, or of gratuities for a loss, and are taken directly from the hand that gives. Hugh Stevenson had not, at the time of his death, even a promise of the bounty in question, nor of any other bounty. His services entitled him to his pay and subsistence alone.

It is difficult to comprehend what is meant by the opposite counsel, when he speaks of those 'whom by his will he had appointed to represent him, or to that class of relations among whom personal property was distributed by the statute of distributions.' As to the statute of distributions, it is enough to say, that then, as well as now, it no more embraced a bastard than the feudal law of descents. And as to the terms 'appointed by his will to represent him,' if they mean any thing, they mean the persons to whom the party had devised the property in question. But could Hugh Stevenson devise the property in question? Real estate in Virginia was never devisable at the common law. In 1776, the English statute of wills was in force. Under that statute, those only who were seised, could devise. The construction of that statute was the same in England and Virginia. Those lands only, which the testator had at the time of making his will, could be devised. The Virginia statute of wills empowers a party to devise such estates, real or personal, as the party hath, 'or at the time of his death shall have,' &c. This statute passed in 1785, and began its operation on the 1st of January, 1787. It is, then, obvious that the appellants cannot claim as devisees, neither at the common law, nor under the English statute of wills; nor even under the Virginia statute of wills, if it had been then in force; because neither at the time of making his will, nor at the time of his death, had the testator any interest in the premises.

2. The appellants claim as heirs at law to Richard, under the 19th and 18th sections of the act directing the cause of descents. The 19th section is in these words: 'Where a man having, by a woman, one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child or children, if recognized by him, shall be thereby legitimated.' The issue also in marriages deemed null in law, shall, nevertheless, be legitimate. And the 18th section is in these words: 'In making title by descent, it shall be no bar to a party that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent, was, or shall have been, an alien. Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother, in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother.'

In the construction of statutes no authority need be quoted for the following rules of interpretation. 1st. All the acts passed at any one session of a legislative body are to be taken together as one act. 2d. Consequently, the same words or phrases, as often as they occur, are to be construed to have the same meaning when that can be given them without gross violation of the sense. 3d. The acts of the same session, made in pari materia, are to be taken together as one act. The marriage act, the act of descents, the statute of wills and distributions, and the act respecting dower, were made in pari materia. Marriage is the source of all legitimate birth, and, as such, the cause of dower, of descents, and of distributions. These laws have extraordinary claims to be considered as one statute. They were compiled at the same time, by the same committee, composed of the ablest lawyers and civilians of their country—enacted at the same session of the same legislative body, in the same year, (1785;) and, lastly, all went into operation at the same time, on the 1st of January, 1789. They will be found to contain a complete code for the government of domestic relations, without any contradictions or discrepancies. These four statutes contain 164 sections; in almost every one of which the future verb shall occurs, and in all of which, with the exception of the 7th section of the marriage act, (which confirms past irregular marriages,) its future operation cannot be disputed, nor never has been disputed.

With the rules of construction already stated, and this view of the four statutes, we will proceed to show, that the appellants' construction of the 19th section is incorrect. And this, 1st, on principle, and, 2dly, on authority. First. The rules of construction entitle us to give to the verb shall, in this section, the same meaning intended whenever it occurs in any of the statutes. If the legislature had intended to confer legitimacy on those recognized before the 1st of July, 1787, (July 1, 1787) they certainly would have left us nothing for construction. They would not have been less cautions than in the preceding section they had shown themselves on a less important subjec; 'is or hath been an alien,' &c. Again; it is the obvious policy of a just legislature, that this act should operate prospectively, not retrospectively. Words which might bear both constructions, ought to be expounded according to that policy; to give a statute a retroactive effect without evident necessity, is inconsistent with this policy. To give to this act an operation upon past births and marriages, is to carry the liberality of construction far indeed. But to cause it to operate on the past recognitions of the father who is dead, before the commencement of the statute itself, would be unjustificable. The principle of the law is, that after marriage, the father, if he pleases, may render his children legitimate. Legitimation, in this view, is the effect of the father's agreement; an effect of which he must be sensible, to make it his act. It is easy to conceive of cases in which a father, willing to soothe his wife, and make the best of his case, might be brought to say that her children, born before their marriage, were his, at a time when such acknowledgment would have no legal effect whatever; but who, with the provisions of this statute before him, would make such an acknowledgment; an acknowledgment which would make the child his heir, and pledge him to the mother and the world to provide for it as such: To construe the act as having a retrospective effect on past recognitions, would, therefore, be against the general policy of legislation; contrary, often, to the wish of a deceased individual; and might be productive of much injury to private rights.

But, it is said, that the possible interest which children have in the property of their father in his life time, is not of that absolute character which the legislature cannot control. This is admitted, and the statute of descents is an exercise of such a control. But the new rule of descents created by that act, is known to the proprietor in his life time, and if that pleases him not, the statute of wills, of the same date, is placed in his hands, and enables him to control the act of descents. Again; it is a maxim that nemo est haeres viventis. In life, the relation of father and child exists between legitimates, but not between illegitimates. The relation of ancestor and heir, presumptive or expectant, may exist while the former is still living. But the legal relation of ancestor and heir never does exist until the death of the father. The moment the eyes of the father are closed in death, is that in which this legal relation begins to exist, and from that time it becomes unalterable. So, after his decease, Hugh Stephenson became ancestor to Richard in ventre sa mere; but not the ancestor of the appellants.

To examine the 19th section upon authority. The cases of Rice et al. v. Efford et al.f and of Stones v. Keeling, and Hughes v. Striker,g are all that bear upon the subject. The only question which seemed to create much difficulty in those cases was, whether births and marriages, before the act, were embraced by it? and the decisions are, that such births and marriages are embraced, where the children, born before wedlock, had been recognized by the father, after the 1st of January, 1787. But this is said to be nothing more than an obiter dictum of Judge Roane. But we regard it as the reasoning of the Court, given by the only Judge who gave any reason for the decision. A decision, that marriages and births, before the act, are embraced by its provisions, because the recognition took place after the act was in force, is plainly a decision, that, but for the subsequent recognition, prior marriages and births could not be considered as within the act. These cases furnish good authority for applying the 7th section of the marriage act, to marriages contracted before, but existing on the 1st of January, 1787; (January 1, 1787) and for substituting the words 'hath been,' in the act of descents respecting aliens, for the words 'shall have been.' If this be correct, both those provisions will accord with the residue of the acts containing them,

3 Henn. & Munf. 225.

Ib. and with the act concerning dower, and the statute of wills and distributions. The operation of all, will then be prospective.

The statute of descents shows, that wherever, in adopting the civil law, its framers meant to exceed or fall short of its provisions, they have done so in explicit terms. By the civil law, the marriage of the parents legitimated the children previously born, without the father's recognition.h This legitimation was the subject of the famous proceeding at the parliament of Merton. The ecclesiastics there demanded, that the marriage of the parent should legitimate the children; to which the barons returned their memorable answer: 'Nolumus leges Angliae mutari.'i The common lawyers of England, therefore, would not agree to adopt the civil law in this particular. But the common lawyers of Virginia, who compiled the act of 1785, determined to adopt the civil law in this particular, sub modo; that the marriage of the parents should legitimate the children, provided the father should afterwards recognize them. It is contended, on the other side, that this recognition is nothing more than statutory evidence of the fact, which might be otherwise proved, and is not of itself a substantive provision. If this argument be correct, then by the common and civil law a bastard must always have been the heir of his natural father, provided the identity of that natural father could be proved. But as we know that the mother, both by

1 Bl. Comm. 455. Just. Inst. l. 1. tit.

1 Bl. Comm. 455. the common and civil law, was always a competent witness to establish that fact of the father's identity, and yet never resorted to for the purpose of making her child heir to the father, we have a right to conclude, that the recognition required by the statute, is something more than mere evidence of the fact.

3. The appellants claim as heirs of Richard Stevenson, under the 18th section, and in support of this claim they contend, that the terms, 'inheriting or transmitting inheritance on the part of the mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother,' confer a capacity to inherit and transmit inheritance in the ascending as well as descending line, and also from and among collaterals. Their doctrine amounts plainly to this: that by the true construction of the second member of the 18th section, bastards are made the legitimate children of their mothers, at least for the purposes of inheritance.

In expounding the statute of descents, it has been justly remarked by Judge Tucker, that the framers of it were eminent sages of the law, and complete masters of its technical terms. This being the case, it would be reasonable to look for the same technical language, in all cases where the same thing was intended. When in the 19th section of the act of descents, and also in the marriage act, they remove from certain classes of bastards all the disabilities under which they laboured, they employ that legal term which conveys their meaning clearly, and leaves nothing for construction. They say they shall be 'legitimate,' not that they shall be capable of inheriting 'on the part of their mothers and fathers;' leaving us to inquire after the extent of the capacity. The law causes them to change characters. They cease to be bastards, and become the legitimate children of their father and mother. The consequences of their legitimacy follows. They have father and mother, sisters and brothers, uncles and aunts, with an universal capacity of inheriting and transmitting inheritance. The 18th section immediately preceding, if it had been intended to make bastard children the legitimate offspring of their mothers, would have followed the same language, and would have left nothing to interpretation. That section would have read thus: 'In making title by descent, it shall be no bar to a party, that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent from the intestate, is, or hath been an alien or a bastard. Bastards also shall be considered in law as the legitimate children of their mother.' The 19th section, like the marriage act, gives no new capacities to bastards as such. They make certain persons of that description legitimate, and the capacities of legitimacy follow of course. They inherit to both parents, not as bastards, but as their legitimate offspring.

The second proposition of this argument is, that all the disabilities of bastardy are of feudal origin. With us it is of Saxon origin. The term bastard being derived from a Saxon word, importing a bad, or base, original. The disabilities of bastardy are the same under the civil as under the common law, and in all ages and nations.j He has no ancestor; no name; can inherit to nobody, and nobody to him; can have no collaterals nor other relatives except those descended from him. He can have no surname, until gained by reputation. This is the origin of new families. He is the propositus by common law. But by the civil law he can inherit his mother's estate.k She is, therefore, the propositus of the civil law. Collaterals descended from a male relative are by the civillaw termed agnati; those descended from a female relative cognati.l In a note to Cooper's Justinian, which I take to be from the pen of Sir Henry Spelman, it is said that illegitimate children can have no agnati—Quia neque gentem neque familiam habent.m If for this reason they can have no agnati, it follows that they can have no cognati; and this is the reason of Justinian's broad proposition, that bastards can have no collaterals; which is our doctrine in this case.

It is admitted that the 18th section does not give legitimacy except specially for inheritance; that is, it removes that incapacity, and no other: finding and leaving them bastards. Now, there are no other disabilities except the incapacity to inherit or to hold a church dignity.n And since these dignities do not exist in the United States, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the bastard on the footing of a lawful child of his mother, for the purposes of inheritance, and thus to admit him among collaterals in her line, it is inconceivable why they should not have said at once, that bastards shall be considered in law the legitimate children of their mother. Instead of which, they have used a technical term, ex parte materna; which in the civil law is constantly opposed to this other term, ex linea materna. The first importing a capacity of lineal inheritance; the other, that, and collateral inheritance also. Neither by the common nor civil law could she inherit to her child, even chattels; she is not mother for inheritable purposes by either code; and the 18th section has given her no inheritable blood of her child. Being incapable of inheriting herself, she cannot give inheritance to a legitimate child by the civil law; because, by one of its canons, the child can never succeed by representation or succession, where the parent could not.

So far, therefore, is the assertion, that the heritable disabilities of bastardy are of feudal origin, from being correct, that they were known and enforced from time immemorial in all nations; were known and emorced in England, before the Norman sat foot there. The Ecclesiastics at Merton did not demand of the king that bastards should inherit even to their mother. They simply demanded, that by the intermarriage of their parents they should become legitimate; which was refused.

But it is contended by the appellants' counsel, that the words, 'in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother,' apply as well to collateral as lineal inheritance. But what is that which a bastard has capacity to do, 'in like manner as if lawfully begotten of his mother?' The answer is in the words of the statute, 'of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of his mother.'

But, we insist, that although Richard Stevenson, the son, took by purchase from the State; yet he took quasi heir, to hold as such to the use of his male anceastry, under the equity of the 5th section of the act of descents: 'Provided, nevertheless, that where an infant shall die without issue, having title to any real estate of inheritance derived by purchase or descent from the father; neither the mother of such infant, or any issue which she may have by any person other than the father of such infant, shall succeed to, or enjoy the same, or any part thereof, if there be living any brother or sister of such infant on the part of the father, or any brother or sister of the father, or any lineal descendant of either of them.' The principle of this section is, that the estate which came from a male ancestor, shall return to his stock. The principle of the 6th section, immediately following it, is the same; that the estate which came from a female ancestor, shall return to her stock. It is admitted, that the case of Richard Stevenson is not within the letter of the 5th section; but is it not within the equity of it? The estate came not from the father by descent, or by gift; but in equity we may pursue the consideration of the grant, and have a right to inquire, whether that consideration was furnished in common, by the paternal and maternal kindred; and, therefore, ought to pass to both lines. The consideration of the grant to Richard Stevenson, is his father's military service, and his death in that service. Loss is a valuable consideration for a grant, and the grant ought, in consequence, to be made to the heir of the family suffering the loss. A military bounty is in the nature of compensation for a loss, or of a gratuity for services. It is intended to supply to a family, as far as the liberality of the country can supply the place of a lost member. They are intended to avail the heir in his pecuniary concerns to the extent to which it is supposable his father's labour might have availed him had he lived. In this view, therefore, the hounty, given by law to the heir, is, in equity, a paternal estate, and should descend and pass to the paternal kindred, in exclusion of the maternal.

The Attorney-General, on the same side, contended, that the appellants were not entitled, either as legal representatives of Hugh, or as heirs of Richard Stevenson.

1. The appellants were not the legal representatives of Hugh Stevenson; for legal representatives are those whom the law appoints to stand in a man's place, and such was not the case of the appellants. The law recognized no connexion between them and Hugh Stevenson.

But, it is objected, that the father had made them his legal representatives by his will. This admits of various answers: but one is sufficient, that the will was a nullity; it was revoked by the subsequent marriage and brith of a child.o Neither, therefore, by operation of law, nor by any act of Hugh Stevenson, does it appear that the appellants were his legal representatives.

2. Neither could they inherit as heirs to Richard Stevenson; for, being natural children, there was no common blood between them.

It is again objected, that they were legitimated by the 19th section of the law of descents. But this clause has received a judicial exposition by the highest Court of the State, in which the law was passed, and is now the settled law of that land. In the cases of Rich v. Efford,p and Sleighs v. Strider,q the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided, that the act applied to cases of prior births and marriages; but, that to give it an application, the father must have been in life after the passage of the act. In this case, the father had died more than ten years before the act took effect, and, consequently, the case at bar is not within its operation. But, it is said, that the Court of Appeals were right in extending the law to cases of births and marriages antecedent to the act; but they were demonstrably wrong in declaring, that the act applied to cases only in which the father had died posterior to the act. To which we answer, that the precedent cannot be divided; if it is to have the authority of a precedent, it must be taken altogether; it cannot be entitled to the authority of a precedent so far as it favours the opposite side, and be open to dispute so far as it destroys their position. It has been the settled law of Virginia, since the year 1805; for it was then that Sleighs v. Strider was decided, and though its correctness may have been originally doubtful, yet extreme inconvenience follows the disturbance of a rule of property which has been so long settled; and that this argument ab inconvenienti, was of great weight in the estimation of the Court of Appeals itself, may be seen from the proposition to reconsider the decision of that Court in the celebrated case of Tomlinson and Delland.r The original decision in that case, which subjected the succession to personal property, to the feudal principle, which, in relation to lands, respected the blood of the first purchaser, had been made in 1801. It having produced great excitement in the State, and being very generally disapproved, a reconsideration was most strenuously pressed in 1810, nine years only after the original decree; but a majority of the Court was of the opinion, that the inconvenience of overthrowing what was already considered as a settled rule of property, was too great to be encountered, even if the decision were erroneous at first. It is true, that they thought the decision called for by the stern language of the law; but from one of the Judges this opinion was wrung with such manifest reluctance, that it was believed he would have come to a different result had the question heen res integra. Here the rule having been settled, the Court will say how far it ought now to be considered as the settled law of the State.

If, however, these precedents be open to question at all, they are open throughout; and if the Court of Appeals erred at all, it was not in limiting the operation of the law to cases in which the father has died since the act took effect, but in extending it to cases of births and marriages which happened anterior to the passage of the law. This law took effect on the 1st of January, 1787. The births, the marriage, the recognition, and the death of the father, had all occurred in, and prior to August, 1776. Had the legislature of Virginia the right to pass a retrospective law? The Court of Appeals said not, in the cases of Turner v. Turner's executors,s Elliott v. Lyell,t and the Commonwealth v. Hewitt.u Even where it has been attempted to apply a new remedy to pre-existing rights, it is said the language must be irresistibly clear, or the Court will not give it such retrospective operation.

Does the language of this act clearly intend to operate on pre-existing facts? on pre-existing marriages and births? We contend that it does not. In the case of the Commonwealth v. Hewitt, before cited, Judge Roane, in resisting the retroactive effect of the law, founds himself, in a great measure, on the general nature of laws, as prospective, and on the time assumed by the act itself for the commencement of its operation, from and after the passing thereof. Both considerations concur here, with this farther circumstance in favour of this law, that while it has (in the original act) the usual clause, 'This act shall commence in force from and after the passing thereof,' a subsequent and distinct law was passed to suspend its operation until the 1st of January, 1787. Again; this act commences with a general declaration, most unequivocally prospective. The first clause is, 'be it enacted by the general assembly, that henceforth, when any person having title, &c.' According to settled rules of construction, therefore, the force of this expression, henceforth, runs through every subsequent clause. The 19th section under consideration ought to be read thus: 'Be it enacted that, HENCEFORTH, [that is, after the 1st of January, 1787,] (January 1, 1787)where a man, having by a woman, one or more children, shall, afterwards, intermarry with such woman, such child or children, if recognized by him, shall thereby be legitimated.' Is this language so irresistibly retrospective, in relation to the date of the law, that the Court is constrained to give it that construction? Is it not, on the contrary, so obviously future and prospective, that it requires subtility and violence to wrest it to a retrospective meaning? The verbs which indicate the acts that are to produce the effect of legitimation, are in the future tense. It is insisted, therefore, that the clause has no application to any case, but to one in which all the facts on which it is to operate, shall happen after its passage; the birth of the children, the marriage, and the recognition. It is true, that in speaking of the children, the present participle is used, 'having one or more children.' But the present tense of this participle relates, not to the time of passing the act, but to the time of the marriage, 'having,' at the time of the marriage, 'one or more children.' This is not a new use of the present tense; grammarians tell us that the present tense is occasionally used to point at the relative time of a future action. The true reading of this part of the act is this, 'where' (i. e. in all cases, hereafter, in which) 'a man shall marry a woman, having by him, at the time, one or more children.' Thus, the participle, although present at the time of the marriage, is future in relation to the passage of the act. This is no unusual application of this participle;—if I say, 'if a man shall go to Rome, and having a dagger in his hand, shall strike it to the heart of the Pope:' the present participle is properly used in it; it is present in relation to the action with which it stands connected, though future, in relation to the time of speaking. So the present participle here is present in reference to the act with which it clearly stands connected, the act of marriage; although future in relation to the date of the act. The sense is the same as if the legislature had said, 'wherever, hereafter, a man shall have one or more children by a woman, and shall, afterwards, intermarry with her,' &c. It is only by this construction which considers both the birth and marriage as future, that the word 'afterwards,' used in the act, acquires a grammatical sense, or, indeed, any kind of sense. To prove this, let us see what the effect will be of considering this participle, as used in the present tense, in reference to the time of passing the act. Then the sense will be, 'where a man now having one or more children by a woman, shall afterwards intermarry with her:' it is clear that the word, afterwards, becomes insignificant and senseless. It adds nothing to the meaning; for if a man now having one or more children by a woman, shall intermarry with her, he must of necessity intermarry with her afterwards; for the future verb, shall intermarry, makes the act future, in relation to the passage of the act; and the adverb of time, afterwards, added to the verb, does not perform its appropriate function of adding a new quality to the verb. It is a useless clog, therefore, on the sence, because its tendency is to obscure, and not to illustrate the sense. Whereas, the construction for which we contend, (by considering both facts as posterior to the act, but the marriage as being posterior to the birth,) gives the word, afterwards, force and significancy; it then performs the office of arranging the order of the two future events. In this point we differ from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and insist, that the liberality which would apply this act retrospectively, to previous births and marriages, is a liberality which looks beyond the judicial sphere, and belongs only to the legislature. What is the argument on which the Court of Appeals (and the opposite counsel, after them) ground themselves in extending this act to antecedent births and marriages? 'I see no difficulty,' says Judge Roane, in Rice v. Efford,v 'except what arises from the words, shall afterwards intermarry, which might seem to import only marriages to be celebrated in future: that word, afterwards, however, is rather to be referred to the birth of the children, than the passage of the act; and no good reason could possibly have existed with the legislature for varying the construction of a section, embracing two descriptions of cases standing on a similar foundation.' The counsel for the appellants, seizing this passage, has said, the terms, 'shall afterwards intermarry,' are correctly referred (by the Court) to the birth of the children, not to the date of the act. This is not accurate: it is not the three words, shall afterwards intermarry, that are referred by the Court to the birth of the children: but the word, afterwards, alone. This, we admit, is correctly referred to the birth of the children: but the Court having correctly gained this conclusion, forget the force of the future verb, 'shall intermarry.' We say, that the force of this future verb requires that the marriage shall be after the act. That henceforth, 'where a man having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman,' irresistibly demands a marriage future to the date of the act: that the words, shall intermarry, make the marriage future in relation to the act. The word, afterwards, removes the marriage farther off, and marks its futurity in relation to another event, the birth of the children; which other event, although expressed by the present participle, is itself drawn forward into futurity by the force of the word, afterwards, to which it is attached. That such an intention is utterly inconsistent with the prospective character given to the whole act, by the force of the word henceforth, and in the commencement. That the force of this word runs through the whole act; and that, used in the clause under consideration, it would render the retrospective construction of that clause absurd. In the passage cited, Judge Roane says, that no good reason could possibly have existed with the legislature, for varying the construction of a section embracing two descriptions of cases, standing on a similar foundation. This might have been a good argument on the floor of the legislature, to induce them to embrace past cases; but it is no argument to prove that they have embraced them. Whether they ought to have embraced them is a very different question from whether they have actually done so. The first is purely a legislative question; the last purely a judicial question, and the only question in the case for the Court.

But it is said, the appellants do not seek to give the act a retrospective effect; they say that the act, from the time it took effect, clothed the appellants with a new capacity of inheritance, not in relation to rights previously vested, but in relation to inheritances which might thereafter fall. Let it be admitted that their position is such; let it also be admitted, that the legislature had the right to clothe them with such new capacity in relation to future inheritances. But the question still remains, have they done so: is it to persons in their predicament that this new capacity of inheritance is extended? We have endeavoured to show that it is not: whether the Court look to the exposition of the statute by the tribunals of the State, or whether they look to the construction of the statute, per se. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, while they admit the application of this statute to antecedent births and marriages, decide that the law applies to cases only where the father has died posterior to the passage of the statute. The reasoning on which the Court ground this distinction is not fully developed by them: the appellants' counsel infers their reasoning, and, as we may safely admit, contests it with success. But there is a reason for requiring that the father should continue in life after the act, which applies with equal force both to the marriage and the recognition, and corroborates the construction drawn from the language of the law, that both those facts should be posterior to the act. It is this: the statute attaches new legal consequences to the act of marrying a woman by whom the man had, previously, had children; and to the act of recognizing such children. Make the law prospective in those particulars, and the citizens for whose government it was intended, have it in their choice, by performing those acts thereafter, to incur those consequences or not. But attach those consequences to a past marriage and recognition, and you change the legal character of a past transaction by an ex post facto law. By a subsequent law you attach consequences to an act which did not belong to it when it was performed. It is precisely for this reason that ex post facto laws are prohibited; because consequences are attached to an act which did not belong to them at the time; and which, consequently, could not have entered into his consideration of the question, whether he would commit it or not. You surprise him by a new case, on which his judgment was never called to pass, and when it is too late to retract the step and avoid the new consequences.

3. The next ground taken by the claimants is, that if they were not legitimated by the 19th section of the law of descents, they were made capable of inheriting from Richard by the 18th section of that law.w It is contended on the part of the appellants, that this clause opens an inter-communication of blood through the mother, to an indefinite extent lineally and collaterally. But we insist, that it only gives to the natural children the faculty of inheriting immediately from the mother, and of transmitting such inheritance to their posterity. The legislature has not said, that natural children shall be considered as lawfully born of their mother for all the purposes of inheritance pointed out by the act. It has given them two capacities of inheritance only; the capacity to inherit on the part of the mother; and the capacity of transmitting inheritances on the part of the mother. These capacities, it is true, they are to enjoy, in like manner 'as if they had been lawfully begotten of the mother.' But these words, 'as if, &c.' do not add to the number of their heritable capacities; they seem only to designate the extent to which they shall enjoy the two specific capacities which are expressly given them.

Do these capacities authorize them to claim the inheritance from Richard? What are they? 1st. That they shall be capable of inheriting on the part of their mother; 2dly. That they shall be capable of transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother. The last capacity it is not contended, has any application to the case at bar. This not being the case of an inheritance transmitted through the natural children, but one which they claim directly for themselves. If they are entitled, therefore, their title must arise under the first capacity, that of inheriting on the part of their mother. What is the meaning of this expressin, on the part of their mother? The counsel on the other side contends, that it means from or through the mother; that it connects the bastard with the ancestral line of the mother, and through her, collaterally, with all who are of her blood. On the other hand, we insist, that the capacity does not go beyond an inheritance from the mother, and the transmission of that inheritance lineally and collaterally among their descendants; or, in other words, to make the mother the head of a new family. The expression 'on the part of the mother,' does not carry the mind beyond the mother, unless connected with words of more extensive significance, such as, ancestors on the part of the mother, or descendants on the part of the mother; and here it would be the supplemental words which would produce the effect, not the words, 'on the part of the mother.' But, it will perhaps be urged, that in the case of Barnitz v. Casey,x the counsel upon both sides, and the Court, seem to have understood this term in the sense contended for on the other side. That case arose on a statute of Maryland, in which the force of the term is expounded to mean, from or through. In our case, the Virginia statute furnishes an opposite inference. The expressions, 'on the part of the father,' and 'on the part of the mother,' occur in the 5th section of the law of descents. It is the only instance in which they do occur, and there they are indisputably synonymous with 'of' and 'from' any brother or sister of such infant on the part of the father, and no vice versa. It is said, that this provision places the natural children on the footing of legitimate children to all the purposes of inheritance. But, we would ask, does it enable the mother to inherit from them? Does it enable the mother's ancestors or collateral relations so to inherit? The provision is, that the natural children may innerit from the mother. But where is the provision that the mother may inherit from them, or that her relations may inherit from them? It is not to be found; the legislature did not look upwards beyond the mother. It was not their object to force her natural issue upon a family which she had dishonoured and offended by bringing them into the world. That they should have connected them with her was just and proper; she could not complain. But to have connected them with a family from which she had probably been expelled on account of her infamy, and to have given them a capacity to inherit the estates of that family, would not have been quite so just or reasonable. We contend, that the legislature have not done it; but that the capacity to transmit applies only to inheritances descending from the mother, and from each other. Again; if the expression, 'on the part of the mother,' is of the extent contended for, then the capacity to inherit on the part of the mother, is a power to take inheritances from, or through her, in right of her. But the inheritance claimed is not of this description; it is a direct inheritance from a mother, which, both at the common law, and under the statute, is not an inheritance on the part of the mother; it does not come from, or through her, it does not come in her right. So say the Court in the case of Barnitz v. Casey, before cited.y That was on the statute of Maryland; the statute of Virginia, in case there is no father, gives the estate to the mother, brothers and sisters, per capita, so that the shares taken by the brothers and sisters, are cast at once from the deceased brother on them, and do not come to them, from, or through, or in right of the mother. This is the inheritance which the appellants claim, and which they claim in virtue of their specific and single capacity to inherit on the part of the mother.

Mr. Hammond, for the appellants, in reply, stated, that the argument on the other side, involved the general construction of the act, as well as its operation upon this particular case. It asserts, that the recognition must, in all cases, be subsequent to the marriage; thus proving the consent of the father to the legitimation. Now, if the legitimation does not result from the agreement, or depend upon the assent of the father, this argument is of no avail. The principle is adopted from the civil law. And it is reasonable to suppose, that when the ablest lawyers and civilians of the country, introduced it into their code, they intended to adopt it as interpreted and understood in the countries where it prevailed. The civilians held, that 'this legitimation is a privilege or incident inseparably annexed to the marriage, so that, though both the children and parents should wave it, the children would, nevertheless, be legitimate.' The foundation of this doctrine is thus explained: 'Ratio est quia matrimonium subsequens ex fictione legis retrahitur ad tempus susceptionis liberorum ut legitimati habeantur legitime suscepti (i. e.) post contractum.'z

If legitimacy is an incident inseparably annexed to the marriage, it must be the marriage, and not the agreement of the father, that legitimates the child. But there can be no such legitimacy without the agreement or recognition of the father. Agreement and recognition are not synonymous terms. Recognition implies no more than a simple admission of a fact; it is in the nature of evidence. Agreement supposes an assent or compact, from which certain consequences result, made with a view to those consequences. Recognition refers to something past. Agreement implies a transaction from which some effect is to follow. The provision under consideration consists of an enumeration of facts, and a declaration of legal consequences resulting from those facts. The facts are, having children by a woman, and afterwards marrying her. Upon such a case the statute operates, and declares the children legitimate. But the effect follows only the legal proof of the facts; and this the statute has defined. There must be a recognition by the father; and this is considered a third fact. Though as a fact it must exist; yet its existence is only necessary to establish the first fact; that the husband of the mother is, in verity, the father of the child. No legal consequences can result, until facts are established by proof. We insist, that the terms 'if recognized by him,' are inserted for the single purpose of defining the proof upon which the material facts should be established, and are to be regarded only as prescribing a rule of evidence for the particular case. Had the legislature intended this recognition as one fact, a principal condition upon which the legitimacy was to be founded, they could easily have connected it with the other facts, so as to have left no doubt about it. The act would have read thus: 'Where a man, having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, AND recognize such child or children, they shall thereby be legitimated.' As the words now stand in the sentence, they are of very different import. The two principal facts are first enumerated; then proceeding to declare the result, the mode of proof is set down, as it were, in a parenthesis, hypothetically, and indefinite as to time: As much as to say, 'when the father and mother intermarry, if, suppose that, allow that the father recognized the children, they shall be legitimate.' If the recognition of the father is a principal fact; if the legitimacy is the consequence of that recognition, the child could only be legitimate from the time of the recognition. This would introduce endless confusion and litigation. The rights of parties would always depend upon the time the father signified his assent, or declared his agreement. This never was the doctrine of the civil law. Some referred the legitimation to the birth, others to the time of marriage; but all dated it from the one or the other of these periods. But as legitimation could not exist until the celebration of the marriage, we hold that it must commence at that time, and from that time confer rights upon the parties. A recognition before marriage is within the letter of the act. It supplies evidence as conclusive of the fact to be established, as if made after the marriage. Constantine, who introduced this provision into the civil law, 'is supposed to have intended it as an encouragement to those who had children born in concubinage, to marry the mother of such offspring.'aa But in our case, the recognition is in fact subsequent to the marriage. The will speaks only from the death of the testator, and is, therefore, a recognition by him at the time of his death. The appellants were born illegitimate. Their father recognized them as his children. While illegitimate, he declares their mother his wife. He afterwards marries her, and continues to recognize them as his children. He dies. Then comes an act of the legislature, the special object of which is, 'to protect and provide for the innocent offspring of indiscreet parents, who had already made all the atonement in their power for their misconduct, by putting the children whom the father recognized as his own, on the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock.' If birth and marriage are the facts upon which the act operates, and recognition nothing but evidence of those facts, the decisions already cited are decisive in our favour. It is settled, that the act extends to cases of birth and marriage before its passage; and it is perfectly clear, that the enacting part of the act is prospective. The parties upon whom it is acknowledged to operate, could claim no rights, but those which accrued after the first of January, 1787. It was at that period, and not before, that their new capacity commenced. We have shown, that this interpretation of the act interferes with no vested right: And we have shown how interests in possession may be affected, upon the principle decided in the Virginia Court of Appeals. In the view we take of the case, the death of the father, before the passage of the act, is a circumstance of no importance. It is upon the children, and not upon the father, that the act operates. It attaches upon existing cases, and gives a character to transactions already past. Were he alive, he could not recal the birth, the marriage, or the recognition. A solemn disavowal of the children could not restrain the operation of the law; for we have shown, that legitimation results from the facts, and not from the inclination or pleasure of the father.

The common law rules of succession, both as to real and personal estate, were exceedingly narrow and illiberal. Where those rules have been enlarged by statute, Courts have always given the act a liberal interpretation in favour of the persons let in. Thus the English statute of distributions was construed to extend to cases of intestacy that happened before its passage, where administration was granted afterwards.bb No vested right was disturbed by this interpretation, though it allowed the act a retrospective operation. So in our case, though legitimated by a law subsequent to their birth, the appellants claim a new capacity, only in regard to inheritances that may fall after their legitimacy takes effect. The appellants do not seek to make themselves heirs to their father Hugh. They claim that, upon the death of their brother Richard, in 1796, they were his heirs at law. In making title by descent from a brother, the father is not noticed at the common law. The descent is held to be immediate between brothers. So, by the laws of Virginia and Kentucky, where the father and mother are both dead, the descent is cast directly to the brothers and sisters. If this position could at any time have been doubted, it is now settled by the decision of this Court in the case of Barnitz's Lessee v. Casey.cc

But if the appellants were not legitimated by the 19th section of the act, they claim that they are entitled, as bastards, under the 18th section. When it is admitted that the act changes the condition of bastards, the extent of that change must be ascertained. By determining the class of cases included, it can be best decided what cases are excluded. The Court are called upon for the first time to put a construction upon this part of the act; and we hold, that it will not be correct to say, that bastards cannot inherit collaterally, without showing that the terms and policy of the law can be fairly satisfied, and collateral inheritance between bastards denied. The Court must say that the act confers nothing but a direct lineal succession between bastards and their mother; or they must say that the act removes entirely their incapacity of inheritance through and from the maternal kindred. To this last position it is objected by the counsel for the respondent, that it makes bastards the legitimate children of their mother for purposes of inheritance, which ought not to be done; because if such had been the intention of the legislature, they would have said so in express terms. But does it follow, that the capacity of inheritance would follow the express legitimation of bastards, without providing that such should be the consequence of legitimation? Children legitimated by the marriage of their parents, are no longer bastards. But bastards legitimated in the maternal line, would still, in law, be without a father, and that badge of illegitimacy must ever attach to them. It was a maxim of the civil law, that the Prince could legitimate bastards; but the civilians held, that such legitimation did not confer the right of succession.dd It was the right of succession, the capacity of inheriting and transmitting inheritance, that the legislature in this case meant to confer; and they have chosen to do it in express terms. There is no room to doubt what was intended; and we think there is no just foundation for the exceptions and limitations set up by the respondent.

We admit distinctly, that the appellants must take as bastards, or they cannot take at all. They are 'clothed with all the attributes and disabilities of bastards, except the capacity of inheritance, specially conferred on them, and conferred on them too as bastards.' What were the disabilities of bastards at the time the act was passed? They could not inherit. In matters of succession and inheritance, they had no mother, and consequently could have no other relative. But except on the single subject of inheritance, the laws recognised and regarded them as standing in the same relation to their kindred as if born in wedlock. In contracting marriage, bastards were held to be relations, and prohibited from marrying within the Levitical degrees. In the case of Haines v. Jeffell, the Court of King's Bench refused a prohibition, to stay proceedings in the Spiritual Court against Haines, for marrying the bastard daughter of his sister.ee And the Court said it had always been held so; especially where it was the child of a woman relative. Here the law expressly recognizes the collateral kindred between the uncle and his bastard niece. Bastards are within the marriage act, which requires the consent of parents or guardians to the marriage of persons within age.ff In this case, Mr. Justice Buller declares that the rule that a bastard is nullius filius, applies only to cases of inheritance, and says it was so considered by Lord Coke. Even Blackstone, who is quite a zealot for the common law doctrines respecting bastards, admits, almost in terms, that bastards were, at the time he wrote, subject to no disability but the incapacity of inheritance.gg And Woodeson asserts the same thing.hh In passing the act, the legislature meant to effect a change in the legal condition of bastards, by removing, to some extent, the only legal incapacity to which they were subject: and this was a total disqualification to inherit or transmit estates, from or to ascending or collateral kindred. It is, therefore, evident, that the legislature contemplated confering this capacity, in respect to the ascending or collateral kindred, or both. The civil law distinguished bastards into four classes. Those born in concubinage succeeded to the effects of their mother and relatives, and in some cases to a part of the estate of their putative father.ii So that the authority of precedent is against the doctrine of the respondent, which would limit the effect of the act to inheritance direct between the mother and the bastard.

But it is urged, that the appellants cannot inherit collaterally, because, legally speaking, bastards have no collateral relations; and therefore the appellants cannot be the brothers and sisters of Richard. This was true before the passage of the act. But does it remain so since? The law then provided, that so far as inheritance was concerned, a bastard was the son of no person. He had neither father nor mother, and, consequently, had no blood to convey succession except in a lineal descent from himself. There was no blood to convey succession, either to ascendants or collaterals. Having in law no mother, there could be no source from which a bastard could derive inheritable blood, and no channel through which his blood could communicate with that of others. But as this was a provision of positive law, a new provision could restore the connection. Such is the effect of the provision under consideration. 'Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting, and transmitting inheritance, on the part of THEIR MOTHER, in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother.' Henceforth there shall be heritable blood between the bastard and the mother. The bastard has thus a legal mother; and having a mother, a channel is opened through which he can have brothers and sisters, and every other relative in the ascending and collateral line. It was because the bastard had no mother, that he could have no brothers and sisters. The act gives him a mother. He can inherit from, and transmit inheritance to her direct. Heritable blood can flow from the mother to her bastard child, and be traced from the child to the mother, and through the mother to brothers and sisters, and uncles and aunts. The bastard is not legitimated: But his blood is made heritable through that parent about whom there can be no doubt. The character of his blood being changed, he is restored to his kindred in matters of inheritance; the only case in which the law separated him from them. It is true that the appellants were not the brothers and sisters of Richard at the time of his birth, as far as concerned inheritance. But the act of 1785 has effected a change in their condition; and from the day it took effect, they were in law, and for the purposes of succession to estates, his brothers and sisters of the half blood. Had Richard left brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the 15th section of the act would expressly embrace their case. There was no occasion to make express provision for the succession of bastards, either in the law of descents, or in Judge Tucker's table, because the general provision for the half blood included their case. This is clearly the mode of succession contemplated. They shall inherit in like manner as if lawfully begotten.

It is argued that, on the part of, are technical terms of the law, which only import immediately from. The operation of the act is thus limited to a descent immediately from the mother. If we are mistaken in the consequence, which we suppose even this intercommunication of blood must work in the legal condition of a bastard, we must still inquire whether the terms of the act can be satisfied by this narrow construction. We do not admit that the terms, on the part of, import no more than immediately from. We insist that they are used to describe the ancestral kindred in the line of each parent. On the part of the mother, means, from or through the mother, or her relatives. Thus, brothers and sisters of the same mother, but different fathers, are brothers and sisters on the part of the mother, and are described as such in the 6th section of the act. And in the case of Barnitz's lessee v. Casey, before cited, the counsel upon both sides, and the Court, seem to have understood these terms in the sense we contend for. The capacity of transmitting inheritance, conferred by the act, can have no operation, if the terms, on the part of, be interpreted to mean, immediately from the mother. The bastard must transmit the inheritance to or through, whether it pass to ascendants or callaterals.

The common law disabilities of bastards are, like the canons of descent, of feudal origin: for it must be remembered that this disability relates entirely to inheritance. Escheats are the fruits and consequences, as Blackstone says, of feudal tenure resulting from the frequent extinction of heritable blood, according to the feudal tenure of inheritance. A bastard, being the son of nobody, could have no heritable blood, consequently none of the blood of the first purchaser. The feudal doctrine of carrying the estate through the blood of the first purchaser, inevitably excluded inheritance among bastards. In this sense the disability of bastards was the consequence of feudal policy, and totally inconsistent with the liberal and equitable canons of descent, introduced by the act of 1785. The preference of the male ascending line, preserved by the statute of 1786, is not founded upon feudal doctrines. The inheritance is directed first to the father; not because he is the most worthy of blood, but because he is the head of the family, who can best dispose of the estate among his surviving children: And upon this same principle the grandfather is preferred to the grandmothers and aunts. This is no preference of the male ancestors; but simply a preference of the husband or father, if in existence, to the wife or children of the same person; and the principle of this doctrine is directly repugnant to that of the feudal or common law. Corruption of blood by convictions for crimes, alienage, and bastardy, were three fruitful sources of escheats at the common law. The principle of extinguishing the inheritable blood, applied to each case. The first was cut up by the constitution of Virginia. The act of 1785 laid the axe to the root of the other two. Not by authorizing aliens to hold lands, or by legitimating bastards. In the one case it permits a citizen, claiming by descent, to trace his relation to an intestate through an alien. In the other, it confers a capacity of inheritable blood upon bastards. The object of both provisions is the same: to enable the kindred of the intestate to obtain the property he left, instead of rapaciously seizing it for the government. The act is clearly remedial, and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the object of the legislature, conformable to the opinions of the Virginia Courts already quoted.

March 4th.

Mr. Justice WASHINGTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is admitted by the counsel on both sides, in their argument, with which the opinion of the Court coincides, that Hugh Stephenson, though the meritorious cause of the grant of this land, never took any interest therein, but that the right to the same vested in his son Richard, to whom the warrants issued, as the first purchaser. It is further admitted by the counsel, that the law of descents of Ohio, at the time when Richard Stephenson died, was not more favourable to the claim of the appellants than that of Virginia, which will be hereafter noticed; and they have, in the argument, rested the cause upon the construction of the latter law. The opinion of the Court, therefore, is founded on this law.

The appellants object to the decree of the Court below, upon the following grounds: 1. That the land warrants ought to have been granted to them as the representatives of Hugh Stephenson, designated as such by his last will.

2. That by the marriage of their mother with Hugh Stephenson, and his recognition of them as his children, they were legitimated, and entitled to the inheritance in this land as heirs to Richard Stephenson; if not so, then,

3. That, as bastards, they were capable of inheriting from Richard, who, they contend, was their brother, on the part of the mother.

1. The appellants' counsel do not contend, that their clients are entitled to this land, as devisees under the will of Hugh Stephenson; such a claim would be clearly inadmissible, inasmuch as the testator was not only not seised of the land at the time his will was made, but the law which authorized the grant of it, was not even then in existence. But they are understood by the Court, to insist, that the will so far operates upon the subject, as to name them the representatives of the testator, and to render them capable, as such, of taking under the act of assembly, which passed after the death of the testator. The act provides, that where any officer, soldier, or sailor, shall have fallen, or died in the service, his heirs or legal representatives shall be entitled to, and receive the same quantity of land as would have been due to such officer, &c. had be been living.'

This claim is altogether fanciful and unfounded; for, in the first place, the appellants were not appointed by the will to be the general representatives of the testator, but the devisees, together with their mother, of all the testator's property; and, 2dly, if they had been so appointed, still it could not confer upon them such a description as to entitle them to take under the act of assembly, unless the act itself described them as the legal representatives of Hugh Stephenson, for whose benefit the grant was intended; the then, they would have taken exclusively under the act, by force of such legislative description, and not under, or in virtue of the description in the will. It is not likely that the expression, 'legal representatives,' in the act, was meant to apply to devisees of deceased officers and soldiers for whom the bounty was intended, if they had lived, because, at the time this law was passed, there could not be a devisor of those lands under the general law. It is more probable that they were intended to provide for the case of a person who may have purchased the right of the officer or soldier to such bounty as the legislature might grant to him.

The next question is, whether the appellants were legitimated by the marriage of Hugh Stephenson with their mother, and his recognition of them as his children. This question arises under the 19th section of the act of 1785, directing the course of descents, which took effect on the 1st of January, 1787. This section declares, that 'where a man, having by a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child or children, if recognized by him, shall be thereby legitimated.'

There can be no doubt but that the section applied to bastards in esse, at the time the law came into operation, as well as to such as might thereafter be born. But it is contended by the counsel for the appellants, that the section is, in every other respect, prospective, not only as to the fact of legitimation, but as to the two circumstances of marriage and recognition, which entitle the bastard to the benefits of the law; and, consequently, that to bring a case within the operation of this section, both the marriage and recognition must take place after the 1st of January, 1787. On the other side, it is admitted, that the privilege of legitimation is not conferred upon a bastard prior to the above period; but it is insisted, that, as to the marriage and recognition, the law should be construed as well retrospectively as prospectively.

In the case of Rice v. Efford, decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia,jj the marriage took place prior to the 1st of January, 1787, but the father recognized his illegitimate children, and died, after that period. The whole Court seem to have been of opinion, that the word 'afterwards' referred not to a time subsequent to the 1st of January, 1787, but to the birth of the children, and, therefore, that the marriage, though prior to that period, legitimated the children before born, if they should be recognized by the father. But, it was stated by Judge Roane, in giving his opinion, that the construction of the act applies only to cases where the father has died posterior to the passage of the act.

It is contended by the counsel for the appellants, that since, in the above case, the father recognized the children subsequent to the 1st of January, 1787, this opinion of Judge Roane as to the time of the recognition, was unnecessarily advanced, and is, therefore, entitled to no higher respect than what is due to a mere obiter dictum. Be this as it may, it is the uncontradicted opinion of a learned Judge upon the construction of a law of his own State; and is noticed by this Court, not upon the ground of its being considered in that State as of conclusive authority, but because it strongly fortifies the opinion which this Court entertains upon the point decided; which is, that, however the construction may be as to the inception of the right, it is clearly prospective as it relates to the consummation of it. And this prospective operation being given to the act, by requiring the most important condition upon which the privilege of legitimation is to be conferred, to be performed after the law came into operation, it is less material whether the marriage was celebrated before, or after that period. To render the past recognition of the father effectual to give inheritable blood to his children, who were then illegitimate, and incapable of taking the estate by descent, either from him, or from those to whom it should descend, would in some respects at least, partake of the character of a retrospective law. It would seem to be most reasonable so to construe the law, as to enable the father to perceive all the consequences of his recognition at the time he made it.

The 3d question is, are the appellants, as bastards, capable of inheriting from Richard Stevenson?

The 18th section of the law of descents, under which this question arises, is as follows: 'In making title by descent, it shall be no bar to a party that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent from the intestate, is, or hath been, an alien. Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting or of transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother.'

In the construction of this section, it is never to be lost sight of, that the appellants are to be considered as bastards, liable to all the disabilities to which the common law subjects them, as such, except those from which the section itself exempts them. Though illegitimate, they may inherit and transmit inheritance, on the part of the mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of the mother. What is the legal exposition of these expressions? We understand it to be, that they shall have a capacity to take real property by descent immediately or through their mother in the ascending line; and transmit the same to their line as descendants, in like manner as if they were legitimate. This is uniformly the meaning of the expressions, 'on the part of the mother or father,' when used in reference to the course of descent of real property, in the paternal or maternal line. As bastards, they were incapable of inheriting the estate of their mother notwithstanding they were the innocent offspring of her incontinence, and were, therefore, in the view of the legislature, and consonant to the feelings of nature, justly entitled to be provided for out of such property as she might leave undisposed of at her death, or which would have vested in her, as heir to any of her ancestors, had she lived to take as such. The current of inheritable blood was stopt in its passage from, and through the mother, so as to prevent the descent of the mother's property and of the property of her ancestors, either to her own illegitimate children, or to their legitimate offspring. The object of the legislature would seem to have been, to remove this impediment to the transmission of inheritable blood from the bastard in the descending line, and to give him a capacity to inherit in the ascending line, and through his mother. But although her bastard children are, in these respects, quasi legitimate, they are, nevertheless, in all others bastards, and as such, they have, and can have neither father, brothers, or sisters. They cannot, therefore, inherit from Richard Stephenson, because, in contemplation of law, he is not their brother; and even if he were their brother, they would not inherit their estate under this section, on the part of their mother, but directly from Richard, the descent from brother to brother being immediate. Upon no principle, therefore, can this section help the appellant's case. His estate never vested in the mother, so as for her bastard children to inherit from her; nor did it pass through her in the course of descent to the bastard children.

Decree affirmed, with costs.kk

Rees' Cyclopedia, art. Bastard. Cooper's Just. Inst. 37 1 Bac. Abr. 510.

3 Henn. & Munf. 225.

The history of the respective disabilities and rights of illegitimate children in different ages and nations, is a subject of curious speculation. The most ancient people of whose laws and political institutions we have any accurate knowledge are the Jews. They appear to make little or no distinction between their legitimate and illegitimate offspring. So, also, the Greeks, in the heroic ages, seem to have regarded them as in every respect equal: but at a subsequent epoch they were stigmatized with various marks of unfavourable distinction. Among the Athenians, the offspring of parents who had contracted marriages, which though valid by the law of nations, were contrary to the policy and the positive institutions of the state, were considered as illegitimate; and all bastards were not only deemed incapable of inheriting from either of their parents, but excluded from public honours and offices, and negarded as aliens to the commonwealth. Thus, the citizen who married a foreign woman at once degraded and denationalized his offspring.a The seversity of this law was however occasionally mitigated from motives of policy; and when the ranks of the citizens of a Grecian republic became thinned by wars and proscriptions, they were filled up again from this disfranchised class. (Arist. Politic. l. 3. c. 3. Id. l. 6. c. 4.)

The Roman law distinguished between the offspring of that concubinage which it

tolerated as an inferior species of marriage, and 'the spurious brood of adultery, prostitution, and incest.' (Gibbon's Decl. & Fall, &c. c. 44. s. 1.) The former were termed naturales; and the latter, spurii, adulterini, incestuosi, nefarii, or sacrilegi, according as they were respectively the fruit of prostitution, of incest between persons in the direct line of consanguinity, or related in remoter degrees, and of the violation of vows of chastity.

None of these different classes of illegitimate offspring were stigmatized by civil degradation, or excluded from aspiring to public honours.

Leges Attica, Sam. Petiti, tit. 4 de liberis legit. nothis, &c.

(OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. pp. 384, 385. Dissert, sur les Bastards.) But 'according to the proud maxims of the republic, a legal marriage could only be contracted by free citizens; an honourable, at least an ingenuous birth, was required for the spouse of a senator: but the blood of kings could never mingle in legitimate nuptials with the blood of a Roman; and the name of Stranger degraded Cleopatra and Berenice to live the concubines of Mark Anthony and Titus.' (Gibbon, ubi supra.) 'A concubine, in the strict sense of the civilians, was a woman of servile or plebeian extraction, the sole and faithful companion of a Roman citizen, who continued in a state of celibacy. Her modest station, below the honours of a wife, above the infamy of a prostitute, was acknowledged and approved by the laws.' (Ib.) Thus there were several classes of persons who could not lawfully be concubines, either in respect to the infamy of their characters, ut meretrices; or in respect to their rank in life, ut ingenuoe et illustres; or in respect to their condition as married women, or nuns professed, or as within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. (OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, ubi supra.)

Although bastards were not deprived of any civil rights by the Roman law, and 'the outcasts of every family were adopted without reproach as the children of the state,' yet they were excluded in the early ages of the republic from all claim to the property of their deceased parents. As the law of the XII Tables only called to the succession the agnates, or the persons connected by a line of males of the same gens or family; and absolutely disinherited the cognates or relations on the side of the mother, bastards could have no claim to the property of their parents by inheritance: not to that of the father quis neque gentem, neque familiam habent; nor to that of the mother, because her relations were entirely excluded. It seems, however, that there was no law prohibiting the father from making a provision for his illegitimate children by will, until the time of Constantine, who made some regulations restraining this liberty; which, however, are involved in such obscurity, that the commentators

are not agreed as to their precise nature. J. Godefroy, in his commentary on the Theodosian code, is of the opinion that these regulations annulled such provision by will in favour of bastards wherever the testator left any legitimate children, or father, mother, brothers, or sisters. (Jac. Godefroy. Com. ad. Cod. Theodo. l. 1. De natural, fillis.) Be this as it may, it is certain that the Emperor Valentinian, A. D. 371, permitted the bastard children of fathers, who had also legitimate offspring, to acquire either by donation or will, one-twelfth part of the paternal property; and in case the father had no legitimate children, or surviving parents, he might dispose in the same manner of one-fourth of his estate in favour of his illegitimate children. (Cod. Theodos. l. 1. De natural. liberis.) Justinian again permitted those who had both legitimate and illegitimate children to give or bequeath one-twelfth part of their property to the latter; and in case they had no legitimate children, to make the same disposition of a moiety of their estate. (Novell. 18. c. 5. Pothier Pandect. in Nov. Ordin. Redact. tom. 2. p. 55.) He afterwards permitted them, in case they had no legitimate children, nor father or mother, 'quibus necessitas est legis relinquere partem propriae substantiae competentem,' to leave the whole of their property to their illegitimate offspring; and in case their father or mother survived, the whole, except what the parents were entitled to by law. (Novell. 89. c. 12.) Justinian also established, for the first time in the Roman jurisprudence, the principle of giving to illegitimate children a legal claim to a portion of their fathers's property by inherintance ab intestato, by providing, that in case the father died intestate, leaving neither wife nor legitimate offspring, his natural children and their mother should be entitled to one-sixth part of his estate. (OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. 389.) This, however, must be understood strictly of the children born in concubinage, such as the Roman law recognized this domestic relation; and not of 'the spurious brood of adultery, prostitution, and incest, to whom, (according to Gibbon,) Justinian reluctantly granted the necessary aliments of life;' but from whom it would, in fact, appear that he inhumanly withheld ever this provision.

'Omnis qui ex complexibus nefariis aut incestis, aut damuatis processerit, iste neque naturalis nominatur, neque alendus est a parentibus, neque habehit quoddam ad praesentem legem participium.' (Novell. 89. c. 12. s. 6.) It seems, therefore, that this provision for the necessary support of illegitimate children was confined to those termed naturales. (Ib.)

The stern contempt of the early Roman legislators for the female sex had entirely excluded the cognates from the rights of inheritance, 'as strangers and aliens.' This necessarily prevented even legitimate children from succeeding to their mother; and it is not, therefore, surprising that bastards could claim no part of the maternal estate. When the rigour of this principle was relaxed by the equitable interference of the praetor, his edict called indiscriminately to the succession both the legitimate and illegitimate children of the mother. (OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. p. 391. Pothier. Pandect. in Nov. Ordin. Redact. tom. 2. p. 557.) This rule was subsequently confirmed by the Tertullian and Orphitian senatus consulta, and continued the law of the empire ever afterwards, except that Justinian engrafted into it an exception unfavourable to the illegitimate children of noble women, mulieres illustrae. (Ib.)

The Roman law had provided various modes by which bastards might be legitimated. 1. The first was by a subsequent marriage of the father and mother; a mode of legitimation first established by Constantine. 2. Per oblationem curioe, a mode introduced by Theodosius and Valentinian, which was when the parent consecrated his child to the service of a city. But this only had the effect of legitimating the children in regard to their father. They had no right to inherit from conllaterals, and even their claim to inherit from their father was confined to his property within the city to whose service they were devoted. 3. Adoption blone was declared by the emperor Anastasius to be sufficient to legitimate the natural children of the person adopting them. But this law was abolished by Justin and Justinian. 4. By the last will of the father, confirmed by the emperor. But this only applied to cases where he had no surviving legitimate children, and had some sufficient reason for not having married the mother of his natural children. 5. Per rescriptum principis; by a special dispensation from the

emperor granted upon the petition of the father, who had no legitimate offspring, and whose concubine was dead, or where he had sufficient reasons for not marrying her. 6. By the recognition of the father; as if the father designated one of his natural children as his child in any public or private instrument; this had the effect of legitimating the child thus acknowledged, and all his brothers and sisters by the same mother, upon a legal presumption, that a marriage might have been contracted between the parents. In all these cases, except the 2d, the children thus legitimated were in all respects placed upon the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock. (OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. p. 393, and seq. Pothier, Pandect. in Nov. Ord. Redact. tom. 1. p. 27.)

It should be added, that none of these modes of legitimation could apply to the offspring of criminal commerce, ex damnato coitu; since they all suppose that the children are born of a concubine with whom the father might lawfully intermarry. (Aeuvres de D'Aguesseau, ubi supra.)

By the Roman law if a bastard left legitimate children, they became his heirs precisely as if he himself had been legitimate. But if he died, without having been himself legitimated, and without children, his succession was determined by the rule of reciprocity, and his father and mother, &c. succeeded to him, precisely as he would have succeeded to them. If he had been legitimated while living, his succession was regulated in the same manner with that of persons born in lawful wedlock. (Id. p. 399.)

By the Canon law, the subject of bastardy was, in general, regulated in the same manner as by the Civil law. But though bastards were capable by the latter of aspiring to all the honours and offices of the State, the former refused them the same privileges in respect to the dignities of the church. The canonists also aimed to exclude them entirely from the succession of their father or mother, but allowed all indiscriminately a right to claim the necessary aliments of life. After legitimation in any of the modes provided by the civil law, such as a subsequent marriage of the parents, & c. they regarded them in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock. (Id. p. 400.

et seq.) It was this rule which they endeavoured to impose upon the English barons at the parliament of Merton in the reign of Henry III. (1 Bl. Com. 456.)

The laws of those European countries which have adopted the Roman law as the basis of their municipal jurisprudence, regulate the rights and disabilities of illegitimate children in the same manner as they are determined by the civil and common law. But the Gothic monarchies of Europe adopted from the earliest times a legislation on this subject, in many respects different from that of imperial and papal Rome. Thus, in all the provinces of France, where the droit coutoumier, or unwritten law, prevailed, bastards were incapable of inheriting ab intestato, except the property of their legitimate children, and the reciprocal right of the husband and wife to succeed to each other according to the title of the civil law, unde vir et uxor. This was the universal law of the kingdom, with the exception of the peculiar customs of a few provinces, and the pays du droit ecrit, where the Roman law constituted the municipal code. (Ferriere. Dict. Mot. Bastard. OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. pp. 403. 430. 448.)

They were, also, with the exception of certain local customs, incapable of taking by devise from their parents, except des donations moderes pour leur alimens et entretiens. (Ferriere. Dict. ubi supra. OEuvres de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7 p. 431.)

The king was the heir of all bastards dying without legitimate children, or without having disposed of their property by donation inter vivos, or last will and testament, in the same manner as he inherited the estates of aubains, or aliens, dying in the kingdom. (Ib.) Of the various modes of legitimation known to the civil law, that of France adopted only two, 1. that by a subsequent marriage of the parents, and 2. by authority of the prince. (OEuvr. de D'Aguesseau, tom. 7. p. 437. The bastard who was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, was placed upon the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock, as to personal rights, and those of property; but he who was legitimated by authority of the prince, par lettre du prince, although capable of aspiring to civil honours and offices, was incapable of inheriting, or transmitting property

by inheritance. (Id. p. 462.) Such was the law of France before the revolution; but it was greatly modified by the compilers of the new civil code, who retained but one mode of legitimation, that by a subsequent marriage and recognition of the parents. (Code-Napol eon, art. 331, 332, 333.) Illegitimate children, legally recognized as such, are entitled, in case their father shall have left legitimate descendants, to one third of the portion to which they would have been entitled had they been legitimate; in case the former shall have left no descendants, but only kindred in the ascending line, or brothers or sisters, to a moiety of the same; and in case the parents shall have left neither descendants, nor kindred in the ascending line, nor brothers or sisters, to three fourths of the same portion. (Ib. art. 757.) They have a right to the whole of their parents' property where the latter shall have left no kindred within the degrees of succession. (Ib. art. 758.) Their descendants are entitled to the same rights, jure representationis. (Ib. art. 759.) But bastards are not entitled in any case to succeed to the relations of their parents; (Ib. art. 756.) and none of these provisions are appliable to bastards, the fruit of incestuous or adulterous intercourse, who are only entitled to necessary aliments. (Ib. art. 762, 763, 764.) The property of bastards leaving no posterity, is inherited by the parents who shall have recognized them. (Ib. art. 765.) And in case the parents are deceased, the property received from them, is inherited by the legitimate brothers and sisters of the bastard; and all his other property by his illegitimate brothers and sisters, or their descendants. (Ib. art. 766.)

By the law of Scotland, the king succeeds as ultimus hoeres, to the estates of bastards, and they cannot dispose of their property by will, unless to their lawful issue, without letters of legitimation. But these letters do not enable the bastard to succeed to his natural father, to the exclusion of lawful heirs; for the king cannot, by any prerogative, cut off the private right of third parties. But he may, by a special clause in the letters of legitimation, renounce his right to the bastard's succession, in favour of him who would have been the bastard's heir had he been born in lawful marriage, as such renunciation does

not encroach upon the rights of third parties. (Erskine's Inst. B. 3. tit. 10. s. 3.) A bastard is not only excluded, 1. From his father's succession, because the law knows no father who is not marked out by lawful marriage; and, 2. From all heritable succession, whether by the father or mother; because he cannot be pronounced lawful heir by the inquest, in terms of the brief; but, also, 3. From the moveable succession of his mother; for, though the mother be known, the bastard is not her lawful child, and legitimacy is implied in all succession deferred by law. But though he cannot succeed jure sanguinis, he may succeed by destination, where he is specially called to the succession by an entail or testament. (Ib. s. 4.)

The laws of England respecting illegitimate children, are too well known to render any particular account of them necessary in this place. Vide 1 Bl. Comm. 454. et seq. Co. Litt. by Hargr. & Butler, 3 b. note 1. Id. 123. a. note 8. Id. 123. b. note 1, 2. Id. 243. b. note 2. Id. 244. a. note 1, 2.Id. 244. b. note 1.

2 Bl. Comm. 247.

Cooper's Just. Inst. 561.

Cooper's Just. Inst. 561. note.

1 Bl. Comm. 459.

Wilcocks v. Rootes, 1 Wash. Rep. 140.

3 Henn. & Munf. 225.

Id. 229. note.

3 Call's Rep. 105.

1 Wash. Rep. 139.

3 Call. Rep. 269.

2 Henn. & Munf. 187.

3 Henn. & Mumf. 231.

Which provides, that 'in making title by descent, it shall be no bar to a party that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent from the intestate is, or hath been an alien. Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting or of transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother.'

7 Cranch, 476.

Hargr. note. Co. Litt. fol. 244. b. 245. a.

1 Woodes. 391.

2 Vern. 642.

7 Cranch, 456.

Domat, Loix Civiles, l. 1. s. 2. art. 10.

Ld. Raym. 68.

The King v. The Inhabitants of Hodnett, 1 T. R. 96.

1 Bl. Comm. 486.

1 Woodes. 394.

Nov. 89. c. 12. s. 4.^{^[52]}

CC∅ | Transformed by Public.Resource.Org

March 4, 1829

Andrew Jackson (1st cousin 8 times removed) is inaugurated as the seventh president of the United States.[53] Andrew Jackson 1829 presidential inauguration: Jackson was the first President to invite the public to attend the White House ball honoring his first inauguration. Many poor people came to the inaugural ball in their homemade clothes. The crowd became so large that Jackson's guards could not hold them out of the White House. The White House became so crowded with people that dishes and decorative pieces in the White House began to break. Some people stood on good chairs in muddied boots just to get a look at the President. The crowd had become so wild that the attendants poured punch in tubs and put it on the White House lawn to lure people out of the White House. Jackson’s raucous populism earned him the nickname King Mob.[54]

March 4, 1837 – Martin Van Buren becomes President of the United States of America.[55]

March 4, 1837: Chicago receives its official charter by the state of Illinois.[56]

March 4, 1841: William Henry Harrison (1773-1841), America’s ninth president, served just one month in office before dying of pneumonia. His tenure, from March 4, 1841, to April 4, 1841, is the shortest of any U.S. president. Harrison, who was born into a prominent Virginia family, joined the Army as a young man and fought American Indians on the U.S. frontier. He then became the first congressional delegate from the Northwest Territory, a region encompassing much of the present-day Midwest. In the early 1800s, Harrison served as governor of the Indiana Territory and worked to open American Indian lands to white settlers. He became a war hero after fighting Indian forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811. Harrison went on to serve as a U.S. congressman and senator from Ohio. He was elected to the White House in 1840, but passed away a month after his inauguration, the first U.S. president to die in office.[57]

William Henry Harrison

H O M E S T A T E Ohio P A R T Y Whig T E R M I N O F F I C E March 4, 1841- April 4, 1841 V I C E P R E S I D E N T John Tyler _ Harrison became the first president to die in office when he died of pneumonia 32 days after his inaugural celebration. S I G N I F I C A N T A C T S Harrison died only 32 days after taking office and carried out no significant acts. C A R E E R 1791 Left medical school to fight in the Indian Wars. 1800-1812 Served as territorial governor of Indiana. 1811 Defeated Native American forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe, earning the nickname "Old Tippecanoe." 1813 Recaptured the city of Detroit from the British during the War of 1812. 1816-1819 Represented Ohio in the U.S. House of Representatives. 1825-1828 Represented Ohio in the U.S. Senate. March 4- April 4, 1841 President of the United States. _ Harrison's father signed the Declaration of Independence and his grandson became the 23^rd president of the United States. _ Harrison's 8578-word inaugural address is the longest on record.[58]

March 4, 1844: Paid aTreasury under act April 6, 1838 from March 4, 1844 to September 4, 1844. Agent notified April 20, 1845.

January 30, 1846: The Adm. of Nancy Vance, decd.....paid from March 4, 1844 to September 4, 1844.

FINAL PAYMENT RECORD

Date of death of Nancy Vance is given as February 8, 1845. Payment made to Law. Marx, Atty., February 5, 1846. Ricmond Roll. No other genealogical data of interest.[59]

March 4, 1859: Boteler, Alexander Robinson, a Representative from Virginia; born in Shepherdstown, Jefferson County, Va. (now West Virginia), May 16, 1815; was graduated from Princeton College in 1835; engaged in agriculture and literary pursuits; elected as the candidate of the Opposition Party to the Thirty-sixth Congress (March 4, 1859-March 3, 1861); during the Civil War entered the Confederate Army and was a member of Stonewall Jackson’s staff; chosen by the State convention a Representative from Virginia to the Confederate Provisional Congress November 19, 1861; elected from Virginia to the Confederate Congress, serving from February 1862 to February 1864; appointed a member of the Centennial Commission in 1876; appointed a member of the Centennial Commission in 1876; appointed a member of the Tariff Commission by President Arthur and a member and subsequently made pardon clerk in the Department of Justice by Attorney General Brewster; died in Shepherdstown, Jefferson County, W. Va., May 8, 1892; interment in Elmwood Cemetery.[60]

March 4, 1861 Abraham Lincoln’s inaugural address as he argued passionately before his audience and the nation to keep the Union together: “We mjust not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”^{^[61]} Abraham Lincoln becomes the 16th president of the United States. Although he extended an olive branch to the South, he also made it clear that he intended to enforce federal laws in the seceded states.

Since Lincoln's election in November, seven states had left the Union. Worried that the election of a Republican would threaten their rights, especially slavery, the lower South seceded and formed the Confederate States of America. In the process, some of those states had seized federal properties such as armories and forts. By the time Lincoln arrived in Washington for his inauguration, the threat of war hung heavy in the air. Lincoln took a cautious approach in his remarks, and he made no specific threats against the southern states. As a result, he had some flexibility in trying to keep the states of the upper South--North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware--in the Union.

In his address, Lincoln promised not to interfere with the institution of slavery where it existed, and he pledged to suspend the activities of the federal government temporarily in areas of hostility. However, he also took a firm stance against secession and the seizure of federal property. The government, insisted Lincoln, would "hold, occupy, and possess" its property and collect its taxes. He closed his remarks with an eloquent reminder of the nation's common heritage:

"In your hand, my fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend" it...We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

Six weeks later, the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, and the Civil War began.^{^[62]}

March 4, 1861: The Confederate Flag is adopted in Montgomery, Alabama.^{^[63]}

Fri. March 4, 1864

Got ordered to march went to depot then ^{^[64]}

Went back to camp great crowd of soldiers

Sent coat^{^[65]} home. Great celebration at

Orleans for union gov Wahn[66]

March 4, 1865

The regiment left Savanna, Georgia on board the United States transport Delaware (coastal steamer), with the 176^th New York under sealed orders,^{^[67]} touching at Hilton Head, S. C., March 4.^{^[68]}

March 4, 1865 (Lincoln’s 2^nd Inaugural)

“If we could know first where we are, and wither we are tending,

We could better judge what to do, and how to do it.

A house divided against itself cannot stand.

We shall not fail, even we stand firm.

Wise counsels may accelerate or mistaken delay it,

But sooner or later, the victory is sure to come.

It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces,

It may seem strange, but let us judge not, but let us judge not, that we be not judged!” ^{^[69]} President Lincoln begins his second term, expressing his desire for the war to end and extending a gracious hand to the South. "Fondly do we hope--fervently do we pray--that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away." He concluded with the following stirring statement: "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right...let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wound...to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations."

Within six weeks, the war was over and an assassin had killed Abraham Lincoln.^{^[70]}

March 4, 1877: Kirkwood, Samuel Jordan, a Senator from Iowa: born in Harford County, Md., December 20, 1813; clerked in a drug store and taught school; moved to Mansfield, Richmond County, Ohio, in 1835 and continued teaching until 1840; studied law; admitted to the bar in 1843 and commenced practice in Mansfield; prosecuting attorney of Richland County 1845-1849; member of the State constitutional convention in 1850 and 1851; moved to Coralville, Johnson County, Iowa, in 1855 and engaged in the milling business; member, State senate 1856-1859; Governor of Iowa 1860-1864; appointed by President Abraham Lincoln as Minister to Denmark in 1863, but declined; elected as a Republican to the United States Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of James Harlan and served from January 13, 1866, to March 3, 1867; resumed the practice of law and also served as president of the Iowa & Southwestern Railroad Co; Governor of Iowa 1876-1877, when he resigned to become United States Senator, serving as a Republican from March 4, 1877, to March 7, 1881, when he resigned to accept a Cabinet portfolio; Secretary of the Interior in the Cabinet of President James Garfield 1881-1882, when, upon the death of President Garfield, he resigned; unsuccessful candidate for election in 1886 to the Fiftieth Congress; resumed the practice of law; president of the Iowa City National Bank; died in Iowa City, Johnson County, Iowa, September 1, 1894; interment in Oakland Cemetery.

http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=k000242

March 4, 1879: Zebulon Baird Vance

Zebulon Baird Vance

37th and 43rd Governor of North Carolina
In office January 1, 1877 – February 5, 1879
Preceded by	Curtis Hooks Brogden
Succeeded by	Thomas Jordan Jarvis
In office September 8, 1862 – May 29, 1865
Preceded by	Henry Toole Clark
Succeeded by	William Woods Holden
United States Senator from North Carolina
In office March 4, 1879 – April 14, 1894
Preceded by	Augustus S. Merrimon
Succeeded by	Thomas Jordan Jarvis
Personal details
Born	(1830-05-13)May 13, 1830 Weaverville, North Carolina
Died	April 14, 1894(1894-04-14) (aged 63) North Carolina
Political party	Whig/American (pre-Civil War)^[1] Conservative Party of NC (c. 1862–1872)^[2]^[3] Democratic (1872–1894)
Spouse(s)	Harriette Vance
Children	4
Profession	lawyer, colonel, politician
Zebulon Baird Vance (May 13, 1830 – April 14, 1894) was a Confederate military officer in the American Civil War, the 37th and 43rd Governor of North Carolina, and U.S. Senator. A prodigious writer, Vance became one of the most influential Southern leaders of the Civil War and postbellum periods.

Childhood

Zebulon Vance was born in Buncombe County, North Carolina near present-day Weaverville,^[4] the third of eight children. His family is known to have owned a relatively large number of slaves (18). His uncle was Congressman Robert Brank Vance, for whom his elder brother, Robert B. Vance, was named. At age twelve he was sent to study at Washington College in Tennessee, now known as Washington College Academy.The death of his father forced Vance to withdraw and return home at the age of fourteen. It was during this time that he began to court the well-bred Miss Harriette Espy by letter.^[5]

Zebulon Vance birthplace

To improve his standing, Vance determined to go to law school. At the age of twenty-one, he wrote to the President of the University of North Carolina, where he was a member of the Dialectic and Philanthropic Societies, former Governor David L. Swain, and asked for a loan so that he could attend law school. Governor Swain arranged for a $300 loan from the university, and Vance performed admirably. By 1852 Vance had begun practicing law in Asheville, and was soon elected county solicitor (prosecuting attorney). By 1853, he and Harriette Espy were married, and they would subsequently have four sons.

Civil War

By the time the ordinance of secession had passed in May 1861, Vance was a captain stationed in Raleigh, commanding a company known as the "Rough and Ready Guards," part of the Fourteenth North Carolina Regiment. That August, Vance was elected Colonel of the Twenty-sixth North Carolina. The Twenty-sixth engaged in battle in New Bern in March 1862, where Vance conducted an orderly retreat. Vance also led the Twenty-sixth at Richmond. The Twenty-sixth was ultimately destroyed at the Battle of Gettysburg, losing more than 700 of its original 800 members, though Vance at that time was no longer in military service.

In September 1862, Vance won the gubernatorial election. In the Confederacy Vance was a major proponent of individual rights and local self-government, often putting him at odds with the Confederate government of Jefferson Davis. For example, North Carolina was the only state to observe the right of habeas corpus and keep its courts fully functional during the war. Also, Vance refused to allow supplies smuggled into North Carolina by blockade runners to be given to other states until North Carolinians had their share. Vance's work for the aid and morale of the people, especially in mitigating the harsh Confederate conscription practices, inspired the nickname "War Governor of the South." Vance was re-elected in 1864.

Post-War career

Governor Vance was arrested by Federal forces on his birthday in May 1865 and spent time in prison in Washington, D.C. Per President Andrew Johnson's amnesty program, he filed an application for pardon on June 3, and was paroled on July 6.^[6] After his parole, he began practicing law in Charlotte, North Carolina. Among his clients was accused murderer Tom Dula, the subject of the folk song "Tom Dooley." Governor Vance was formally pardoned on March 11, 1867, though no formal charges had ever been filed against him leading to his arrest, during his imprisonment, nor during the period of his parole.^[6]

In 1870, the state legislature elected him to the United States Senate, but due to the restrictions placed on ex-Confederates by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, he was not allowed to serve. In 1876, Vance was elected Governor once again (during which time he focused on education), and in 1879 the legislature again elected him to the United States Senate. This time he was seated, and he served in the Senate until his death in 1894. After a funeral in the U.S. Capitol, Vance was buried in the Riverside Cemetery in Asheville.^[6]

Starting in about 1870, Vance gave a speech hundreds of times he called "The Scattered Nation," which praised the Jews and called for religious tolerance and freedom amongst all Americans. In 1880, Vance married Florence Steele Martin of Kentucky.^[7]^[8]

Quotes

About Vance

"He was the Mount Mitchell of all our great men, and in the affections and love of the people, he towered above them all. As ages to come will not be able to mar the grandeur and greatness of Mount Mitchell, so they will not be able to efface from the hearts and minds of the people the name of their beloved Vance."

– T. J. Jarvis, Governor from 1879 to 1885

By Vance

"The purpose of war is to explore each other."

Unconfirmed

"A vale of humility between two mountains of conceit."

Supposedly said by Vance about North Carolina. The two mountains of conceit are Virginia and South Carolina. This is also attributed to Alexander Hamilton, but probably predates both Hamilton and Vance.

Legacy

There are several monuments dedicated to Vance:

Vance Monument in Asheville, North Carolina, with the Merrill Lynch building in the rear

An obelisk similar to the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C. is dedicated to Vance in Pack Square, Asheville.
A statue on the south grounds of the North Carolina State Capitol in Raleigh
A bronze in the National Statuary Hall Collection in Washington, D.C.
A small monument located where his post-war home once stood (1865–1894), at Sixth and College Streets, in Charlotte
One of the administrative buildings at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is named Vance Hall in his honor.
A portrait of Vance hangs behind the President's chair of The Dialectic and Philanthropic Societies of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
His birthplace is a state historic site in Weaverville.^[9]

Several locations and schools in North Carolina bear Vance's name:

The town of Zebulon, in Wake County
The town of Vanceboro, North Carolina
Vance County on the North Carolina – Virginia border
Zebulon B. Vance High School in Charlotte
Zeb Vance Elementary School in Kittrell
Vance Masonic Lodge A.F.&A.M. #293 in Weaverville

In World War II, the United States liberty ship SS Zebulon B. Vance was named in his honor.[71]

March 4, 1896: Willis Ralph Goodlove (March 22, 1869-April 8, 1953) married

Myrtle Isabelle Andrews, March 4, 1896. She died August 29,

1962, at age 86 years. Both are buried at Jordan’s Grove Cemetery (Bk. II, F-87). Their children were: Wallace Harold (Bk.II, F-88), Ethel Vinetta, Bessie Marie, Wilma Laura, Mary lone,

William Paul, Gladys Lavona, and Kenneth Ivan.^{^[72]}

^{^[73]}

Willis R. Goodlove and Myrtle J. Andrews were united in marriage March 4 at Alburnett by Reverend J. P. Fisher, pastor of the Methodist Church. Mr. and Mrs. Goodlove were born and raised near their present home about 5 miles east of Alburnett and they have a large circle of friends to unite in congratulations.^{^[74]}

March 4, 1942: Enterprise,Marcus Island

March 4, 1942

At a meeting in Berlin, Dannecker tells Eichmann and other officials of the Gestpo’s Jewish Affairs Department of “the necessity to finally propose to the French governemtn something truly positive, for example, the deportation of severlal thousand Jews.”^{^[75]}

March 4, 1942: Baranovichi is a city in the Brest Province of western Belarus. Soon after the beginning of World War II the town was occupied by the Soviet Union. The local Jewish population of 9,000 was joined by approximately 3,000 Jewish refugees from the Polish areas occupied by Germany. After the start of Operation Barbarossa the town was seized by the Wehrmacht on June 25, 1941. In August of the same year a ghetto was created in the town, with more than 12,000 Jews kept in tragic conditions in six buildings at the outskirts. Between March 4 and December 14, 1942, the entire Jewish population of the ghetto was sent to various German concentration camps and killed in gas chambers. Only approximately 250 survived the war.^[2]

March 4, 1943: Mindla Gottlieb, born Geb Goldhammer, October 8, 1880 in Boryslaw, Galizien. Mitte, Kaiserstr. 22-24; 34. Resided Berlin. Deportation: from Berlin, March 4, 1943, Auschwitz. Place of death: Auschwitz, missing^{^[76]}

Convoys 50 and 51, March 4 and 6, 1943.

Background and Origin

In 1970, the former Nazi diplomat Ernst Achenbach was removed from his position as representative of the Federal Republic to the European Economic Commission in Brussels, after his responsibility in the anti-Jewish campaign in France was brought to public attention…. In particular it was shown the role that he played in the deportation of 2,000 Jews on March 4 and 6, 1943, and the fact that these two convoys were constituted as reprisals for an attack against German officers.

Two days after an assassination of February 13 which took the lives of two German officers, Ernst Achenbach, head of the political section of the German Embassy, cabled to Berlin (CXXVI-a-92).

No. 1701, February 15, 1943.

On February 13, 1943, about 11:10 PM, Lieutenant Colonel Winkler and Major Nussbaum, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe’s Third Division, were shot from behind while walking from their office to their hotel a short distance from the Louvre Bridge over the Seine, which they had just crossed. Winkler was wounded by three bullets; Nussbaum by two. They died the same night. Seven 7.65mm cartridges were found near the scene of the crime, and presumably came from the same gun. The whereabouts of the assassins is being investigated. The first reprisal will be the arrest and deportation of 2,000 Jews.

ACHENBACH

Reprinted here is a passage from the book “Wherever they may be (Partout ou ils seront; pp. 107-9) which shows that, contrary to what Achenbach pretended after the was, the reprisals for this attack were not a simple bluff, but rather an operation which brought two thousand Jews to extermination:

“On the day after that telegram, February 16, 1943, the chief of the Gestap’s Bureau for Jewish Affairs, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Heinz Rothke, wrote in a memorandum: ‘In a reprisal for the murder on February 13, 1943, of two German air force officers, 15,000 able bodied men had to be deported from France, and thousands of Jews had to make up that quota.’

“On February 23, 1943, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Kurt Lischka, commander of the Paris SD-Security Police, informed his Brussels counterpart that ‘the Paris Police Commissioner was notified through my intervention on February 14, 1943, that as a reprisal, 2,000 Jews between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five were to be arrested and shipped to the concentrationcamp for Jews at Drancy.’

“On February 24, Rothke reported to Lischka on a conversation with Sauts, the chief of staff of Police Commissionner Leguay, about ‘the solution of the Jewish problem in France, and the Italians’ attitude toward the Jewish problem.

‘Sauts replied to me that the arrest of 2,000 Jews by the French police in the zone formerly and presently occupied in order to effect the measures of reprisals ordered by threw Paris Commander [Lischka] was underway. Before February 23, more than 1,500 able bodied Jews between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, in each precinct. They were found either at liberty (registered addresses or not) or in the reception centers of the Social Service for Foreigners, or even in orphanages such as Chateau de la Hille in Haute-Garonne. Two contingents of one hundred persons were sent from the Noe and Vernet Camps directly to Gurs…

‘From all corners of the old unoccupied zone persons arrested were sent as swiftly as possible to the camp at Gurs. The total number of newcomers was far from enough, and so a significant number of those already at Gurs had to be included.

‘First Deportation- The screening for the first deportation, on February 26, was more rapid than careful. Everyone, as his name was called, was earmarked for deportation right away, even the sick and infirm. The only nationalities exempted were Hungarians and Turks. For the first time [from Gurs] Belgians, Dutch, Luxenburgers, and Greeks were included. The first convoy consisted of 975 men.

‘Second Deportation- The second deportation took place on the night of March 23. It numbered 770. Naturally it included a sizable number of former army volunteers, men who had been wounded in action, and even some who had been decorated.

‘The number of deportees thus far was 1,745, but the required number was 1,850. Consequently, the quota had to be filled en route. According to some information I have not been able to verify, it appears that four hundred persons who had been rounded up at Nerxon were put on the train that left Oloron on March 3. At any rate, it appears that the number of 1,850 was considerably exceeded.

“Among the countless testimonies from Jews as to their personal sufferings, we found one from a Hungariran interned at Gurs that confirms the above report:

‘Deportations began in early February 1943. A large number, about 150, of guards suddenly appeared. They were assigned to the blocks of huts in which were penned internees from other camps, especially for the one of Nexon. The deportation was to include all men of German, Polish, Austrian and Czech nationality up to the age of sixty five. At that time I was sixty four years , nine and a half months old; but fortuanately I was able, on the strength of my birth certificate, to pass myself off as a Hungarian, and in the general confusion the details were never checked out. ‘Among the deportees were a large number of Poles and Czechs who had fought in the French army or in the Foreign Legion. These too were handed over to the Germans. The fellow in the bed next to mine, a Germnan rabbi, Dr. Rosenwasser, was to be sixty five in six days, but he was deported just the same.

‘The deportation went on for two days. Two guards came after each of the ‘called’ and forced him to pack in five minutes, so impossible a task that many possessions were left behind.

‘ The internees destined for deportation were taken under heavgy guard to Block E, each carrying his belongings. Those who were allowed to remain in the hell of Gurs were invied by the deportees as the luckiest of men. All through the night you could hear women weeping in despair, for many had not time even to say good-bye to their sons and husbands. Several could not find outr whether their husbands had been deported. My wife did not sleep a wink for two nights for fear that I had been deported. On the day after the deportation the women were allowed to visit our block, and their sobs and cries whenb they saw their husbands’ beds empty were dreadful to hear.”^{^[77]}

Convoy 50, March 4, 1943

This list is in very poor condition. Over time the names have rubbed off the onion skin, and it is very difficult to decipher them.

Counting deportees by nationality we found 377 Poles, 268 Germans, 99 Austrians, 91 Russians, and 30 Dutch among the largest groups. One person was from Java.

There were 937 men and 66 women, according to the list. Only five children were in this convoy. Almost the entire quota of Convoys 50 and 51 was male, as described above.

The list is in two parts:

1. Gurs, 888 deportees, all men between 16 and 65.

2. Drancy, 136 deportees, with 22 crossed out (leaving 114), The sublist included the 66 women. Most of the people resided in or around Paris.

On board Convoy 50 was Leizer Gotlieb born November 6, 1891 from Russie, (Russia), and Charles Gottlieb, born May 13, 1898 from Fulda, Germany. ^{^[78]}

The routine telex, dated March 4 (XXVc-211), was signed by Rothke. It annoced to the recipients, among them Eichmaann, that on the same day 1,000 Jews left the station at Le Bourget/Drancy (see section below on destination) for Cholm, the word Auschwitz is crossed out, under the supervision of Lieutenant Ott.

One deportee, Jacob Silber, escaped from this convoy. His escape and transfer to Auschwitz after drecapture are related in documents XXVc-216 and 220.^{^[79]}

Convoy 50 took close to a thousand people, some to Maidanek and the great majority to Sobibor, the former for immediate killing and the latter for slave labor. Indications are that most were killed at Sobibor; only four people from this convoy were alive at the end of the war. Convoy 50 included 10 children.^{^[80]}

March 4-9, 1943: Nearly all the 4,000 Jews of Bulgarian Thrace are arrested and sent to Treblinka.^{^[81]}

March 4, 2012

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At the Nature Center at Moraine Hills State Park I met Steve who gave me a tour of the facilities. He is a volunteer and his help and time was deeply appreciated.

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Video of the Sandhill Cranes and Sherri.

Video of the Sandhill Cranes.

A pair of Sandhill Cranes in the distance.

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A pair of Sandhill Cranes at Moraine Hills State Park. They made quite a loud noise when we approached their area.

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[1] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[2] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[3] mike@abcomputers.com

[4] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[5] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[6] http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1492

[7] beginshttp://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1570

[8] On This Day in America by John Wagman.

[9] That Dark and Bloody River by Allan W. Eckart, page xxvii.

[10] On This Day in America by John Wagman

[11] http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/paboundary.html

[12] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[13] http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/ice_ages.html

[14] Genome, The autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters by Matt Ridley, page192

[15] Scottish Rite News, September 1997. In the Beginning by Harry Stouse.

[16] The Jews of the United States, Hasia R. Diner, page 39-40.

[17] The Changing Face of Anti-Semitism From Ancient Times to the Present Day by Walter Laqueur page 58. Your People, My People by A. Roy Eckardt, page 16.

[18] America before Columbus, NTGEO, 11/22/2009.

[19] Glacial Park, McHenry County, IL February, 19, 2012.

[20] Glacial Park, McHenry, IL February 19, 2012.

[21] http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/wv/Hardy/harhistory.html

[22] http://exhibits.museum.state.il.us/exhibits/athome/1700/timeline/index.html

[23]Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[24] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, Mchenry, IL

[25] Jeff Goodlove, familytreemaker

[26][26] At the time this deed was dated, it may be observed and is reasonably true, that Richard Stephenson (step-father of William and Valentine Carawford), had become weary of his work at the bloomer, after he had already spent 10 to 20 of his best years in partnership at the ironworks. No records are available to show there were any change in this partnership. All we know is, that he and his wife Onnor were selling by deed, to John Carlyle and George William Fairfad, in 1761-1762. Richard and Onnour Stephenson had complete control at this time, since they alone were the grantors, with their names and marks appearing at the conclusion of this instrument.

Apparently Richard Stephenson was failing in health at this time, as three years later we find him making his last will and testament.

From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, 1969, page 69-70.

[27]One of the grantees mentioned in this historical document and having a strong relationship to the Washington family, was George William Fairfax. John Carlyle had married sarah Fairfax, sister of Lawrence Washington’s wife, ‘nn (Fairfax) Washington.

From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, by Grace U. Emahiser , 1969. pp. 68-69.

[28] Washington’s Journal, From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, by Grace U. Emahiser, 1969, page 108.

[29] GW lent Crawford £5 for his journey, which the captain repaid upon his re turn to Mount Vernon later in the month (Ledger A, 302, ).

[30][30] At the time this deed was dated, it may be observed and is reasonably true, that Richard Stephenson (step-father of William and Valentine Carawford), had become weary of his work at the bloomer, after he had already spent 10 to 20 of his best years in partnership at the ironworks. No records are available to show there were any change in this partnership. All we know is, that he and his wife Onnor were selling by deed, to John Carlyle and George William Fairfad, in 1761-1762. Richard and Onnour Stephenson had complete control at this time, since they alone were the grantors, with their names and marks appearing at the conclusion of this instrument.

Apparently Richard Stephenson was failing in health at this time, as three years later we find him making his last will and testament.

From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, 1969, page 69-70.

[31]One of the grantees mentioned in this historical document and having a strong relationship to the Washington family, was George William Fairfax. John Carlyle had married sarah Fairfax, sister of Lawrence Washington’s wife, ‘nn (Fairfax) Washington.

From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, by Grace U. Emahiser , 1969. pp. 68-69.

[32] (Washington writings. From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford, by Grace U. Emahiser, 1969, page 121).

[33] The Complete Guide to Boston’s Freedom Trail, Third edition by Charles Bahne, page 5.

[34] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/american-forces-occupy-dorchester-heights

[35] GW had called a meeting of the officers of the Virginia Regiment at Winchester on 4 Mar. to report on the trip down the Ohio River that he had made the previous fall (Va. Gaz., P&D, 31 Jan., 7 Feb., and 14 Feb. 1771). Triplets: the ordinary of James and William Carr Lane at Newgate (no Centreville), Va.

[36] Before GW left Greenway Court, he obtained a grant from Lord Fairfax for the unclaimed land on Dogue Run he had surveyed on 24 Mar. 1770, a total of 201/2 acres (Lord Fairfax’s grant to GW, 4 Mar. 1771, Northern Neck Deeds and Grants, Book 1, 187, Vi Microfilm). This land gave him control of most of the area around his new dams and upper millrace, but a portion of the race still infringed upon William Harrison’s patent, a problem that was not resolved until he exchanged some small strips of land there with William Triplett 18 May 1785.

[37] Annals of Southwestern Pennsylvania, By Lewis Clark Walkinshaw, Volume II, pg.115.

[38] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[39] Philadelphia, Art Color Card Distributors.

[40] (History Bourbon etc., p. 249) Chronology of Benjamin Harrison compiled by Isobel Stebbins Giuvezan. Afton, Missouri, 1973 http://www.shawhan.com/benharrison.html

[41] (History Bourbon etc., p. 250) BENJAMIN HARRISON 1750 – 1808 A History of His Life And of Some of the Events In American History in Which He was Involved By Jeremy F. Elliot 1978 http://www.shawhan.com/benharrison.html

[42] (Harrison County Deed Bk. 1, p. 31) BENJAMIN HARRISON 1750 – 1808 A History of His Life And of Some of the Events In American History in Which He was Involved By Jeremy F. Elliot 1978 http://www.shawhan.com/benharrison.html

[43]

[44] Scottish Rite Temple, Milwaukee WI

[45] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[46] (Ancestors of Forrest Roger Garnett pge. 454.21)

[47] Wikipedia.com

[48] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/thomas-jefferson-is-elected

[49] Since Uriah Springer was the Power of Attorney for Moses Crawford, Sr. (son of Lt. John Crawford and grandson of Col. William Crawford), this may have been the stretch of land Moses was entitled to. Probably was sold by Uriah Springer and the amount turned over to Moses Crawford, Sr., as part of his share.

Uriah Springer, (who was Power of Attorney to Moses Crawfored’s share of Lt. John Crawfor’s estate), had a son, Uriah Springer. The records of Brown County, Ohio, indicate that young Uriah Springer was collecting bounty lands belonging to his own father, (who was the second husband of Sarah, daughter of Col. William Crawford). Uriah Springer, Sr. randed as a Captain. Young Uriah Springer was a Justice of the Peace and he and his wife Nancy, lived at Williamsburg (which is in present Clermont Couynty, Ohio), on East Fork of the Little Miami River, and where many of the early transactions were recorded. Note: the relationship between young Uriah Springer and Moses Crawford, Sr., would be first cousins, since Moses and Moses Crawford, Sr., would be first cousins, since Moses father, John, was abrother to young Uriah’s mother, Sarah. From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford by Grace U. Emahiser, 1969, p. 187.

[50] From River Clyde to Tymochtee and Col. William Crawford by Grace U. Emahiser, 1969, pp. 187-189.

[51] www.frontierfolk.net/ramsha_research/families/Stephenson.rtf

[52] https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/18/18.US.207.html

[53] http://www.milestonedocuments.com/document_detail.php?id=49&more=timeline

[54] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Jackson

[55] Timetable of Cherokee Removal.

[56] http://thisdayinjewishhistory.blogspot.com/

[57] http://www.history.com/topics/william-henry-harrison

[58] "William H. Harrison Quick Facts," Microsoft’ Encarta’ Encyclopedia 2000. b 1993-1999 Microsoft Corporation. All

[59] Ancestors of Forrest Roger Garnett p. 910.12

[60] Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000653

[61] The Journal of the Masonic Society, Autumn 2010, Issue 10.

[62] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/lincoln-inaugurated

[63] ON This Day in America by John Wagman.

[64] From Algiers the Twenty-fourth moved by rail to Berwick Bay

[65] “A ball has passed between my body and the right arm which supported him, cutting through his chest from shoulder to shoulder. There was no more to be done for him and I left him to his rest. I have never mended that hole in my sleeve. I wonder if a soldier ever does mend a bullet hole in his coat?” Clara Barton at Antietam, The Civil War 2010 Calendar.

[66] William Harrison Goodlove Civil War diary by Jeff Goodlove

[67] (Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Part II Record of Events Volume 20 Serial no. 32. Broadfoot Publishing Company Wilmington, NC 1995.)

[68] UNION IOWA VOLUNTEERS, 24th Regiment, Iowa Infantry: http://www.itd.nps.gov/cwss/template.cfm?unitname=24th%20Regiment%2C%20Iowa%20Infantry&unitcode=UIA0024RI

[69] Lincoln Cantata, by Gyula Fekete, For the St. Charles Singers.

[70] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/lincoln-inaugurated-for-a-second-term

[71] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zebulon_Baird_Vance

[72] Winton Goodlove:A History of Central City Ia and the Surrounding Area Book ll 1999

[73] Linda Peterson, June 12, 2011

[74] Winton Goodlove papers.

[75] French Children of the Holocaust, A Memorial, by Serge Klarsfeld, page 28.

[76] [1] Gedenkbuch, Opfer der Verfolgung der Juden unter der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft in Deutschland 1933-1945. 2., wesentlich erweiterte Auflage, Band II G-K, Bearbeitet und herausgegben vom Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 2006, pg. 1033-1035,.

{2}Der judishchen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus

“Ihre Namen mogen nie vergessen werden!”

[2]Memorial Book: Victims of the Persecution of Jews under the National Socialist Oppression in Germany, 1933-1945

[77] Memorial to the Jews Deported from France, 1942-1944 by Serge Klarsfeld, page 392-394.

[78] Memorial to the Jews Deported from France, 1942-1944 by Serge Klarsfeld, page 399.

[79] Memorial to the Jews Deported from France, 1942-1944 by Serge Klarsfeld, page 395

[80] French Children of the Holocaust, A memorial by Serge Klarsfeld, page 406.

[81] Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, Editor, page 1775

[82] Nature Center, Moraine Hill State Park, McHenry, IL

[83] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[84] Nature Center , Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[85] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry IL.

[86] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[87] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[88] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[89] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[90] Nature Center, Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[91] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[92] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[93] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[94] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[95] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[96] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[97] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[98]Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[99] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[100] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[101] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[102] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

[103] Moraine Hills State Park, McHenry, IL

This Day in Goodlove History

Monday, March 4, 2013

This Day in Goodlove History, March 4

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